《尼各马可伦理学》译本考

按：笔者误入此伦理学一书，发现译本众多，故摘选《尼各马可伦理学》[卷一]（Nicomachean Ethics, book I）部分段落做一次中英译本考据与对比。功底有限，未收录完备，此文仅供参考。选取的译本如下：

[3]

苗译：
每人对自己所知的事情都会作出很好的判断，对于这些事情他是个好裁判员。因而，在个别方面受过教育的人在这个方面能够很好地判断，而在一切方面受过教育的人则能够作一般意义上的判断。所以政治学不是青年人本应学习的课程，他们对生活尚无实践经验，而道理却是来自生活经验并说明生活经验。此外，他们还为情感所左右，学不到任何有益的事情。因为这门科学的目的不是知识而是实践。青年人不但在岁月上年轻，而且在品格上也幼稚。他们的缺点不在于少经历了些岁月，而在于纵情使气，在生活上追求那些个别的东西。他们和那些不知约束自己的人一样，对于他们说来知识等于不知，对于那些使欲求服从于理性的人，这门科学在他们的行为和活动上却有所帮助。关于听讲以及应当如何进行论证，我们设定了某种前提，就把这些当作引言罢。

廖译：
一个人可以对他熟悉了的那些事物作出正确的判断，在这些事物上他是一个好的判断者。所以，对于某个题材判断得好的是在那个题材上受过特殊教育的人，在事物总体上判斯得好的人是受过全面教育的人。所以青年人不适合听政治学。他们对人生的行为缺少经验，而人的行为恰恰是政治学的前提与题材。此外，青年人受感情左右，他学习政治学将既不得要领，又无所收获，因为政治学的目的不是知识而是行为。一个人无论是在年纪上年轻还是在道德上稚嫩，都不适合学习政治学。他们的缺点不在于少经历了岁月，而在于他们的生活与欲求受感情宰制。他们与不能自制者一样，对于他们知等于不知。但是对于那些其期求和行为合于逻各斯的人，对于这些题材的知识将于他大有搭助。作为开篇的话，关于什么人适合学习这门学问，应当以什么方式来研究它，以及这种研究的目的是什么，我们就说到这里。

H. Rackham:
Again, each man judges correctly those matters with which he is acquainted; it is of these that he is a competent critic. To criticize a particular subject, therefore, a man must have been trained in that subject: to be a good critic generally, he must have had an all-round education. Hence the young are not fit to be students of Political Sciences For they have no experience of life and conduct, and it is these that supply the premises and subject matter of this branch of philosophy. And moreover they are led by their feelings; so that they will study the subject to no purpose or advantage, since the end of this science is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether they are young in years or immature in character: the defect is not a question of time, it is because their life and its various aims are guided by feeling; for to such persons their knowledge is of no use, any more than it is to persons of defective self-restraint. But Moral Science may be of great value to those who guide their desires and actions by principle. Let so much suffice by way of introduction the student of the subject, the spirit in which our conclusions are to be received, and the object that we set before us.

D. Ross:
Now each man judges well the things he knows, and of these he is a good judge. And so the man who has been educated in a subject is a good judge of that subject, and the man who has received an all-round education is a good judge in general. Hence a young man is not a proper hearer of lectures on political science;for he is inexperienced in the actions that occur in life, but its discussions start from these and are about these; and, further, since he tends to follow his passions, his study will be vain and unprofitable, because the end aimed at is not knowledge but action. And it makes no difference whether he is young in years or youthful in character; the defect does not depend on time, but on his living, and pursuing each successive object, as passion directs. For to such persons, as to the incontinent, knowledge brings no profit; but to those who desire and act in accordance with reason, knowledge about such matters will be of great benefit. These remarks about the student, the sort of treatment to be expected, and the purpose of the inquiry, may be taken as our preface.

R. Crisp:
Each person judges well what he knows, and is a good judge of this. So, in any subject, the person educated in it is a good judge of that subject, and the person educated in all subjects is a good judge without qualification. This is why a young person is not fitted to hear lectures on political science, since our discussions begin from and concern the actions of life, and of these he has no experience. Again, because of his tendency to follow his feelings, his studies will be useless and to no purpose, since the end of the study is not knowledge but action. It makes no difference whether he is young in years or juvenile in character, since the deficiency is not related to age, but occurs because of his living and engaging in each of his pursuits according to his feelings. For knowledge is a waste of time for people like this, just as it is for those without self-restraint. But knowledge of the matters that concern political science will prove very beneficial to those who follow reason both in shaping their desires and in acting. Let these comments – about the student, how our statements are to be taken, and the task we have set ourselves – serve as our preamble.

H.G. Apostle:
Now a man judges well the things he knows [well], and it is of these that he is a good judge; so a good judge in a subject is one who is educated in that subject, and a good judge without qualification is one who is educated in every subject. In view of this, a young man is not a proper student of [lectures on] politics; for he is inexperienced in actions concerned with human life, and discussions proceed from [premises concerning those actions] and deal with [those actions]. Moreover, being disposed to follow his passions, he will listen in vain and without benefit, since the end of such discussions is not knowledge but action.25 (And it makes no difference whether he is young in age or youthful in character, for his deficiency arises not from lack of time but because he lives and pursues things according to passion). For knowledge about such matters in such a man, as in those who are incontinent, becomes unprofitable; but in those who form their desires and act according to [right] reason, it becomes very beneficial. Let so much, then, be taken as a preface concerning (a) the kind of student, (b) the manner in which the discussion of the subject should be accepted, and (c) the subject of the inquiry which is before us.

[4]

苗译：
最好是从所知道的东西开始，而所知道的东西有双重意义，或者是为我们所知道的，或者是在一般的意义上所知道的。对我们来说，研究还是从我们所知道的东西开始为好。所以那些想学习高尚和公正的人，也就是学习政治事务的人，最好是从习性或品德开始。始点或本原是一种在其充分显现后，就不须再问为什么的东西。像这样的人也就具有，或者很容易获得这种始点和本原，对那些与此无缘的人，请他听听赫西俄德的诗句吧。
自己想过一切的在人中最高，
那些肯听良言的人也算还好，
只有那些自己什么也不来想，
对他人什么也不听的人才最糟。

廖译：
但已知的东西是在两种意义上已知的：一是对我们而言的，二是就其自身而言的。也许我们应当从对我们而言是已知的东西出发。所以，希望自己有能力学习高尚[高贵]与公正即学习政治学的人，必须有一个良好的道德品性。因为一个人对一件事情的性质的感觉本身就是一个始点。如果它对于一个人是足够明白的，他就不需再问为什么。而受过良好道德教育的人就已经具有或是很容易获得这些始点。至手那些既不具有，也没有能力获得这些始点的人，他仔应当听一听赫西阿德的诗句：
自己有头脑最好，
肯听别人的劝告也不错，
那些既无头脑又不肯听从的人
是最低等的人。

H. Rackham:
Now no doubt it is proper to start from the known. But ‘the known’ has two meanings—‘what is known to us,’ which is one thing, and ‘what is knowable in itself,’ which is another. Perhaps then for usa at all events it is proper to start from what is known to us. This is why in order to be a competent student of the Right and Just, and in short of the topics of Politics in general, the pupil is bound to have been well trained in his habits. For the starting-point or first principle is the fact that a thing is so; if this be satisfactorily ascertained, there will be no need also to know the reason why it is so. And the man of good moral training knows first principles already, or can easily acquire them. As for the person who neither knows nor can learn, let him hear the words of Hesiodb:
Best is the man who can himself advise;
He too is good who hearkens to the wise;
But who, himself being witless, will not heed.
Another’s wisdom, is worthless indeed.

D. Ross:
For, while we must begin with what is evident, things are evident in two ways — some to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin with things evident to us. Hence anyone who is to listen intelligently to lectures about what is noble and just and, generally, about the subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits. For the fact is a starting-point,* and if this is sufficiently plain to him, he will not need the reason as well; and the man who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting-points. And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the words of Hesiod:
Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart.
Another’s wisdom, is a useless wight.

R.Crisp:
For while we should begin from things known, they are known in two senses: known by us, and known without qualification. Presumably we have to begin from things known by us. This is why anyone who is going to be a competent student in the spheres of what is noble and what is just — in a word, politics – must be brought up well in his habits. For the first principle is the belief that something is the case, and if this is sufficiently clear, he will not need the reason why as well. Such a person is in possession of the first principles, or could easily grasp them. Anyone with neither of these possibilities open to him should listen to Hesiod:
This person who understands everything for himself is the best of all,
And noble is that one who heeds good advice.
But he who neither understands it for himself nor takes to heart
What he hears from another is a worthless man.

H.G. Apostle:
One should begin, of course, from what is familiar; but things are familiar in two ways, for some are familiar relative to us while others are familiar without qualification.3 Probably we should begin from things which are familiar relative to us. Accordingly, he who is to listen effectively to 5 lectures concerning noble and just things and, in general, to subjects dealt with by politics should be brought up well in ethical habits; for the beginning[here] is the fact, and if this fact should appear to be adequate, there will be no further need of the why of it. Such a man either has or can easily get principles.5 As for him who lacks both, let him listen to the words of Hesiod:
That man’s completely best who of himself
Thinks of all things, … and he is also good
Who trusts a good advisor; but the man
Who neither for himself can think nor, listening,
Takes what he hears to heart, this man is useless.

[5]

苗译：
那些崇尚名声，喜欢活动的人认为善就是荣誉。也可以说，这就是政治生活的目的。然而，对我们所求索的东西来说，这未免太浅薄了。因为这种善更多地在授予荣誉的人那里，而不在被授予荣誉的人。而我们则敢断言，善自身却是某种本己的、固有的、难于剥夺的东西。更进一步说，人们似乎是为了表明自身的善良而追求荣誉，至少是来自明智之人的夸奖和有识之士的赞誉，也就是为了德性的缘故追求赞誉。

廖译：
人和爱活动的人则把荣誉等同于幸福，因为荣誉可以说就是政治的生活的目的。然而对于我们所追求的善来说，荣誉显得太肤浅。因为荣誉取决于授子者而不是取决于接受者，而我们的直觉是，善是一个人的属己的、不易被拿走的东西。此外，人们追求荣誉似乎是为确证自己的优点，至少是，他们寻求从有智慧的人和认识他们的人那里得到荣誉，并且是因德性而得到荣誉。

H. Rackham:
Men of refinement, on the other hand, and men of action think that the Good is honour—for this may be said to be the end of the Life of Politics. But honour after all seems too superficial to be the Good for which we are seeking; since it appears to depend on those who confer it more than on him upon whom it is conferred, whereas we instinctively feel that the Good must be something proper to its possessor and not easy to be taken away from him. Moreover men’s motive in pursuing honour seems to be to assure themselves of their own merit; at least they seek to be honoured by men of judgement and by people who know them, that is, they desire to be honoured on the ground of virtue.

D. Ross:
A consideration of the prominent types of life shows that people of superior refinement and of active disposition identify happiness with honour; for this is, roughly speaking, the end of the political life. But it seems too superficial to be what we are looking for, since it is thought to depend on those who bestow honour rather than on him who receives it, but the good we divine to be something of one’s own and not easily taken from one. Further, men seem to pursue honour in order that they may be assured of their merit; at least it is by men of practical wisdom that they seek to be honoured, and among those who know them, and on the ground of their virtue.

R.Crisp:
Sophisticated people, men of action, see happiness as honour, since honour is pretty much the end of the political life. Honour, however, seems too shallow to be an object of our inquiry, since honour appears to depend more on those who honour than on the person honoured, whereas we surmise the good to be something of one’s own that cannot easily be taken away. Again, they seem to pursue honour in order to convince themselves of their goodness; at least, they seek to be honoured by people with practical wisdom, among those who are familiar with them, and for their virtue.

H.G. Apostle:
Men of culture and action seek a life of honor; for the end of political life is almost this. But this good appears rather superficial to be what is sought; for it is thought to depend on those who bestow rather than on those who receive honor, whereas we have a strong inner sense that the good is something which belongs to the man who possesses it and cannot be taken away from him easily. Further, men seem to pursue honor in order to assure themselves that they are good; at least, they seek to be honored (a) by men of prudence, and (b) among those who know them, and (c) on the basis of their virtue.

[7]

苗译：
我们说为其自身来追求的东西比为了他物的东西更为完满。那从来不因为他物而被选择，比时而由于自身，时而由于他物而被选择的东西更为完满。总而言之，只有那由自身而被选择，而永不为他物的目的才是最完满的。不论我们选择的是荣誉，是快乐，是理智，还是所有的德性，都通过它们自身（即或一无所得，我们还是选择它们中的每一个）。我们是为幸福而选择它们，通过它们我们得到幸福。看起来，只有这才有资格作为幸福，我们为了它本身而选取它，而永远不是因为其他别的什么。

廖译：
我们说，那些因自身而值得欲求的东西比那些因它物而值得欲求的东西更完善；那些从不因它物而值得欲求的东西比那些既因自身又因它物而值得欲求的东西更完善。所以，我们把那些始终因其自身而从不因它物而值得欲求的东西称为最完善的。与所有其他事物相比，幸福似乎最会被视为这样一种事物。因为，我们永远只是因它自身而从不因它物而选择它。而荣誉、快乐、努斯和每种德性，我们固然因它们自身故而选择它们（因为即使它们不带有进一步的好处我们也会选择它们)，但是我们也为幸福之故而选择它们。然而，却没有一个人是为着这些事物或其他别的什么而追求幸福。

H. Rackham:
it is clear that not all of them are final ends; whereas the Supreme Good seems to be something final. Consequently if there be some one thing which alone is a final end, this thing—or if there be several final ends, the one among them which is the most final—will be the Good which we are seeking. In speaking of degrees of finality, we mean that a thing pursued as an end in itself is more final than one pursued as a means to something else, and that a thing never chosen as a means to anything else is more final than things chosen both as ends in themselves and as means to that thing; and accordingly a thing chosen always as an end and never as a means we call absolutely final. Now happiness above all else appears to be absolutely final in this sense, since we always choose it for its own sake and never as a means to something else; whereas honour, pleasure, intelligence, and excellence in its various forms, we choose indeed for their own sakes (since we should be glad to have each of them although no extraneous advantage resulted from it), but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, in the belief that they will be a means to our securing it. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of honour, pleasure, etc., nor as a means to anything whatever other than itself.

D. Ross:
Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Now such a thing happiness, above all else, is held to be; for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else, but honour, pleasure, reason, and every virtue we choose indeed for themselves (for if nothing resulted from them we should still choose each of them), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, judging that through them we shall be happy. Happiness, on the other hand, no one chooses for the sake of these, nor, in general, for anything other than itself.

R.Crisp:
So if there is only one end that is complete, this will be what we are looking for, and if there are several of them, the most complete. We speak of that which is worth pursuing for its own sake as more complete than that which is worth pursuing only for the sake of something else, and that which is never worth choosing for the sake of something else as more complete than things that are worth choosing both in themselves and for the sake of this end. And so that which is always worth choosing in itself and never for the sake of something else we call complete without qualification. Happiness in particular is believed to be complete without qualification, since we always choose it for itself and never for the sake of anything else. Honour, pleasure, intellect, and every virtue we do indeed choose for themselves (since we would choose each of them even if they had no good effects), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, on the assumption that through them we shall live a life of happiness; whereas happiness no one chooses for the sake of any of these nor indeed for the sake of anything else.

H.G. Apostle:
Now what we maintain is this: that which is pursued for its own sake is more complete than that which is pursued for the sake of something else, and that which is chosen but never chosen for the sake of something else is more complete than other things which, though chosen for their own sake, are also chosen for the sake of this; and that which is complete without any qualification is that which is chosen always for its own sake and never for the sake of something else. Now happiness is thought to be such an end most of all, for it is this that we choose always for its own sake and never for the sake of something else; and as for honor and pleasure and intellect and every virtue, we choose them for their own sake (for we might choose each of them when nothing else resulted from them), but we also choose them for the sake of happiness, believing that through these we shall be happy. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of these, nor, in general, for the sake of some other thing.

[10]

苗译：
现在再让我们回到以前的难点，从那里也许可能找到解决现在问题的一点线索。如若“盖棺定论”，那就是说当一个人在享其天福的时候，不说他洪福齐天，而是在事情过去了才说。而在一个人幸福的时候，不去说出真实，岂不是荒唐之极吗？人们所以不愿承认活着的人幸福，在于命运的多变，而在他们看来，幸福却应是牢固难变的，不像机遇围绕着人们往复流转。一个人如若由着命运摆布，他显然要一会儿倒霉，一会儿幸福，所以我们经常把幸福比做空中楼阁，比做水上浮萍。或者，听从命运的摆布是不对的吗？在机遇里面并没有善和恶，人的生活却少不了这些，正如我们所说，合乎德性的实现活动，才是幸福的主导，其反面则导致不幸。

廖译：
我们先回过来谈第一个困难。因为它对我们正在考虑的问题也许有启发。姐果我们应当看到最后，应当到一个人死后再说他以前而不是现在是享得了福祉的，这显然十分荒谬。因为，我们竟由于顾虑运气的可能变故而不愿意说一个活着的人幸福，由于认为幸福是永恒的、不受可能的变故影响的，由于认为活着的人还可能经历某种变故，而不能在他还幸福的时候说出这一真实的事实。显然，如果遵循这种运气的观念，我们就要此时说一个人幸福，彼时说一个人不幸，就要把幸福的人说成是“一个福祸不定的存在”。所以，遵循这种观点看来是错误的。因为，幸福和不幸并不依赖于运气，尽管我们说过生活也需要运气。造成幸福的是合德性的活动，相反的活动则造成相反的结果。

H. Rackham:
But let us go back to our former difficulty, for perhaps it will throw light on the question we are now examining. If we are to look to the end, and congratulate a man when dead not as actually being blessed, but because he has been blessed in the past, surely it is strange if at the actual time when a man is happy that fact cannot be truly predicated of him, because we are unwilling to call the living happy owing to the vicissitudes of fortune, and owing to our conception of happiness as something permanent and not readily subject to change, whereas the wheel of fortune often turns full circle in the same person’s experience. For it is clear that if we are to be guided by fortune, we shall often have to call the same man first happy and then miserable; we shall make out the happy man to be a sort of ‘chameleon, or a house built on the sand. But perhaps it is quite wrong to be guided in our judgement by the changes of fortune, since true prosperity and adversity do not depend on fortune’s favours, although, as we said, our life does require these in addition; but it is the active exercise of our faculties in conformity with virtue that causes happiness, and the opposite activities its opposite.

D. Ross:
But we must return to our first difficulty; for perhaps by a consideration of it our present problem might be solved. Now if we must see the end and only then call a man blessed, not as being blessed but as having been so before, surely this is a paradox, that when he is happy the attribute that belongs to him is not to be truly predicated of him because we do not wish to call living men happy, on account of the changes that may befall them, and because we have assumed happiness to be something permanent and by no means easily changed, while a single man may suffer many turns of fortune’s wheel. For clearly if we were to follow his fortunes, we should often call the same man happy and again wretched, making the happy man out to be ‘a chameleon, and insecurely based’. Or is this following his fortunes quite wrong? Success or failure in life does not depend on these, but human life, as we said,1 needs these as well, while virtuous activities or their opposites are what determine happiness or the reverse.

R.Crisp:
But we should return to the original question, since considering it might shed light on the one now under discussion. If we must wait to see the end and only then call a person blessed, not as such but as having been so before, surely it is odd that – because we do not wish to call the living happy on account of possible changes in their fortunes, and because happiness is understood as something permanent and not at all liable to change, while the living experience many turns of the wheel – when he is happy, he will not be truly described as such? For clearly, if we were to follow his fortunes, we should often call the same person happy and then wretched, representing the happy person as a kind of chameleon, or as having an unsound foundation. Or is following a person’s fortunes the wrong thing to do? For they are not what doing well or badly depend on, though, as we said, they are required as complementary to a fully human life. What really matter for happiness are activities in accordance with virtue, and for the contrary of happiness the contrary kind of activities.

H.G. Apostle:
But let us return to the first problem, for perhaps from its consideration we might be able to perceive the latter problem also.Now if we are to look to the end and only then consider a man as blessed, not as being then blessed but as having led a blessed life earlier, is it not absurd to say that when the man is happy it would not be true to regard him as happy, giving as the reason the fact that we do not wish to call a man happy because of the possible future changes and (2) our belief (a) that happiness is something enduring and by no means easily changed but (b) that the fortunes of a man often take many turns? For it is clear that if we were to go along with one’s fortunes, we would have to call the same man at one time ‘happy’ and at another ‘wretched’, representing a happy man as a sort of chameleon and with an unsound foundation. It would not be right at all, then, to base happiness on a man’s fortunes. For goodness or badness in a man does not depend on these, although, as we have stated, human life needs them, too; but it is the activities in accordance with virtue which play the dominant role in happiness, while the contrary activities are dominant in the contrary of happiness.

[11]

苗译：
如果说一个人的后代以及所有的亲友的命运都与他完全无关，那也未免太绝情了。同时这也与人们的意见相反。然而机遇种类繁多，各不相同，而且有着不同程度的差异，对每一个都详加分析，不免流于烦琐，而且势必陷于无穷。只来概括地，简略地说一说，也就足够了。甚至一个人自己的坏命运，有的会给生活带来灾难，有的也无关大局。对所有的亲友也是这样。不过，各种苦难不论对生者还是对死者的影响，与悲剧所咏叹的、舞台上表演的违法和罪恶却大有区别。这一区别必须估计到，更应看到，死者到底能否感受善和恶的问题尚未澄清。不过从这些论点看来，即或善恶能影响他们，那么不论就整体而言，还是相对于事物而言这种影响都是十分微弱的。即或不至如此，那么它们的数量和质量也不足把不幸变得幸福，或者把享天福之人的天福剥夺掉。看来，亲友们的善行和恶行对死者确有某种影响，不过不足以大到使幸福变为不幸，或使不幸变为幸福罢了。

廖译：
如果说一位已故者的后人或朋友的运气对于他的幸福完金没有影响，又未免太过绝情，并且也与人们所持的观点相悖。但是生命中的变故是大量的，不仅性质不同，程度上也有差异。逐一地详加讨论将使讨论旷日持久、永无终结。对此作一概括的讨论就己足够了。既然我们自己的意外事件也有的会对生命造成重大影响，有的则不甚重要，朋友的各种意外也是如此。而且，变故是发生在一个人在世时还是发生在他死后也是很不同的。这种区别远远大于被认为是真实地发生的罪行和只在舞台上表演的罪行间的区别。我们应当考虑到这些区别。也许，还应当把对已故者真能分享善与恶的怀疑也考虑进来。这些考虑似乎表明，即使善与恶的确影响到已故者，这种影响不论就其本身还是就对于他们的作用而言都只是微乎其微的。或者如果不是无关紧要的，这种影响的程度与性质也不足以使一个不幸者变得幸福，或使一个享得福祉的人失去幸福。所以，已故者似乎在一定程度上受朋友的好运或不幸的影响。但是这种影响达不到使幸福者不幸或使不幸者幸福的程度。

H. Rackham:
That the happiness of the dead is not influenced at all by the fortunes of their descendants and their friends in general seems too heartless a doctrine, and contrary to accepted beliefs. But the accidents of life are many and diverse, and vary in the degree in which they affect us. To distinguish between them in detail would clearly be a long and indeed endless undertaking, and a general treatment in outline may perhaps be enough. Even our own misfortunes, then, though in some cases they exercise considerable weight and influence upon the course of our lives, in other cases seem comparatively unimportant; and the same is true of the misfortunes of our friends of all degrees. Also it makes a great difference whether those who are connected with any occurrence are alive or dead, much more so than it does in a tragedy whether the crimes and horrors are supposed to have taken place beforehand or are enacted on the stage. We ought therefore to take this difference also into account, and still more perhaps the doubt that exists whether the dead really participate in good or evil at all. For the above considerations seem to show that even if any good or evil does penetrate to them, the effect is only small and trifling, either intrinsically or in relation to them, or if not trifling, at all events not of such magnitude and kind as to make the unhappy happy or to rob the happy of their blessedness. It does then appear that the dead are influenced in some measure by the good fortune of their friends, and likewise by their misfortunes, but that the effect is not of such a kind or degree as to render the happy unhappy or vice versa.

D. Ross:
That the fortunes of descendants and of all a man’s friends should not affect his happiness at all seems a very unfriendly doctrine, and one opposed to the opinions men hold; but since the events that happen are numerous and admit of all sorts of difference, and some come more near to us and others less so, it seems a long — nay, an infinite — task to discuss each in detail; a general outline will perhaps suffice. If, then, as some of a man’s own misadventures have a certain weight and influence on life while others are, as it were, lighter, so too there are differences among the misadventures of our friends taken as a whole, and it makes a difference whether the various sufferings befall the living or the dead (much more even than whether lawless and terrible deeds are presupposed in a tragedy or done on the stage*), this difference also must be taken into account; or rather, perhaps, the fact that doubt is felt whether the dead share in any good or evil. For it seems, from these considerations, that even if anything whether good or evil penetrates to them, it must be something weak and negligible, either in itself or for them, or if not, at least it must be such in degree and kind as not to make happy those who are not happy nor to take away their blessedness from those who are. The good or bad fortunes of friends, then, seem to have some effects on the dead, but effects of such a kind and degree as neither to make the happy not happy nor to produce any other change of the kind.

R.Crisp:
Nevertheless, the idea that the fortunes of a person’s descendants and all his friends have no effect on him seems excessively heartless and contrary to what people think. But, given that the things that happen are many and various, some affecting us more and others less, it looks as if it would be a long – even interminable – job to distinguish them in detail. It will be enough, perhaps, to give a general outline. If, then, as some of a person’s misfortunes have a certain weight and influence on his life, while others seem lighter, so too there are similar differences between the fortunes of all his friends; and if it makes a difference whether each of these misfortunes happens to people when they are alive or when they are dead (a greater difference even than whether the dreadful crimes in tragedies happened before the play or are perpetrated on the stage); then this difference must be taken into account in our reasoning, or rather, perhaps, the fact that there is a puzzle about whether the dead can partake of any good or evil. For it does seem, from what we have said, that if anything good or bad does actually affect them, it will be pretty unimportant and insignificant, either in itself or in relation to them; or if not, it must at least be of such an extent and kind as not to make happy those who are not happy already nor to deprive those who are happy of their being blessed. So when friends do well, and likewise when they do badly, it does seem to have some effect on the dead. But it is of such a nature and degree as neither to make not happy those who are happy, nor anything like that.

H.G. Apostle:
As for the fortunes that may befall a man’s descendants and all his friends, to regard them as not contributing anything at all appears very unwelcome and contrary to the opinions of men. On the other hand, since they are many and differ in various ways, some of them coming more close to him while others less so, to discuss each of them individually appears to be a long and endless task, but to speak of them taken as a whole and sketchily may perhaps be sufficient. Now just as some of a man’s mishaps have some weight or influence on his life, while others seem to be rather light, so the things that happen to all of a man’s friends are similarly related. So since the sufferings which affect the living differ from those which affect the dead much more than the unlawful and terrible deeds which are acted on the stage differ from those which are presupposed in a tragedy, this difference too must be taken into acount,9 and perhaps more so in discussing the problem whether the dead share in any good or its opposite. For, even if any good or its opposite penetrates to them, this seems, from the remarks just made, to be weak or small, either without qualification or to them, or else to be at least so much and of such a kind as not to make happy those who are unhappy nor to deprive happy men of their blessedness. Good actions of friends, then, and bad actions similarly, appear to contribute something to the dead, but they do so to such a degree and extent as not to change happy into unhappy men or to make some other such change.

By Fang Wang