The Road to Serfdom Booknote

/ by Friedrich Hayek

Introduction

Few discoveries are more irritating than those which expose the pedigree of ideas. —Lord Acton 很少有发现比那些暴露思想血统的发现更令人恼火的了。——阿克顿勋爵
An accidental combination of experience and interest will often reveal events to one man under aspects which few yet see.
Though the influences to which the trend of thought is subject in most civilized nations are to a large extent similar, they do not necessarily operate at the same time or at the same speed. Thus, by moving from one country to another, one may sometimes twice watch similar phases of intellectual development. The senses have then become peculiarly acute.
They suggest, if not the necessity, at least the probability, that developments will take a similar course.
虽然大多数文明国家的思想趋势所受到的影响在很大程度上是相似的，但它们并不一定同时发生或以相同的速度发生。因此，从一个国家搬到另一个国家，有时可以两次观看类似的知识发展阶段。因此，感官变得异常敏锐。
它们暗示着，即使不是必要性，至少也是可能性，发展将采取类似的进程。
If in the long run we are the makers of our own fate, in the short run we are the captives of the ideas we have created.
如果我们从长远来看是我们自己命运的创造者，那么从短期来看，我们就是我们所创造的思想的俘虏。
Few are ready to recognize that the rise of fascism and naziism was not a reaction against the socialist trends of the preceding period but a necessary outcome of those tendencies. This is a truth which most people were unwilling to see even when the similarities of many of the repellent features of the internal regimes in communist Russia and National Socialist Germany were widely recognized.
As a result, many who think themselves infinitely superior to the aberrations of naziism, and sincerely hate all its manifestations, work at the same time for ideals whose realization would lead straight to the abhorred tyranny.
很少有人愿意承认，法西斯主义和纳粹主义的崛起不是对之前社会主义趋势的反应，而是这些趋势的必然结果。这是一个大多数人不愿看到的事实，即使共产主义俄罗斯的内部政权和纳粹德国的许多令人厌恶的特征都有相似之处，这一点也被广泛认可。
The important point is that, if we take the people whose views influence developments, they are now in the democracies in some measure all socialists. If it is no longer fashionable to emphasize that “we are all socialists now,” this is so merely because the fact is too obvious. Scarcely anybody doubts that we must continue to move toward socialism, and most people are merely trying to deflect this movement in the interest of a particular class or group.
重要的是，如果我们看看那些影响发展的观点，那么在某种程度上，民主国家的人民都是社会主义者。如果说“我们现在都是社会主义者”已经不再时髦，那只是因为这个事实太明显了。几乎没有人怀疑我们必须继续走向社会主义，大多数人只是试图为了某个特定的阶级或群体的利益而转移这一运动。
Is there a greater tragedy imaginable than that, in our endeavor consciously to shape our future in accordance with high ideals, we should in fact unwittingly produce the very opposite of what we have been striving for?
在我们有意识地按照崇高理想塑造未来的努力中，有没有比这更大的悲剧：事实上，我们不知不觉地制造了我们一直在努力反对的东西？
There is an even more pressing reason why at this time we should seriously endeavor to understand the forces which have created National Socialism: that this will enable us to understand our enemy and the issue at stake between us. It cannot be denied that there is yet little recognition of the positive ideals for which we are fighting. We know that we are fighting for freedom to shape our life according to our own ideas. That is a great deal, but not enough.
在此时此刻，我们更应该认真地努力去理解那些创造了国家社会主义的力量，因为只有这样，我们才能理解我们的敌人和我们面临的问题。不可否认的是，我们很少认识到我们为之奋斗的积极理想。我们知道，我们正在为自由而战，这种自由让我们能够按照自己的想法来塑造自己的生活。这意义重大，但还不够。
It is a lamentable fact that the democracies in their dealings with the dictators before the war, not less than in their attempts at propaganda and in the discussion of their war aims, have shown an inner insecurity and uncertainty of aim which can be explained only by confusion about their own ideals and the nature of the differences which separated them from the enemy. We have been misled as much because we have refused to believe that the enemy was sincere in the profession of some beliefs which we shared as because we believed in the sincerity of some of his other claims.
一个令人遗憾的事实是，在战争之前，民主国家与独裁者打交道时，不亚于在宣传和讨论战争目标时，都表现出一种内在的不安全感和目标的不确定性，这只能用他们对自己的理想和对敌我之间差异的性质的混淆来解释。我们之所以被误导，既是因为我们拒绝相信敌人真诚地信奉我们共同的一些信仰，也是因为我们相信他的一些其他主张是真诚的。
But the fact that they were numerically the only significant opposition to the Nazis means no more than that in the wider sense practically all Germans had become socialists and that liberalism in the old sense had been driven out by socialism. As we hope to show, the conflict in existence between the National Socialist “Right” and the “Left” in Germany is the kind of conflict that will always arise between rival socialist factions.
If this interpretation is correct, it means, however, that many of those socialist refugees, in clinging to their beliefs, are now, though with the best will in the world, helping to lead their adopted country the way which Germany has gone.
几乎所有德国人都成为了社会主义者，旧意义上的自由主义已经被社会主义所驱逐。正如我们希望表明的那样，德国国家社会主义“右翼”和“左翼”之间的现有冲突是社会主义派系之间将永远出现的冲突。
The work from which Hayek quotes may be translated as Faith and Love, or the King and the Queen. Novalis anticipated there a future in which universal human spirituality would eliminate the need for government. —Ed.

One: The Abandoned Road

A program whose basic thesis is, not that the system of free enterprise for profit has failed in this generation, but that it has not yet been tried. 一个基本论点是，不是自由企业为利润的制度在本代失败了，而是它还没有被尝试过。 —F. D. Roosevelt
We are ready to accept almost any explanation of the present crisis of our civilization except one: that the present state of the world may be the result of genuine error on our own part and that the pursuit of some of our most cherished ideals has apparently produced results utterly different from those which we expected.
我们几乎可以接受对当前文明危机的任何解释，但有一个解释除外：即当前的世界状态可能是我们自身真正错误的结果，对某些我们最珍视的理想的追求显然产生了与我们预期截然不同的结果。
Though for the time being the different ideals are represented by hostile nations fighting for their existence, we must not forget that this conflict has grown out of a struggle of ideas within what, not so long ago, was a common European civilization and that the tendencies which have culminated in the creation of the totalitarian systems were not confined to the countries which have succumbed to them.
虽然目前不同的理想是由敌对国家为生存而战所代表的，但我们决不能忘记，这场冲突源于不久前的欧洲共同文明内部的思想斗争，而极权主义制度的最终形成趋势并不限于屈服于它们的国家。
Yet the history of these countries in the years before the rise of the totalitarian system showed few features with which we are not familiar. The external conflict is a result of a transformation of European thought in which others have moved so much faster as to bring them into irreconcilable conflict with our ideals, but which has not left us unaffected.
然而，在极权主义制度兴起之前的这些国家的历史中，很少有我们不熟悉的特点。外部冲突是欧洲思想转变的结果，其他国家走得更快，以至于它们与我们的理想发生了不可调和的冲突，但这并没有使我们不受影响。
Although we had been warned by some of the greatest political thinkers of the nineteenth century, by Tocqueville and Lord Acton, that socialism means slavery, we have steadily moved in the direction of socialism. And now that we have seen a new form of slavery arise before our eyes, we have so completely forgotten the warning that it scarcely occurs to us that the two things may be connected.
Although we had been warned by some of the greatest political thinkers of the nineteenth century, by Tocqueville and Lord Acton, that socialism means slavery, we have steadily moved in the direction of socialism.
尽管十九世纪最伟大的政治思想家托克维尔和阿克顿勋爵警告过我们，社会主义意味着奴役，我们仍然稳步走向社会主义。
The Nazi leader who described the National Socialist revolution as a counter-Renaissance spoke more truly than he probably knew. It was the decisive step in the destruction of that civilization which modern man had built up from the age of the Renaissance and which was, above all, an individualist civilization.
“Freedom” and “liberty” are now words so worn with use and abuse that one must hesitate to employ them to express the ideals for which they stood during that period. “Tolerance” is, perhaps, the only word which still preserves the full meaning of the principle which during the whole of this period was in the ascendant and which only in recent times has again been in decline, to disappear completely with the rise of the totalitarian state.
那位将国家社会主义革命描述为反文艺复兴的纳粹领导人，可能没有意识到，他说出了事实真相。这是摧毁现代文明的决定性一步，现代文明是文艺复兴时代以来现代人建立起来的，而现代文明首先是一种个人主义文明。
“自由”和“自由”是现在被使用和滥用的词语，人们必须犹豫是否使用它们来表达它们在那个时期所代表的理想。“宽容”，也许，是唯一一个仍然保留了整个时期上升的原则的完整意义的词，这个原则只是在最近才再次下降，并随着极权主义国家的崛起而完全消失。
During the whole of this modern period of European history the general direction of social development was one of freeing the individual from the ties which had bound him to the customary or prescribed ways in the pursuit of his ordinary activities. The conscious realization that the spontaneous and uncontrolled efforts of individuals were capable of producing a complex order of economic activities could come only after this development had made some progress. The subsequent elaboration of a consistent argument in favor of economic freedom was the outcome of a free growth of economic activity which had been the undesigned and unforeseen by-product of political freedom.
在整个欧洲现代史中，社会发展的总体方向是将个人从束缚他追求普通活动的传统或规定方式中解放出来。只有在这种发展取得一定进展之后，人们才能有意识地认识到，个人的自发和无控制努力能够产生一种复杂的经济活动秩序。随后对支持经济自由的一致论点的详细阐述是经济活动自由发展的结果，而经济活动自由发展是政治自由无意和不可预见的副产品。
As is so often true, the nature of our civilization has been seen more clearly by its enemies than by most of its friends: “the perennial Western malady, the revolt of the individual against the species,” as that nineteenth-century totalitarian, Auguste Comte, has described it, was indeed the force which built our civilization.
正如通常的情况一样，我们的文明在敌人眼中比在大多数朋友眼中更加清晰：正如十九世纪的极权主义者奥古斯特·孔德所描述的那样，“西方社会经久不衰的弊病，即个人对群体的反抗”的确是构建我们文明的力量。
Wherever the barriers to the free exercise of human ingenuity were removed, man became rapidly able to satisfy ever widening ranges of desire.
无论在哪里，只要消除了人类发挥聪明才智的障碍，人类就能迅速地满足不断扩大的各种欲望。
What in the future will probably appear the most significant and far-reaching effect of this success is the new sense of power over their own fate, the belief in the unbounded possibilities of improving their own lot, which the success already achieved created among men.
在未来，这种成功可能产生的最重大和最深远的影响是，这种成功已经在人们中间创造了一种新的力量感，即对自己命运的力量感，以及对无限改善自己命运的可能性的信心。
There is nothing in the basic principles of liberalism to make it a stationary creed; there are no hard-and-fast rules fixed once and for all. The fundamental principle that in the ordering of our affairs we should make as much use as possible of the spontaneous forces of society, and resort as little as possible to coercion, is capable of an infinite variety of applications. There is, in particular, all the difference between deliberately creating a system within which competition will work as beneficially as possible and passively accepting institutions as they are.
自由主义的基本原则并没有规定它是一个固定的信条；没有一成不变的硬性规定。我们在安排事务时应尽可能多地利用社会的自发力量，并尽可能少地诉诸于强迫，这一基本原则具有无限多种应用方式。特别是，在有意识地创造一个使竞争尽可能有益的体系，与消极地接受现有制度之间，存在着天壤之别。
The attitude of the liberal toward society is like that of the gardener who tends a plant and, in order to create the conditions most favorable to its growth, must know as much as possible about its structure and the way it functions.
自由主义者对社会的态度就像园丁对待植物的态度一样，为了创造最有利于其生长的条件，必须尽可能了解它的结构和运作方式。
There were many obvious tasks, such as our handling of the monetary system and the prevention or control of monopoly, and an even greater number of less obvious but hardly less important tasks to be undertaken in other fields, where there could be no doubt that the governments possessed enormous powers for good and evil;
有许多明显的任务，例如我们处理货币制度和防止或控制垄断，还有更多不那么明显但同样重要的任务，要在其他领域进行，在这些领域，政府拥有巨大的善恶权力，这是毫无疑问的；
“We have never had to set up and direct,” writes Dr. Karl Mannheim, “the entire system of nature as we are forced to do today with society. . . . Mankind is tending more and more to regulate the whole of its social life, although it has never attempted to create a second nature.”
卡尔·曼海姆博士写道：“我们从未被迫像今天这样建立和指导整个自然体系。人类越来越倾向于规范其全部社会生活，尽管人类从未试图创造第二个自然。”
It is now often forgotten how very considerable was the lead which Germany had during this period in the development of the theory and practice of socialism; that a generation before socialism became a serious issue in this country, Germany had a large socialist party in her parliament and that until not very long ago the doctrinal development of socialism was almost entirely carried on in Germany and Austria, so that even today Russian discussion largely carries on where the Germans left off. Most English and American socialists are still unaware that the majority of the problems they begin to discover were thoroughly discussed by German socialists long ago.
现在人们常常忘记，在社会主义理论和实践的发展中，德国曾起过非常重要的带头作用；在社会主义成为这个国家的一个严肃问题之前的一代人时间里，德国议会中有一个庞大的社会主义政党；直到不久以前，社会主义理论的发展几乎完全是在德国和奥地利进行的，以至于今天俄国人的讨论在很大程度上是在德国人停止的地方继续进行。大多数英国和美国社会主义者仍然不知道，他们开始发现的大多数问题，德国社会主义者早已彻底讨论过了。
Even in that year the Macmillan Report could already speak of “the change of outlook of the government of this country in recent times, its growing preoccupation, irrespective of party, with the management of the life of the people” and add that “Parliament finds itself increasingly engaged in legislation which has for its conscious aim the regulation of the day-to-day affairs of the community and now intervenes in matters formerly thought to be entirely outside its scope.” This could be said before, later in the same year, England finally took the headlong plunge and, in the short space of the inglorious years 1931–39, transformed its economic system beyond recognition.
即使在那一年，麦克米伦报告已经可以谈论“这个国家政府近些年的观点转变，它越来越关注，不分党派地，管理人民的生活”，并补充说，“议会发现自己越来越多地参与立法，其有意识的目标是管理社区的日常事务，现在开始干预过去被认为完全在其范围之外的事务。”这可以这么说，在同一年的晚些时候，英国终于一头扎了进去，在1931年至1939年短短几年不光彩的岁月里，彻底改变了其经济制度。
[Hayek criticized the view that individualism is necessarily associated with egoism and selfishness in his article, “Individualism: True and False,” op. cit. —Ed.]

Two: The Great Utopia

What has always made the state a hell on earth has been precisely that man has tried to make it his heaven. —Hölderlin 正是人类试图把它变成天堂，才使国家成为人间地狱。——荷尔德林
It is rarely remembered now that socialism in its beginnings was frankly authoritarian. The French writers who laid the foundations of modern socialism had no doubt that their ideas could be put into practice only by a strong dictatorial government. To them socialism meant an attempt to “terminate the revolution” by a deliberate reorganization of society on hierarchical lines and by the imposition of a coercive “spiritual power.”
现在很少有人记得，社会主义在早期是坦率独裁的。奠定现代社会主义基础的法国作家们毫不怀疑，他们的思想只有通过一个强大的独裁政府才能付诸实践。对他们来说，社会主义意味着通过有意识地按照等级制度对社会进行重组和强制实施“精神权力”来“终止革命”。
Only under the influence of the strong democratic currents preceding the revolution of 1848 did socialism begin to ally itself with the forces of freedom. But it took the new “democratic socialism” a long time to live down the suspicions aroused by its antecedents. Nobody saw more clearly than Tocqueville that democracy as an essentially individualist institution stood in an irreconcilable conflict with socialism: 只有在1848年革命之前强大的民主潮流的影响下，社会主义才开始与自由力量结盟。但是，新的“民主社会主义”花了很长时间才消除其前身引起的怀疑。没有人比托克维尔更清楚地看到，民主作为一种本质上属于个人主义的制度，与社会主义处于不可调和的冲突之中：
“Democracy extends the sphere of individual freedom,” he said in 1848; “socialism restricts it. Democracy attaches all possible value to each man; socialism makes each man a mere agent, a mere number. Democracy and socialism have nothing in common but one word: equality. But notice the difference: while democracy seeks equality in liberty, socialism seeks equality in restraint and servitude.” “民主扩大了个人的自由范围，”他在 1848 年说，“社会主义限制了它。民主赋予每个人所有可能的价值；社会主义使每个人仅仅成为代理人，一个数字。民主和社会主义只有一个共同点：平等。但请注意区别：民主在自由中寻求平等，社会主义在限制和奴役中寻求平等。”
To allay these suspicions and to harness to its cart the strongest of all political motives—the craving for freedom—socialism began increasingly to make use of the promise of a “new freedom.” The coming of socialism was to be the leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom. It was to bring “economic freedom,” without which the political freedom already gained was “not worth having.” Only socialism was capable of effecting the consummation of the age-long struggle for freedom, in which the attainment of political freedom was but a first step. 为了打消这些疑虑，并利用最强大的政治动机——对自由的渴望——社会主义开始越来越多地利用“新自由”的承诺。社会主义的到来将是从必然王国到自由王国的大跃进。它将带来“经济自由”，没有经济自由，已经获得的政治自由“就不值得拥有”。只有社会主义才能实现为自由而进行的长期斗争的圆满结局，而实现政治自由只是第一步。
The subtle change in meaning to which the word “freedom” was subjected in order that this argument should sound plausible is important. To the great apostles of political freedom the word had meant freedom from coercion, freedom from the arbitrary power of other men, release from the ties which left the individual no choice but obedience to the orders of a superior to whom he was attached. The new freedom promised, however, was to be freedom from necessity, release from the compulsion of the circumstances which inevitably limit the range of choice of all of us, although for some very much more than for others. Before man could be truly free, the “despotism of physical want” had to be broken, the “restraints of the economic system” relaxed. 为了使这一论点听起来可信，“自由”一词的微妙含义发生了变化，这一点很重要。对于政治自由的伟大倡导者来说，这个词意味着免于胁迫的自由，免于他人专断的自由，免于束缚的自由，这些束缚使个人别无选择，只能服从上级的命令。然而，新承诺的自由是免于必要性的自由，是免于不可避免地限制我们所有人选择范围的情境压迫的自由，尽管对某些人比对其他人要大得多。在人类能够真正自由之前，必须打破“物质匮乏的专制”，放松“经济制度的束缚”。
Yet, although the promises of this new freedom were often coupled with irresponsible promises of a great increase in material wealth in a socialist society, it was not from such an absolute conquest of the niggardliness of nature that economic freedom was expected. What the promise really amounted to was that the great existing disparities in the range of choice of different people were to disappear. The demand for the new freedom was thus only another name for the old demand for an equal distribution of wealth.
尽管这种新自由往往伴随着在社会主义社会中物质财富极大丰富的不负责任的承诺，但人们期望的经济自由并不是来自对自然吝啬的绝对征服。这种承诺实际上意味着，不同人在选择范围上的现有巨大差异将消失。因此，对这种新自由的需求只是对旧的需求的另一种表达，即财富的平等分配。
Unquestionably, the promise of more freedom was responsible for luring more and more liberals along the socialist road, for blinding them to the conflict which exists between the basic principles of socialism and liberalism, and for often enabling socialists to usurp the very name of the old party of freedom.
Socialism was embraced by the greater part of the intelligentsia as the apparent heir of the liberal tradition: therefore it is not surprising that to them the idea of socialism’s leading to the opposite of liberty should appear inconceivable.
毫无疑问，更大的自由的承诺导致了越来越多的自由主义者走上社会主义道路，使他们看不到社会主义和自由主义的基本原则之间的冲突，并经常使社会主义者篡夺了旧自由党的名称。社会主义被大多数知识分子接受为自由传统的明显继承者：因此，他们认为社会主义将导致自由的对立面，这并不奇怪。
Observer after observer, in spite of the contrary expectation with which he approached his subject, has been impressed with the extraordinary similarity in many respects of the conditions under “fascism” and “communism.” While “progressives” in England and elsewhere were still deluding themselves that communism and fascism represented opposite poles, more and more people began to ask themselves whether these new tyrannies were not the outcome of the same tendencies.
and when we find the same author recognizing that “Stalinism is socialism, in the sense of being an inevitable although unforeseen political accompaniment of the nationalization and collectivization which he had relied upon as part of his plan for erecting a classless society,” his conclusion clearly achieves wider significance.
观察家接二连三地指出，“法西斯主义”和“共产主义”在许多方面有着惊人的相似之处，尽管观察家们在着手研究这一课题时抱有相反的预期。当英国和其他地方的“进步人士”仍然自欺欺人地认为共产主义和法西斯主义代表着对立的两极时，越来越多的人开始问自己，这些新的暴政是否是相同趋势的产物。
当我们发现同一作者承认“斯大林主义是社会主义，因为斯大林主义是他建立无阶级社会计划的一部分，是他所依赖的国有化和集体化的不可避免但不可预见的政治后果”时，他的结论显然具有更广泛的意义。
Several years earlier W. H. Chamberlin, who in twelve years in Russia as an American correspondent had seen all his ideals shattered, summed up the conclusions of his studies there and in Germany and Italy in the statement that “socialism is certain to prove, in the beginning at least, the road NOT to freedom, but to dictatorship and counter-dictatorships, to civil war of the fiercest kind. Socialism achieved and maintained by democratic means seems definitely to belong to the world of utopias.”
Similarly a British writer, F. A. Voigt, after many years of close observation of developments in Europe as a foreign correspondent, concludes that “Marxism has led to Fascism and National Socialism, because, in all essentials, it is Fascism and National Socialism.” And Walter Lippmann has arrived at the conviction that “the generation to which we belong is now learning from experience what happens when men retreat from freedom to a coercive organization of their affairs. Though they promise themselves a more abundant life, they must in practice renounce it; as the organized direction increases, the variety of ends must give way to uniformity. That is the nemesis of the planned society a
几年前，W·H·张伯伦在俄国当了12年的美国记者，亲眼目睹了自己的所有理想破灭，他总结了自己在俄国、德国和意大利的研究结论，称“至少在开始阶段，社会主义必定会证明，它不是通向自由之路，而是通向独裁和反独裁、通向最惨烈的内战之路。通过民主手段实现和维持的社会主义，似乎绝对属于乌托邦的世界。”
英国作家F·A·福格特作为外国记者密切观察了欧洲的发展多年后，得出了这样的结论：“马克思主义导致了法西斯主义和民族社会主义，因为从本质上来说，它就是法西斯主义和民族社会民主主义。沃尔特·李普曼已经得出结论：“我们这一代人正在从经验中认识到，当人们从自由中退却，转而强制性地组织自己的事务时，会发生什么。虽然他们承诺自己会过上更富足的生活，但在实践中，他们必须放弃这种生活；随着有组织的指导的增加，各种目的必须让位于统一性。这是计划社会和人类事务中的专制原则的报应。”
“The complete collapse of the belief in the attainability of freedom and equality through Marxism,” writes Peter Drucker, “has forced Russia to travel the same road toward a totalitarian, purely negative, non-economic society of unfreedom and inequality which Germany has been following. Not that communism and fascism are essentially the same. Fascism is the stage reached after communism has proved an illusion, and it has proved as much an illusion in Stalinist Russia as in pre-Hitler Germany.” “对通过马克思主义实现自由和平等信念的完全崩溃，”彼得·德鲁克写道，“迫使俄罗斯走上与德国相同的道路，走向一个极权主义、纯粹消极、非经济的不自由和不平等社会。这并不是说共产主义和法西斯主义本质上是相同的。法西斯主义是共产主义被证明是一种幻想之后的阶段，在斯大林主义的俄罗斯和前希特勒的德国，它都被证明是一种幻想。”
The relative ease with which a young communist could be converted into a Nazi or vice versa was generally known in Germany, best of all to the propagandists of the two parties.
在德国，人们普遍知道，一名年轻的共产主义者可以相对轻松地转变为纳粹分子，反之亦然。
While to the Nazi the communist, and to the communist the Nazi, and to both the socialist, are potential recruits who are made of the right timber, although they have listened to false prophets, they both know that there can be no compromise between them and those who really believe in individual freedom.
对纳粹来说，共产主义者是潜在的招募对象，对共产主义者来说，纳粹分子是潜在的招募对象，对两者来说，社会主义者都是潜在的招募对象，尽管他们听信了假先知的话，但他们都知道，他们和那些真正相信个人自由的人之间没有妥协的余地。
In an article under the significant title of “The Rediscovery of Liberalism,” Professor Eduard Heimann, one of the leaders of German religious socialism, writes: “Hitlerism proclaims itself as both true democracy and true socialism, and the terrible truth is that there is a grain of truth for such claims—an infinitesimal grain, to be sure, but at any rate enough to serve as a basis for such fantastic distortions. Hitlerism even goes so far as to claim the role of protector of Christianity, and the terrible truth is that even this gross misinterpretation is able to make some impression. But one fact stands out with perfect clarity in all the fog: Hitler has never claimed to represent true liberalism. Liberalism then has the distinction of being the doctrine most hated by Hitler.”
德国宗教社会主义领导人之一爱德华·海曼教授在一篇题为《自由主义的重新发现》的文章中写道：“希特勒主义宣称自己是真正的民主和真正的社会主义，而可怕的事实是，这种说法有一丝真理——当然，是一丝微不足道的真理，但无论如何，这足以成为这种荒谬歪曲的基础。希特勒主义甚至声称自己是基督教的保护者，而可怕的事实是，即使是这种严重的误解也能产生一些影响。但在所有的迷雾中，有一个事实非常清楚：希特勒从未声称代表真正的自由主义。因此，自由主义有幸成为希特勒最痛恨的学说。“
So little is the problem yet seen, so easily do the most irreconcilable ideals still live together, that we can still hear such contradictions in terms as “individualist socialism” seriously discussed.
That democratic socialism, the great utopia of the last few generations, is not only unachievable, but that to strive for it produces something so utterly different that few of those who now wish it would be prepared to accept the consequences, many will not believe until the connection has been laid bare in all its aspects.
因此，问题很少被看到，最不可调和的理想仍然可以轻松地共存，我们仍然可以听到“个人主义社会主义”这样的矛盾说法正在被认真讨论。
过去几代人的伟大乌托邦——民主社会主义不仅无法实现，而且，为之奋斗会产生如此截然不同的结果，以至于现在希望实现民主社会主义的人中，很少有人会愿意接受由此带来的后果，许多人甚至不会相信，除非这种联系的所有方面都被公诸于众。
亚历克西斯·德·托克维尔，“在制宪议会讨论宪法草案时发表的讲话（1848年9月12日），关于劳动权问题”，《亚历克西斯·德·托克维尔的全集》，第9卷（巴黎：米歇尔·莱维兄弟出版社，1866年），第546页。（原文为“民主政体扩大个人独立的范围，社会主义政体缩小这个范围。
民主政体给予每个人尽可能多的价值，社会主义政体使每个人成为工具、手段和数字。民主政体和社会主义政体只差一个词，平等；但请注意区别：民主政体在自由中寻求平等，社会主义政体在贫困和奴役中寻求平等。

Three: Individualism and Collectivism

The socialists believe in two things which are absolutely different and perhaps even contradictory: freedom and organization. —Élie Halévy 社会主义者相信两件完全不同甚至可能相互矛盾的事情：自由和组织。
There are many people who call themselves socialists, although they care only about the first, who fervently believe in those ultimate aims of socialism but neither care nor understand how they can be achieved, and who are merely certain that they must be achieved, whatever the cost.
Many people, on the other hand, who value the ultimate ends of socialism no less than the socialists refuse to support socialism because of the dangers to other values they see in the methods proposed by the socialists.
有很多人自称为社会主义者，但他们只关心第一点，热切地相信社会主义的终极目标，却既不关心也不理解这些目标如何实现，他们只是确信这些目标必须实现，不惜一切代价。
另一方面，许多人的社会主义终极目标和社会党人一样看重，但他们拒绝支持社会主义，因为他们认为社会主义的方法会给其他价值观带来危险。
It may, perhaps, seem unfair to use the term “socialism” to describe its methods rather than its aims, to use for a particular method a term which for many people stands for an ultimate ideal. It is probably preferable to describe the methods which can be used for a great variety of ends as collectivism and to regard socialism as a species of that genus.
It must also not be forgotten that socialism is not only by far the most important species of collectivism or “planning” but that it is socialism which has persuaded liberal-minded people to submit once more to that regimentation of economic life which they had overthrown because, in the words of Adam Smith, it puts governments in a position where “to support themselves they are obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical.”
用“社会主义”来描述它的方法，而不是它的目标，也许看起来是不公平的。对于许多人来说，“社会主义”是一个终极理想。用“集体主义”来描述可以用于各种目的的方法，用“社会主义”来描述这个属，也许更好。
社会主义不仅是迄今为止最重要的集体主义或“计划”类型，而且正是社会主义说服了开明人士再次接受对经济生活的管制，而他们曾经推翻过这种管制，用亚当·斯密的话来说，因为这种管制使政府处于“为了维持自身而不得不压迫和专横”的境地。
The question is whether for this purpose it is better that the holder of coercive power should confine himself in general to creating conditions under which the knowledge and initiative of individuals are given the best scope so that they can plan most successfully; or whether a rational utilization of our resources requires central direction and organization of all our activities according to some consciously constructed “blueprint.”
问题在于，为了这个目的，强制性权力的持有者是否应该将自己一般限制在创造条件上，使个人的知识和主动性得到最好的发挥，以便他们能够最成功地进行规划；或者，合理利用我们的资源是否需要根据某些有意识地构建的“蓝图”，对所有活动进行中央指导和组织。
The liberal argument is in favor of making the best possible use of the forces of competition as a means of coordinating human efforts, not an argument for leaving things just as they are. It is based on the conviction that, where effective competition can be created, it is a better way of guiding individual efforts than any other.
自由主义论点赞成尽可能地利用竞争的力量作为协调人类努力的一种手段，而不是赞成放任自流。它基于这样的信念：在能够形成有效竞争的地方，它比任何其他方法都更好地指导个人努力。
然而，经济自由主义反对用低级的协调个人努力的方法来取代竞争。它之所以将竞争视为上策，不仅是因为在大多数情况下，它是已知的最高效的方法，更因为它是唯一的方法，可以让我们的活动相互适应，而无需权威的强制或武断干预。
事实上，支持竞争的主要论点之一是，它消除了“有意识的社会控制”的必要性，并让个人有机会决定某项职业的前景是否足以弥补与之相关的不利因素和风险。
Any attempt to control prices or quantities of particular commodities deprives competition of its power of bringing about an effective coordination of individual efforts, because price changes then cease to register all the relevant changes in circumstances and no longer provide a reliable guide for the individual’s actions.
任何试图控制特定商品的价格或数量的企图都会使竞争失去有效协调个人努力的能力，因为价格变化将不再记录所有相关情况的变化，不再为个人的行动提供可靠的指导。
It is regrettable, though not difficult to explain, that in the past much less attention has been given to the positive requirements of a successful working of the competitive system than to these negative points. The functioning of a competition not only requires adequate organization of certain institutions like money, markets, and channels of information—some of which can never be adequately provided by private enterprise—but it depends, above all, on the existence of an appropriate legal system, a legal system designed both to preserve competition and to make it operate as beneficially as possible.
The systematic study of the forms of legal institutions which will make the competitive system work efficiently has been sadly neglected;
但令人遗憾的是，与这些消极方面相比，过去对竞争体系有效运作的积极要求的关注要少得多。竞争的运作不仅需要对货币、市场和信息渠道等某些机构进行适当的组织——其中一些机构永远无法由私人企业充分提供——而且最重要的是，它取决于适当法律体系的存在，这种法律体系既旨在保护竞争，又旨在使竞争尽可能有益地运作。
令人遗憾的是，对使竞争体系有效运作的法律制度形式的系统研究一直被忽视；
An effective competitive system needs an intelligently designed and continuously adjusted legal framework as much as any other.
一个有效的竞争制度需要一个精心设计并持续调整的法律框架，就像其他制度一样。
Yet, though all the changes we are observing tend in the direction of a comprehensive central direction of economic activity, the universal struggle against competition promises to produce in the first instance something in many respects even worse, a state of affairs which can satisfy neither planners nor liberals: a sort of syndicalist or “corporative” organization of industry, in which competition is more or less suppressed but planning is left in the hands of the independent monopolies of the separate industries.
然而，尽管我们所观察到的所有变化都朝着经济活动的全面中央指导的方向发展，但普遍反对竞争的斗争首先会在许多方面产生更糟糕的结果，这种结果既不能让规划者满意，也不能让自由主义者满意：某种工团主义或“公司”式的行业组织，在这种组织中，竞争或多或少地受到压制，但规划却掌握在各个行业的独立垄断企业手中。
this is largely because most people still believe that it must be possible to find some middle way between “atomistic” competition and central direction.
Yet mere common sense proves a treacherous guide in this field. Although competition can bear some admixture of regulation, it cannot be combined with planning to any extent we like without ceasing to operate as an effective guide to production. Nor is “planning” a medicine which, taken in small doses, can produce the effects for which one might hope from its thoroughgoing application.
这主要是因为大多数人仍然认为，必须在“原子化”竞争和中央指导之间找到一条中间道路。
这个领域，常识被证明是一个不可靠的向导。尽管竞争可以掺杂一些监管，但它不能与我们喜欢的任何程度相结合，而不停止作为生产的有效指导。也不是“计划”是一种药，可以小剂量服用，产生人们可能希望从其彻底应用中得到的效果。
But as in current usage “planning” has become almost synonymous with the former kind of planning, it will sometimes be inevitable for the sake of brevity to refer to it simply as planning, even though this means leaving to our opponents a very good word meriting a better fate.
但是，在目前的用法中，“规划”几乎成了前一种规划的同义词，为了简洁，有时不可避免地简单地称之为规划，即使这意味着让我们的对手得到一个值得更好命运的好词。
[The statement, “There are many signs that British leaders are growing accustomed to think in terms of national development by controlled monopolies . . .” appeared in The Spectator, no. 5774, March 3, 1939, p. 337. —Ed.] （“有许多迹象表明，英国领导人越来越习惯于从受控垄断的角度来考虑国家发展……”这句话出自 1939 年 3 月 3 日出版的《旁观者》第 5774 期，第 337 页。——译注）

Four: The “Inevitability” of Planning

THE “INEVITABILITY” OF PLANNING 计划的“不可避免性” We were the first to assert that the more complicated the forms assumed by civilization, the more restricted the freedom of the individual must become. 我们首先断言，文明所采取的形式越复杂，个人的自由就越受到限制。 —Benito Mussolini 贝尼托·墨索里尼
The myth is deliberately cultivated that we are embarking on the new course not out of free will but because competition is spontaneously eliminated by technological changes which we neither can reverse nor should wish to prevent.
The tendency toward monopoly and planning is not the result of any “objective facts” beyond our control but the product of opinions fostered and propagated for half a century until they have come to dominate all our policy.
我们之所以走上这条新道路，不是出于自由意志，而是因为竞争被自发地消除了，这种谬论是有意培养出来的。
垄断和计划的趋势不是我们无法控制的“客观事实”的结果，而是半个世纪以来培育和传播的观点的产物，直到它们主宰了我们的所有政策。
The historical fact of the progressive growth of monopoly during the last fifty years and the increasing restriction of the field in which competition rules is, of course, not disputed—although the extent of the phenomenon is often greatly exaggerated. The important question is whether this development is a necessary consequence of the advance of technology or whether it is simply the result of the policies pursued in most countries. We shall presently see that the actual history of this development strongly suggests the latter. But we must first consider in how far modern technological developments are of such a kind as to make the growth of monopolies in wide fields inevitable.
The alleged technological cause of the growth of monopoly is the superiority of the large firm over the small, owing to the greater efficiency of modern methods of mass production. Modern methods, it is asserted, have created conditions in the majority of industries where the production of the large firm can be increased at decreasing costs per unit, with the result that the large firms are everywhere underbidding and driving out the small ones;
The most comprehensive study of the facts undertaken in recent times is that by the Temporary National Economic Committee on the Concentration of Economic Power. The final report of this committee (which certainly cannot be accused of an undue liberal bias) arrives at the conclusion that the view according to which the greater efficiency of large-scale production is the cause of the disappearance of competition “finds scant support in any evidence that is now at hand.” And the detailed monograph on the question which was prepared for the committee sums up the answer in this statement:
垄断增长的所谓技术原因是，由于现代大规模生产方法的效率更高，大公司比小公司更有优势。现代方法在大多数行业中创造了条件，使大公司能够以降低单位成本的方式增加产量，其结果是，大公司到处都在压价和排挤小公司；
“The superior efficiency of large establishments has not been demonstrated; the advantages that are supposed to destroy competition have failed to manifest themselves in many fields. Nor do the economies of size, where they exist, invariably necessitate monopoly. . . . The size or the sizes of the optimum efficiency may be reached long before the major part of a supply is subjected to such control. The conclusions that the advantage of large-scale production must lead inevitably to the abolition of competition cannot be accepted. It should be noted, moreover, that monopoly is frequently the product of factors other than the lower costs of greater size. It is attained through collusive agreement and promoted by public policies. When these agreements are invalidated and when these policies are reversed, competitive conditions can be restored.”
“大型企业的优越性尚未得到证明；许多领域本应消除竞争的优势并没有显现出来。即使存在规模经济，也并不一定需要垄断……在供应的大部分受到控制之前，可能早就达到了最佳效率的大小或规模。大规模生产的优势必然导致竞争消亡的结论是不可接受的。此外，应该指出，垄断往往是除规模经济以外其他因素的产物。它是通过共谋协议实现的，并得到了公共政策的推动。当这些协议无效，当这些政策逆转时，竞争环境可以恢复。”
This conclusion is strongly supported by the historical order in which the decline of competition and the growth of monopoly manifested themselves in different countries. If they were the result of technological developments or a necessary product of the evolution of “capitalism,” we should expect them to appear first in the countries with the most advanced economic system. In fact, they appeared first during the last third of the nineteenth century in what were then comparatively young industrial countries, the United States and Germany.
It was here that, with the help of the state, the first great experiment in “scientific planning” and “conscious organization of industry” led to the creation of giant monopolies, which were represented as inevitable growths fifty years before the same was done in Great Britain. It is largely due to the influence of German socialist theoreticians, particularly Sombart, generalizing from the experience of their country, that the inevitable development of the competitive system into “monopoly capitalism” became widely accepted.
这个结论得到了历史事实的有力支持：在不同的国家里，竞争的衰落和垄断的增长是先后出现的。如果它们是技术进步的结果，或者是“资本主义”发展的必然产物，那么，我们应当期望它们首先出现在那些经济制度最发达的国家。事实上，它们首先出现在19世纪最后三分之一的时间里，出现在当时相对年轻的工业国家，即美国和德国。
在国家的帮助下，“科学规划”和“有意识地组织工业”的第一次伟大实验导致了巨型垄断公司的诞生，这些公司在五十年前的大不列颠被视为不可避免的增长。这在很大程度上归因于德国社会主义理论家的影响，特别是桑巴特，他们从本国经验中概括出，竞争制度不可避免地发展为“垄断资本主义”，这似乎证实了这一概括。
The intellectual history of the last sixty or eighty years is indeed a perfect illustration of the truth that in social evolution nothing is inevitable but thinking makes it so.
过去六七十年的知识史确实完美地说明了这样一个真理：在社会进化中，没有什么是不可避免的，但思想使它成为必然。
There would be no difficulty about efficient control or planning were conditions so simple that a single person or board could effectively survey all the relevant facts. It is only as the factors which have to be taken into account become so numerous that it is impossible to gain a synoptic view of them that decentralization becomes imperative. But, once decentralization is necessary, the problem of coordination arises—a coordination which leaves the separate agencies free to adjust their activities to the facts which only they can know and yet brings about a mutual adjustment of their respective plans. As decentralization has become necessary because nobody can consciously balance all the considerations bearing on the decisions of so many individuals, the coordination can clearly be effected not by “conscious control” but only by arrangements which convey to each agent the information he must possess in order effectively to adjust his decisions to those of others.
如果情况非常简单，以至于一个人或一个委员会就可以有效地调查所有相关事实，那么有效控制或规划就不会有什么困难。只有当需要考虑的因素变得如此之多，以至于不可能对它们有一个全面的了解时，权力下放才会变得必要。但是，一旦权力下放变得必要，协调问题就会出现——这种协调使各个机构能够自由调整自己的活动，以适应只有它们自己才知道的事实，同时实现各自计划的相互调整。由于没有人能够有意识地平衡与如此多个人决策有关的所有考虑因素，因此权力下放变得很有必要。因此，协调显然不能通过“有意识的控制”来实现，而只能通过向每个代理人传达他必须拥有的信息来实现，以便有效地调整他的决策以适应他人的决策。
The more complicated the whole, the more dependent we become on that division of knowledge between individuals whose separate efforts are coordinated by the impersonal mechanism for transmitting the relevant information known by us as the price system.
整个体系越复杂，我们就越依赖于个人之间的知识分工，他们的个人努力由非个人机制协调，以传递我们所知道的相关信息，即价格体系。
It is no exaggeration to say that if we had had to rely on conscious central planning for the growth of our industrial system, it would never have reached the degree of differentiation, complexity, and flexibility it has attained. Compared with this method of solving the economic problem by means of decentralization plus automatic coordination, the more obvious method of central direction is incredibly clumsy, primitive, and limited in scope. That the division of labor has reached the extent which makes modern civilization possible we owe to the fact that it did not have to be consciously created but that man tumbled on a method by which the division of labor could be extended far beyond the limits within which it could have been planned. Any further growth of its complexity, therefore, far from making central direction more necessary, makes it more important than ever that we should use a technique which does not depend on conscious control. 不夸张地说，如果我们不得不依靠有意识的中央计划来发展我们的工业体系，那么它永远不会达到目前的分化、复杂和灵活程度。与通过分权加自动协调来解决经济问题的方法相比，中央指导的更明显的方法是令人难以置信的笨拙、原始和有限。分工达到了使现代文明成为可能的程度，这要归功于这样一个事实：它不必有意识地创造，而是人类偶然发现了一种方法，使分工可以远远超出计划的范围。因此，分工的进一步复杂化，远非使中央指导更加必要，而是比以往任何时候都更加重要，我们应该使用一种不依赖于有意识控制的技术。
但是，个人从来得不到选择的余地
但必须承认，通过强制标准化或禁止一定程度以上的多样性，某些领域的丰富性可能会增加，从而足以弥补消费者选择受到的限制。
Whether such instances are of any great or lasting importance, they are certainly not instances where it could be legitimately claimed that technical progress makes central direction inevitable. They would merely make it necessary to choose between gaining a particular advantage by compulsion and not obtaining it—or, in most instances, obtaining it a little later, when further technical advance has overcome the particular difficulties.
无论这些例子是否具有重大或持久的重要性，它们肯定不是可以合法声称技术进步使中央指导不可避免的例子。它们只会使人们有必要在通过强制获得特定优势和无法获得特定优势之间进行选择——或者在大多数情况下，在进一步的技术进步克服了特定困难之后稍晚一点获得特定优势。
It is the frustration of his ambitions in his own field which makes the specialist revolt against the existing order. We all find it difficult to bear to see things left undone which everybody must admit are both desirable and possible. That these things cannot all be done at the same time, that any one of them can be achieved only at the sacrifice of others, can be seen only by taking into account factors which fall outside any specialism, which can be appreciated only by a painful intellectual effort—the more painful as it forces us to see against a wider background the objects to which most of our labors are directed and to balance them against others which lie outside our immediate interest and for which, for that reason, we care less.
正是他在自己领域的雄心受挫，才使专家们反抗现有秩序。我们都发现很难忍受看到未完成的事情，每个人都必须承认这些事情是可取的，也是可能的。这些事情不可能同时完成，其中任何一个都需要以牺牲其他事情为代价才能实现，只有考虑到超出任何专门知识的因素才能看到，只有经过痛苦的智力努力才能理解——这种努力越痛苦，因为它迫使我们在更广泛的背景下看到我们大部分劳动所针对的对象，并使它们与超出我们直接利益的其他对象进行平衡，因此，我们对后者不那么关心。
The illusion of the specialist that in a planned society he would secure more attention to the objectives for which he cares most is a more general phenomenon than the term “specialist” at first suggests. In our predilections and interests we are all in some measure specialists. And we all think that our personal order of values is not merely personal but that in a free discussion among rational people we would convince the others that ours is the right one.
在一个计划社会中，专家会获得更多对他最关心的目标的关注，这种错觉比“专家”这个词本身所暗示的更为普遍。在偏好和兴趣方面，我们都在某种程度上是专家。我们都认为，我们个人的价值排序不仅是个人的，而且在理性人的自由讨论中，我们会说服其他人我们的才是正确的。
这些人都知道，他们的目标只有通过规划才能实现，因此，他们都希望进行规划。但是，当然，他们所呼吁的社会规划只能暴露出他们目标之间的潜在冲突。
But it would make the very men who are most anxious to plan society the most dangerous if they were allowed to do so—and the most intolerant of the planning of others. From the saintly and single-minded idealist to the fanatic is often but a step. Though it is the resentment of the frustrated specialist which gives the demand for planning its strongest impetus, there could hardly be a more unbearable— and more irrational—world than one in which the most eminent specialists in each field were allowed to proceed unchecked with the realization of their ideals.
但是，如果允许他们规划社会，那些最渴望规划社会的人就会成为最危险的人，他们也是对别人的规划最不能容忍的人。从圣洁而一心一意的理想主义者到狂热分子往往只有一步之遥。
尽管是那些受挫的专业人士对规划的怨恨为规划的需求提供了最强大的推动力，但很难想象一个比以下情况更难以忍受、更不理性的世界：每个领域的最杰出的专家都被允许不受阻碍地实现他们的理想。

Five: Planning and Democracy

The statesman who should attempt to direct private people in what manner they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load himself with a most unnecessary attention, but assume an authority which could safely be trusted to no council and senate whatever, and which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself fit to exercise it. —Adam Smith 政治家如果试图指导私人如何运用他们的资本，不仅会让自己承担一项毫无必要的关注，而且会承担一种权力，这种权力无论交给哪个议会和参议院都是不可靠的，而且这种权力在那些自以为有资格行使这种权力的人手中是最危险的。
The common features of all collectivist systems may be described, in a phrase ever dear to socialists of all schools, as the deliberate organization of the labors of society for a definite social goal. That our present society lacks such “conscious” direction toward a single aim, that its activities are guided by the whims and fancies of irresponsible individuals, has always been one of the main complaints of its socialist critics. 所有集体主义制度的一个共同特征可以用一句话来描述，那就是为了一个特定的社会目标而有意识地组织社会劳动。我们目前的社会缺乏这种单一目标的“有意识”指导，其活动受到不负责任的个人奇思怪想的指导，这一直是社会主义批评家的主要抱怨之一。
In many ways this puts the basic issue very clearly. And it directs us at once to the point where the conflict arises between individual freedom and collectivism. The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, etc., differ among themselves in the nature of the goal toward which they want to direct the efforts of society. But they all differ from liberalism and individualism in wanting to organize the whole of society and all its resources for this unitary end and in refusing to recognize autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals are supreme. In short, they are totalitarian in the true sense of this new word which we have adopted to describe the unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of what in theory we call collectivism. 在许多方面，这非常明确地提出了基本问题。它立即将我们引向了个体自由和集体主义之间的冲突。各种形式的集体主义，共产主义，法西斯主义等等，在它们想要引导社会努力的目标性质方面彼此不同。但是，它们都与自由主义和个人主义不同，它们想要组织整个社会和所有资源以实现这个单一的目标，并且拒绝承认自主领域，即个人目标至高无上的领域。简而言之，它们是极权主义的，这是我们采用的新词的真正含义，我们用它来描述在理论上被称为集体主义但在实践中不可避免的表现。
The “social goal,” or “common purpose,” for which society is to be organized is usually vaguely described as the “common good,” the “general welfare,” or the “general interest.” It does not need much reflection to see that these terms have no sufficiently definite meaning to determine a particular course of action.
The welfare and the happiness of millions cannot be measured on a single scale of less and more. The welfare of a people, like the happiness of a man, depends on a great many things that can be provided in an infinite variety of combinations. It cannot be adequately expressed as a single end, but only as a hierarchy of ends, a comprehensive scale of values in which every need of every person is given its place. To direct all our activities according to a single plan presupposes that every one of our needs is given its rank in an order of values which must be complete enough to make it possible to decide among all the different courses which the planner has to choose. It presupposes, in short, the existence of a complete ethical code in which all the different human values are allotted their due place.
社会的“社会目标”或“共同目标”通常被模糊地描述为“共同利益”、“公共福利”或“共同利益”。不需要太多的思考就可以看出，这些术语没有足够明确的意义来确定特定的行动路线。数百万人的福利和幸福不能用单一的少或多尺度来衡量。
一个民族的福利，就像一个人的幸福一样，取决于许多事情，这些事情可以以无限多种方式组合在一起。它不能作为一个单一的目标来充分表达，而只能作为一个目标层次结构，一个综合的价值尺度，其中每个人的需求都得到了自己的位置。根据一个单一的计划来指导我们的所有活动，假定我们每个人的需求都在一个价值秩序中得到了自己的地位，这个价值秩序必须足够完整，才能在规划者必须选择的所有不同路线中做出决定。简而言之，它假定存在一个完整的道德准则，其中所有不同的人类价值都被分配了应有的位置。
我们的道德准则充满了漏洞。
It may merely be pointed out that up to the present the growth of civilization has been accompanied by a steady diminution of the sphere in which individual actions are bound by fixed rules.
到目前为止，文明的发展一直伴随着个人行为受固定规则约束的领域的稳步减少。我们共同道德准则所包含的规则逐渐变得更少，更具一般性。
Whether his interests center round his own physical needs, or whether he takes a warm interest in the welfare of every human being he knows, the ends about which he can be concerned will always be only an infinitesimal fraction of the needs of all men.
无论他的兴趣集中在自己的物质需求上，还是他对他所认识的每个人的福利充满热情，他关心的目的始终只是所有人需求的无限小的一部分。
它并不像人们经常断言的那样，假定人是利己的或自私的，或者应当是利己的或自私的。它只是从无可争辩的事实出发，即我们想象力的局限使我们不可能把整个社会的需求都纳入我们的价值尺度，而且严格地说，价值尺度只能存在于个人的头脑中，因此除了部分价值尺度外，别无它物——这些价值尺度不可避免地彼此不同，而且常常相互矛盾。
所谓“社会目标”，只是许多个人的相同目标——或者说，个人为实现这些目标所愿意做出的贡献，以换取他们在满足自己的愿望时所得到的帮助。
事实上，人们最有可能就共同行动达成一致，因为共同目标对他们来说不是最终目标，而是能够服务于各种目的的手段。
Although the state controls directly the use of only a large part of the available resources, the effects of its decisions on the remaining part of the economic system become so great that indirectly it controls almost everything. Where, as was, for example, true in Germany as early as 1928, the central and local authorities directly control the use of more than half the national income (according to an official German estimate then, 53 per cent), they control indirectly almost the whole economic life of the nation. There is, then, scarcely an individual end which is not dependent for its achievement on the action of the state, and the “social scale of values” which guides the state’s action must embrace practically all individual ends.
尽管国家只直接控制可用资源的很大一部分，但其决定对剩余经济体系的影响是如此之大，以至于它几乎间接控制了一切。例如，在德国，早在1928年，中央和地方政府就直接控制了全国一半以上的国民收入（根据德国当时的官方估计，占53%），他们间接控制了全国几乎全部的经济生活。因此，几乎没有一个个人目的不是依靠国家的行动来实现，而指导国家行动的“社会价值尺度”实际上必须包括所有个人目的。
在导致决策的讨论中，规划的目标可能会被描述为“共同福利”等术语，这只会掩盖在规划目标上缺乏真正共识的事实。事实上，只有在所要使用的机制上才会存在共识。但是，这种机制只能用于一个共同的目标；一旦行政权力不得不将对单一计划的需求转化为具体计划时，所有活动都应指向的确切目标的问题就会产生。
人们同意必须有中央计划，但不同意目的，其效果将相当于一群人同意一起旅行，但不同意去哪里：结果他们可能都要进行一次大多数人根本不想的旅行。这种计划创造了一种局面，即我们必须就比我们习惯的多得多的主题达成一致，在一个计划体制中，我们不能将集体行动限制在我们能够达成一致的任务上，而是被迫对所有事情都达成一致，以便能够采取任何行动，这是决定计划体制特征的最重要因素之一。
The fault is neither with the individual representatives nor with parliamentary institutions as such but with the contradictions inherent in the task with which they are charged. They are not asked to act where they can agree, but to produce agreement on everything—the whole direction of the resources of the nation. For such a task the system of majority decision is, however, not suited.
错误既不在于个别代表，也不在于议会制度本身，而在于他们所承担的任务所固有的矛盾。他们不是被要求在他们能够达成一致的地方采取行动，而是要在所有事情上达成一致——整个国家的资源方向。然而，对于这样一个任务，多数决定制度是不适合的。
It is the essence of the economic problem that the making of an economic plan involves the choice between conflicting or competing ends—different needs of different people. But which ends do so conflict, which will have to be sacrificed if we want to achieve certain others, in short, which are the alternatives between which we must choose, can only be known to those who know all the facts; and only they, the experts, are in a position to decide which of the different ends are to be given preference. It is inevitable that they should impose their scale of preferences on the community for which they plan.
经济问题的本质在于，制定经济计划涉及在相互冲突或相互竞争的目的——不同人的不同需求——之间进行选择。但是，哪些目标会相互冲突，如果我们想实现某些目标，就必须牺牲哪些目标，简而言之，哪些是我们必须在其中进行选择的替代方案，只有那些了解所有事实的人才能知道；只有他们，专家，才有资格决定不同的目标中哪些应该优先考虑。不可避免的是，他们将把自己的偏好强加于他们计划的社会。
So long as the power that is delegated is merely the power to make general rules, there may be very good reasons why such rules should be laid down by local rather than by the central authority. The objectionable feature is that delegation is so often resorted to because the matter in hand cannot be regulated by general rules but only by the exercise of discretion in the decision of particular cases. In these instances delegation means that some authority is given power to make with the force of law what to all intents and purposes are arbitrary decisions (usually described as “judging the case on its merits”).
只要被下放的权力只是制定一般性规则的权力，那么，就有很好的理由说明，一般性规则应由地方当局（而非中央当局）制定。令人反感的特点在于，之所以经常诉诸于立法权的下放，是因为手头的事务无法通过一般性规则进行管理，而只能通过酌情决定个案来行使自由裁量权。在这些情况下，立法权的下放意味着，某些当局被赋予权力，以法律的形式做出实际上属于武断的决定（通常被称为“根据具体情况判断”）。
Hitler did not have to destroy democracy; he merely took advantage of the decay of democracy and at the critical moment obtained the support of many to whom, though they detested Hitler, he yet seemed the only man strong enough to get things done.
希特勒不必摧毁民主；他只是利用了民主的衰落，并在关键时刻获得了许多人的支持，尽管他们憎恨希特勒，但他似乎仍然是唯一一个足够强大、能够把事情做好的人。
It is the price of democracy that the possibilities of conscious control are restricted to the fields where true agreement exists and that in some fields things must be left to chance. But in a society which for its functioning depends on central planning this control cannot be made dependent on a majority’s being able to agree; it will often be necessary that the will of a small minority be imposed upon the people, because this minority will be the largest group able to agree among themselves on the question at issue.
and it is the great merit of the liberal creed that it reduced the range of subjects on which agreement was necessary to one on which it was likely to exist in a society of free men. It is now often said that democracy will not tolerate “capitalism.” If “capitalism” means here a competitive system based on free disposal over private property, it is far more important to realize that only within this system is democracy possible. When it becomes dominated by a collectivist creed, democracy will inevitably destroy itself.
这是民主的代价，有意识控制的可能性仅限于存在真正共识的领域，而在某些领域，则必须听天由命。但在一个其运转依赖于中央计划的社会中，这种控制不能依赖于多数人能够达成一致；往往有必要将少数人的意愿强加于人民，因为少数人将是能够就所讨论的问题达成一致的最大群体。
自由主义信条的伟大功绩在于，它将需要达成一致的议题范围缩小到在一个自由社会中可能存在共识的议题上。现在人们常说，民主不会容忍“资本主义”。如果“资本主义”在这里意味着一个基于私有财产自由处置的竞争制度，那么更重要的是要认识到，只有在这个制度中，民主才是可能的。当民主被集体主义信仰所主导时，民主将不可避免地自我毁灭。
It cannot be said of democracy, as Lord Acton truly said of liberty, that it “is not a means to a higher political end. It is itself the highest political end. It is not for the sake of a good public administration that it is required, but for the security in the pursuit of the highest objects of civil society, and of private life.” Democracy is essentially a means, a utilitarian device for safeguarding internal peace and individual freedom.
Nor must we forget that there has often been much more cultural and spiritual freedom under an autocratic rule than under some democracies—and it is at least conceivable that under the government of a very homogeneous and doctrinaire majority democratic government might be as oppressive as the worst dictatorship. Our point, however, is not that dictatorship must inevitably extirpate freedom but rather that planning leads to dictatorship because dictatorship is the most effective instrument of coercion and the enforcement of ideals and, as such, essential if central planning on a large scale is to be possible.
But in so far as democracy ceases to be a guaranty of individual freedom, it may well persist in some form under a totalitarian regime. A true “dictatorship of the proletariat,” even if democratic in form, if it undertook centrally to direct the economic system, would probably destroy personal freedom as completely as any autocracy has ever done.
。不能像阿克顿勋爵谈论自由那样谈论民主，说民主“不是实现更高政治目的的手段，民主本身就是最高的政治目的，不是为了良好的公共管理而需要民主，而是为了追求公民社会和私人生活的最高目的而需要民主”。民主本质上是一种手段，一种维护内部和平和个人自由的功利主义工具
我们也不应忘记，在专制统治下，文化与精神自由往往比某些民主国家多得多——至少可以想象，在非常单一和教条的多数民主政府统治下，民主政府可能与最糟糕的独裁一样具有压迫性。
然而，我们的观点并不是独裁必然会扼杀自由，而是计划会导致独裁，因为独裁是最有效的强制手段，也是实现理想的手段，因此，如果大规模的中央计划成为可能，独裁就是必要的。
但是，就民主不再是个人自由的保证而言，它很可能以某种形式在极权主义政权下继续存在。真正的“无产阶级专政”，即使形式上是民主的，如果它集中指导经济制度，很可能会像任何独裁统治一样彻底摧毁个人自由。
“if Parliament were not willing to delegate law-making power, Parliament would be unable to pass the kind and quantity of legislation which public opinion requires” is innocently revealed in the little sentence that “many of the laws affect people’s lives so closely that elasticity is essential”! What does this mean if not conferment of arbitrary power—power limited by no fixed principles and which in the opinion of Parliament cannot be limited by definite and unambiguous rules?
“如果议会不愿意授权立法，议会就无法通过公众舆论所要求的那种数量和类型的立法”，这很可能是在很多情况下一个重要得多的原因，但这句话却天真地揭示了这一点：“很多法律与人们的生活息息相关，所以弹性至关重要！”如果不是授予任意权力，这意味着什么——不受任何固定原则限制的权力，议会认为不能被明确和明确的规则所限制？

Six: Planning and the Rule of Law

Recent studies in the sociology of law once more confirm that the fundamental principle of formal law by which every case must be judged according to general rational precepts, which have as few exceptions as possible and are based on logical subsumptions, obtains only for the liberal competitive phase of capitalism. —Karl Mannheim 法律社会学最近的研究再次证实，形式法的基本原则，即每个案件都必须根据一般理性原则进行判断，尽可能少有例外，并基于逻辑归纳，只适用于自由竞争阶段的资本主义。
Nothing distinguishes more clearly conditions in a free country from those in a country under arbitrary government than the observance in the former of the great principles known as the Rule of Law. Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge. Though this ideal can never be perfectly achieved, since legislators as well as those to whom the administration of the law is entrusted are fallible men, the essential point, that the discretion left to the executive organs wielding coercive power should be reduced as much as possible, is clear enough.
自由国家与专制国家最明显的区别，莫过于前者遵守法治原则，而后者不遵守法治原则。撇开所有技术性细节不谈，这意味着政府在所有行动中都受到事先确定并公布的规则的约束——这些规则使人们有可能以公平的确定性预见到政府将在特定情况下如何使用其强制性权力，并在此基础上规划个人事务。虽然这一理想永远不可能完全实现，因为立法者和那些被委托执行法律的人都是会犯错误的人，但关键的一点是，应该尽可能地减少留给行使强制性权力的行政机构的自由裁量权，这一点是显而易见的。
公正意味着对某些问题没有答案——如果我们必须对这些问题做出决定，我们会通过抛硬币来决定。在一个所有事情都被准确预见的世界里，国家很难做任何事情而保持公正。
Where the precise effects of government policy on particular people are known, where the government aims directly at such particular effects, it cannot help knowing these effects, and therefore it cannot be impartial. It must, of necessity, take sides, impose its valuations upon people and, instead of assisting them in the advancement of their own ends, choose the ends for them. As soon as the particular effects are foreseen at the time a law is made, it ceases to be a mere instrument to be used by the people and becomes instead an instrument used by the lawgiver upon the people and for his ends. The state ceases to be a piece of utilitarian machinery intended to help individuals in the fullest development of their individual personality and becomes a “moral” institution— where “moral” is not used in contrast to immoral but describes an institution which imposes on its members its views on all moral questions, whether these views be moral or highly immoral. In this sense the Nazi or any other collectivist state is “moral,” while the liberal state is not.
当政府政策对特定人群的确切影响已为人所知，当政府目标直接针对这些特定影响时，它不可避免地会知道这些影响，因此它不可能是公正的。它必然会偏袒一方，将自己的价值观强加于人，而不是帮助他们实现自己的目标，而是为他们选择目标。一旦在制定法律时预见到特定影响，它就不再是人民用来实现自己目标的工具，而是变成了立法者用来实现自己目标的工具。国家不再是旨在帮助个人充分发展个人个性的功利主义机器，而变成了一个“道德”机构——这里的“道德”不是与不道德相对的，而是用来描述一种机构，这种机构将自己的观点强加于其成员，无论这些观点是道德的还是高度不道德的。从这个意义上说，纳粹或其他任何集体主义国家是“道德的”，而自由国家则不是。
To take only the most characteristic case: when capital and labor in an industry agree on some policy of restriction and thus exploit the consumers, there is usually no difficulty about the division of the spoils in proportion to former earnings or on some similar principle.
When we have to choose between higher wages for nurses or doctors and more extensive services for the sick, more milk for children and better wages for agricultural workers, or between employment for the unemployed or better wages for those already employed, nothing short of a complete system of values in which every want of every person or group has a definite place is necessary to provide an answer.
对某个特定问题最直接相关的利益相关者，并不一定是整个社会的最佳判断者。仅以最具代表性的案例为例：当一个行业的资本和劳动力就某种限制性政策达成一致，从而剥削消费者时，根据以往收益或某种类似原则对收益进行分配通常是没有问题的。
当我们必须选择为护士和医生提供更高的工资，还是为病人提供更广泛的服务，为儿童提供更多的牛奶，为农业工人提供更好的工资，或者为失业者提供就业机会，还是为那些已经就业的人提供更好的工资时，只有建立一个完整的价值体系，在这个体系中，每个人的每个需要都有一个确定的位置，才能提供答案。
Indeed, the Rule of Law, more than the rule of contract, should probably be regarded as the true opposite of the rule of status. It is the Rule of Law, in the sense of the rule of formal law, the absence of legal privileges of particular people designated by authority, which safeguards that equality before the law which is the opposite of arbitrary government.
事实上，法治，而不是契约规则，更应该被视为地位规则的真正对立面。法治是正式法律意义上的规则，不存在由权威指定的特定人群的法定特权，这保障了法律面前人人平等，这是专制政府的对立面。
It may even be said that for the Rule of Law to be effective it is more important that there should be a rule applied always without exceptions than what this rule is. Often the content of the rule is indeed of minor importance, provided the same rule is universally enforced. To revert to a former example: it does not matter whether we all drive on the left- or on the right-hand side of the road so long as we all do the same. The important thing is that the rule enables us to predict other people’s behavior correctly, and this requires that it should apply to all cases—even if in a particular instance we feel it to be unjust.
对于法治而言，更重要的是始终适用没有任何例外的规则，而不是这个规则的内容是什么。如果同样的规则得到普遍执行，那么规则的内容其实并不重要。回到前面举的例子：只要我们都遵守同样的规则，我们是在道路的左侧还是右侧驾驶并不重要。重要的是，规则使我们能够正确地预测他人的行为，而这要求它适用于所有情况——即使我们在特定情况下认为它不公正。
The conflict between formal justice and formal equality before the law, on the one hand, and the attempts to realize various ideals of substantive justice and equality, on the other, also accounts for the widespread confusion about the concept of “privilege” and its consequent abuse.
But to call private property as such, which all can acquire under the same rules, a privilege, because only some succeed in acquiring it, is depriving the word “privilege” of its meaning.
但是，将所有人在相同规则下都可以获得的私有财产称为特权，因为只有一些人成功获得了它，这就使“特权”一词失去了意义。
As Immanuel Kant put it (and Voltaire expressed it before him in very much the same terms), “Man is free if he needs to obey no person but solely the laws.” As a vague ideal it has, however, existed at least since Roman times, and during the last few centuries it has never been so seriously threatened as it is today.
正如伊曼纽尔·康德（Immanuel Kant）所言（伏尔泰【Voltaire】在他之前用非常相似的措辞表达了同样的观点），“如果一个人只需要服从法律，而无需服从任何人，那么他就是自由的。”然而，作为一种模糊的理想，它至少从罗马时代就已经存在了，而且在过去的几个世纪中，它从未像今天这样受到如此严重的威胁。
To say that in a planned society the Rule of Law cannot hold is, therefore, not to say that the actions of the government will not be legal or that such a society will necessarily be lawless. It means only that the use of the government’s coercive powers will no longer be limited and determined by pre-established rules. The law can, and to make a central direction of economic activity possible must, legalize what to all intents and purposes remains arbitrary action.
By giving the government unlimited powers, the most arbitrary rule can be made legal; and in this way a democracy may set up the most complete despotism imaginable.
因此，说在计划经济中不能实行法治，并不是说政府的行为不会合法，也不是说这样的社会必然会无法无天，而仅仅意味着，政府强制权的使用将不再受到既定规则的限制和决定。法律可以，而且为了使中央指导经济活动成为可能，也必须将本来就武断的行为合法化。
通过赋予政府无限权力，最武断的规则可以被合法化；通过这种方式，一个民主国家可以建立想象中最完整的专制制度。
“democratic government no less than dictatorship must always [sic] have plenary powers in posse, without sacrificing their democratic and representative character. There is no restrictive penumbra of individual rights that can never be touched by government in administrative matters whatever the circumstances. There is no limit to the power of ruling which can and should be taken by a government freely chosen by the people and can be fully and openly criticised by an opposition.”
自社会主义运动开始以来，他们一直攻击个人权利的“形而上学”思想，并坚持认为，在一个理性有序的世界里，不会有个人权利，而只有个人义务。
“民主政府与独裁政府一样，必须始终拥有充分的权力，而不牺牲其民主和代表性。”在行政事务中，没有限制个人权利的半影，无论在什么情况下，政府都不能触及。执政的权力没有限制，可以由人民自由选择，也可以由反对派充分公开批评。”
[I was unable to locate the quotation attributed to Kant, but for the other, Hayek refers to François Marie Arouet de Voltaire, Oeuvres Complète de Voltaire, vol. 23 (Paris: Garnier, 1879), p. 526, where Voltaire writes, “La liberté consiste à ne dépendre que des lois.” —Ed.] 【我无法找到引自康德的话，但哈耶克指的是弗朗索瓦·玛丽·阿鲁埃·德·伏尔泰，《伏尔泰全集》，第23卷（巴黎：加尼耶出版社，1879年），第526页，伏尔泰写道，“自由就是只服从法律。”——译注】
The conflict is thus not, as it has often been misconceived in nineteenth century discussions, one between liberty and law. As John Locke had already made clear, there can be no liberty without law. The conflict is between different kinds of law—law so different that it should hardly be called by the same name: one is the law of the Rule of Law, general principles laid down beforehand, the “rules of the game” which enable individuals to foresee how the coercive apparatus of the state will be used, or what he and his fellow-citizens will be allowed to do, or made to do, in stated circumstances. The other kind of law gives in effect the authority power to do what it thinks fit to do.
因此，这种冲突并不是像19世纪讨论中经常误解的那样，是自由和法律之间的冲突。正如约翰·洛克已经明确说明的那样，没有法律就没有自由。这种冲突是不同种类的法律之间的冲突——法律如此不同，以至于几乎不能用同一个名称来称呼：一个是法治的法律，预先规定的一般原则，是“游戏规则”，使个人能够预见国家强制机构将如何使用，或者在特定情况下，他和他的公民同胞将被允许做什么，或者被要求做什么。另一种法律实际上赋予了当局权力去做它认为合适的事情。
The form which the Rule of Law takes in criminal law is usually expressed by the Latin tag nulla poena sine lege—no punishment without a law expressly prescribing it. The essence of this rule is that the law must have existed as a general rule before the individual case arose to which it is to be applied.
法治在刑法中通常表现为“法无明文规定不为罪，法无明文规定不处罚”的拉丁格言。这一原则的实质是，在适用法律之前，法律必须作为一种普遍规则存在。

Seven: Economic Control and Totalitarianism

The control of the production of wealth is the control of human life itself. 控制财富的生产就是控制人的生命本身。 —Hilaire Belloc ——希莱尔·贝洛克
我们的规划者向我们提供的安慰是，这种独裁指导将“仅”适用于经济事务。
例如，最著名的经济规划者之一斯图尔特·蔡斯向我们保证，在一个规划的社会中，“如果政治民主仅限于经济事务之外，那么政治民主可以继续存在。”这些保证通常伴随着这样的建议：在放弃生活中或应该是生活中不那么重要的方面的自由的同时，我们将获得追求更高价值更大的自由。
If planning really did free us from the less important cares and so made it easier to render our existence one of plain living and high thinking, who would wish to belittle such an ideal? If our economic activities really concerned only the inferior or even more sordid sides of life, of course we ought to endeavor by all means to find a way to relieve ourselves from the excessive care for material ends and, leaving them to be cared for by some piece of utilitarian machinery, set our minds free for the higher things of life.
如果规划真的能让我们摆脱次要的忧虑，从而更容易过上朴素的生活，进行高深的思考，谁会希望贬低这样的理想？如果我们的经济活动真的只涉及生活中低劣甚至卑鄙的一面，当然，我们应该想尽一切办法摆脱对物质目标的过度关注，让它们由一些功利机器来照顾，把我们的思想解放出来，追求生活中更高尚的东西。
Unfortunately, the assurance people derive from this belief that the power which is exercised over economic life is a power over matters of secondary importance only, and which makes them take lightly the threat to the freedom of our economic pursuits, is altogether unwarranted. It is largely a consequence of the erroneous belief that there are purely economic ends separate from the other ends of life.
The ultimate ends of the activities of reasonable beings are never economic. Strictly speaking, there is no “economic motive” but only economic factors conditioning our striving for other ends.
What in ordinary language is misleadingly called the “economic motive” means merely the desire for general opportunity, the desire for power to achieve unspecified ends. If we strive for money, it is because it offers us the widest choice in enjoying the fruits of our efforts. Because in modern society it is through the limitation of our money incomes that we are made to feel the restrictions which our relative poverty still imposes upon us, many have come to hate money as the symbol of these restrictions.
We shall better understand the significance of this service of money if we consider what it would really mean if, as so many socialists characteristically propose, the “pecuniary motive” were largely displaced by “noneconomic incentives.”
不幸的是，人们从这种信念中得到保证，即对经济生活行使的权力只是对次要问题行使的权力，这使他们淡化了对我们经济追求自由的威胁，而这完全是毫无根据的。这在很大程度上是错误信念的后果，即认为纯粹的经济目的与生活的其他目的截然分开。
理性行为者的活动的最终目的决不是经济的。严格地说，没有“经济动机”，只有影响我们追求其他目的的经济因素。在日常语言中被错误地称为“经济动机”的东西，仅仅意味着对一般机会的渴望，对实现不明确目的的权力的渴望。如果我们追求金钱，那是因为它为我们提供了享受努力成果的最广泛选择。因为在现代社会，正是通过限制我们的金钱收入，我们才会感受到相对贫困强加于我们的限制，因此许多人开始憎恨金钱，视其为这些限制的象征。
如果我们考虑一下，如果像许多社会主义者所提议的那样，“金钱动机”在很大程度上被“非经济激励”所取代，那么这到底意味着什么，那么我们就会更好地理解金钱的作用。
Once we realize that there is no separate economic motive and that an economic gain or economic loss is merely a gain or a loss where it is still in our power to decide which of our needs or desires shall be affected, it is also easier to see the important kernel of truth in the general belief that economic matters affect only the less important ends of life and to understand the contempt in which “merely” economic considerations are often held.
Economic changes, in other words, usually affect only the fringe, the “margin,” of our needs. There are many things which are more important than anything which economic gains or losses are likely to affect, which for us stand high above the amenities and even above many of the necessities of life which are affected by the economic ups and downs.
一旦我们意识到没有单独的经济动机，经济收益或经济损失仅仅是一种收益或损失，我们仍然可以决定哪些需求或愿望将受到影响，那么，我们也会更容易看到普遍认为的经济事务只影响生活中不太重要的目的的重要核心事实，并理解“仅仅”经济考虑往往受到的蔑视
换句话说，经济变化通常只影响我们需求的边缘，即“边际”。有许多事情比经济收益或损失可能影响的事情更重要，对我们来说，这些事情比经济起伏影响的生活便利甚至许多生活必需品更重要。
To be controlled in our economic pursuits means to be always controlled unless we declare our specific purpose. Or, since when we declare our specific purpose we shall also have to get it approved, we should really be controlled in everything.
在经济追求中受到控制意味着，除非我们声明我们的具体目的，否则我们总是受到控制。或者，既然当我们声明我们的具体目的时，我们也必须获得批准，那么我们实际上应该受到一切事物的控制。
The question raised by economic planning is, therefore, not merely whether we shall be able to satisfy what we regard as our more or less important needs in the way we prefer. It is whether it shall be we who decide what is more, and what is less, important for us, or whether this is to be decided by the planner. Economic planning would not affect merely those of our marginal needs that we have in mind when we speak contemptuously about the merely economic. It would, in effect, mean that we as individuals should no longer be allowed to decide what we regard as marginal.
经济规划不仅会影响我们在蔑视纯粹经济时所考虑的边际需求。实际上，这意味着我们个人不再被允许决定我们认为什么是边际的。
The authority directing all economic activity would control not merely the part of our lives which is concerned with inferior things; it would control the allocation of the limited means for all our ends. And whoever controls all economic activity controls the means for all our ends and must therefore decide which are to be satisfied and which not.
Economic control is not merely control of a sector of human life which can be separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends. And whoever has sole control of the means must also determine which ends are to be served, which values are to be rated higher and which lower—in short, what men should believe and strive for.
Central planning means that the economic problem is to be solved by the community instead of by the individual; but this involves that it must also be the community, or rather its representatives, who must decide the relative importance of the different needs.
控制所有经济活动的权力机构不仅会控制我们生活中与低级事物有关的那一部分；它还会控制我们实现所有目的的有限手段的分配。而控制所有经济活动的人，也控制着我们实现所有目的的手段，因此必须决定哪些目的能够实现，哪些目的不能实现
经济控制不仅仅是对人类生活中某一领域的控制，这一领域是可以与人类生活的其他领域分开的；经济控制是对我们实现所有目的的手段的控制。而控制这些手段的人，也必须决定实现哪些目的，哪些价值应该被赋予更高的评价，哪些价值应该被赋予较低的评价——简而言之，人们应该信仰什么，追求什么。
中央计划意味着，解决经济问题的是整个社会，而不是个人；但这也意味着，必须由整个社会，或者它的代表，来决定不同需求的相对重要性。
The so-called economic freedom which the planners promise us means precisely that we are to be relieved of the necessity of solving our own economic problems and that the bitter choices which this often involves are to be made for us. Since under modern conditions we are for almost everything dependent on means which our fellow-men provide, economic planning would involve direction of almost the whole of our life. There is hardly an aspect of it, from our primary needs to our relations with our family and friends, from the nature of our work to the use of our leisure, over which the planner would not exercise his “conscious control.”
规划者向我们承诺的所谓经济自由，恰恰意味着我们无需解决自己的经济问题，而那些往往涉及痛苦抉择的选择将由他人为我们做出。由于在现代条件下，我们几乎一切都要依赖他人提供的手段，经济规划将涉及我们生活的几乎方方面面。从我们的基本需求，到我们与家人朋友的关系，从工作的性质，到闲暇时间的利用，规划者几乎都会对其施加“有意识的控制”。
The source of this power over all consumption which in a planned society the authority would possess would be its control over production.
在计划社会中，当局将拥有对所有消费的控制权，其来源是对生产的控制。
Our freedom of choice in a competitive society rests on the fact that, if one person refuses to satisfy our wishes, we can turn to another. But if we face a monopolist we are at his mercy.
在一个竞争性社会中，我们的选择自由取决于这样一个事实：如果一个人拒绝满足我们的愿望，我们可以转向另一个人。但如果我们面对一个垄断者，我们就任由他摆布了。
Not only in our capacity as consumers, however, and not even mainly in that capacity, would the will of the authority shape and “guide” our daily lives.
some freedom in choosing our work is, probably, even more important for our happiness than freedom to spend our income during the hours of leisure.
权威的意志不仅会以消费者的身份影响和“指导”我们的日常生活，甚至主要不是以这种身份，还会以生产者的身份影响和“指导”我们的生活。
因此，与我们在闲暇时间花费收入相比，选择工作的自由可能对我们的幸福更加重要。
Few people ever have an abundance of choice of occupation. But what matters is that we have some choice, that we are not absolutely tied to a particular job which has been chosen for us, or which we may have chosen in the past, and that if one position becomes quite intolerable, or if we set our heart on another, there is almost always a way for the able, some sacrifice at the price of which he may achieve his goal. Nothing makes conditions more unbearable than the knowledge that no effort of ours can change them; and even if we should never have the strength of mind to make the necessary sacrifice, the knowledge that we could escape if we only strove hard enough makes many otherwise intolerable positions bearable.
很少有人拥有丰富的职业选择。但重要的是，我们有一些选择，我们并不是绝对地被束缚在为我们选择或我们过去选择的工作上，如果一个职位变得让人无法忍受，或者如果我们一心想换一个职位，那么几乎总是有办法让有能力的人做出一些牺牲，以实现他的目标。没有什么比知道我们的任何努力都无法改变现状更让人无法忍受的了；即使我们永远没有足够的勇气做出必要的牺牲，但知道只要我们足够努力就可以逃脱的事实，让许多原本无法忍受的职位变得可以忍受。
The “freedom of choice” would be purely fictitious, a mere promise to practice no discrimination where in the nature of the case discrimination must be practiced, and where all one could hope would be that the selection would be made on what the authority believed to be objective grounds.
“自由选择”将成为纯粹的虚构，成为一种承诺，即在必须实施歧视的情况下不实施歧视，在人们所能期望的只是根据该机构认为的客观理由进行选择的情况下不实施歧视。
Conditions will be without exception what in some measure they inevitably are in a large organization—or rather worse, because there will be no possibility of escape. We shall no longer be free to be rational or efficient only when and where we think it worth while; we shall all have to conform to the standards which the planning authority must fix in order to simplify its task.
条件将不可避免地在一定程度上成为大型组织的条件——或者更糟，因为没有逃脱的可能性。我们将不再能够自由地理性或高效，只有在我们认为值得的地方和时间；我们都必须遵守规划当局必须确定的标准，以简化其任务。
It is significant of the confusion prevailing on all these subjects that it should have become a cause for reproach that in a competitive society almost everything can be had at a price. If the people who protest against having the higher values of life brought into the “cash nexus” really mean that we should not be allowed to sacrifice our lesser needs in order to preserve the higher values, and that the choice should be made for us, this demand must be regarded as rather peculiar and scarcely testifies to great respect for the dignity of the individual. That life and health, beauty and virtue, honor and peace of mind, can often be preserved only at considerable material cost, and that somebody must make the choice, is as undeniable as that we all are sometimes not prepared to make the material sacrifices necessary to protect those higher values against all injury.
在一个竞争社会中，几乎任何东西都可以用金钱买到，这应该受到指责，这表明了所有这些主题上普遍存在的混乱。如果那些抗议把更高的生活价值带入“金钱关系”的人真的意味着，我们不应该被允许牺牲较小的需求，以维护更高的价值，选择应该为我们做出，那么这一要求必须被视为相当特殊，几乎不能证明对个人尊严的极大尊重。生命和健康、美丽和美德、荣誉和心灵的平静，往往只能以相当大的物质代价来换取，而且必须有人做出选择，这是无可争辩的，就像我们有时不准备为保护这些更高的价值而做出必要的物质牺牲一样。
Nor can it be otherwise, since all our ends compete for the same means; and we could not strive for anything but these absolute values if they were on no account to be endangered.
除此之外别无他法，因为我们的所有目的都在争夺同样的手段；如果这些绝对价值毫发无损，我们除了争取这些绝对价值之外别无他求。
That people should wish to be relieved of the bitter choice which hard facts often impose upon them is not surprising. But few want to be relieved through having the choice made for them by others. People just wish that the choice should not be necessary at all. And they are only too ready to believe that the choice is not really necessary, that it is imposed upon them merely by the particular economic system under which we live. What they resent is, in truth, that there is an economic problem. 人们希望摆脱严酷的现实所强加于他们的痛苦选择，这并不奇怪。但很少有人愿意通过让别人为自己做出选择来摆脱痛苦。人们只是希望根本没有必要做出选择。他们非常愿意相信，这种选择实际上是不必要的，它只是我们所处的特定经济制度强加于他们的。事实上，他们怨恨的是存在一个经济问题。
But the question remains whether the price we should have to pay for the realization of somebody’s ideal of justice is not bound to be more discontent and more oppression than was ever caused by the much-abused free play of economic forces.
但是，问题仍然是，为了实现某人的正义理想而必须付出的代价，是否必然比滥用经济力量所造成的不满和压迫更多。
It could not stop at what we regard as our economic activities, because we are now for almost every part of our lives dependent on somebody else’s economic activities. The passion for the “collective satisfaction of our needs,” with which our socialists have so well prepared the way for totalitarianism, and which wants us to take our pleasures as well as our necessities at the appointed time and in the prescribed form, is, of course, partly intended as a means of political education. But it is also the result of the exigencies of planning, which consists essentially in depriving us of choice, in order to give us whatever fits best into the plan and that at a time determined by the plan.
它不能停留在我们认为的经济活动上，因为我们现在几乎生活的每个方面都依赖于他人的经济活动。我们的社会主义者为极权主义铺平了道路，他们热衷于“集体满足我们的需求”，希望我们在规定的时间和规定的形式下享受我们的乐趣和必需品，当然，这在一定程度上是为了进行政治教育。但这也是计划所迫的结果，计划的本质是剥夺我们的选择权，以便给我们最适合计划的东西，并在计划的时间给我们。
The economic freedom which is the prerequisite of any other freedom cannot be the freedom from economic care which the socialists promise us and which can be obtained only by relieving the individual at the same time of the necessity and of the power of choice; it must be the freedom of our economic activity which, with the right of choice, inevitably also carries the risk and the responsibility of that right.
经济自由是任何其他自由的先决条件，它不能是社会主义者向我们承诺的摆脱经济忧虑的自由，这种自由只能通过同时消除个人选择的必要性和选择能力来获得；它必须是我们经济活动的自由，这种自由伴随着选择权，不可避免地也伴随着选择权的风险和责任。
In his appendix, Robbins discusses the meaning of the term “economic causation,” and concludes “The causes of war are to be regarded as economic if the objective is purely instrumental to securing for some person or persons a greater command of resources in general. . . . They are to be regarded as non-economic if the objective is not instrumental to anything further—if it is definitely an end in itself rather than means for a number of ends.” Op. cit., p. 118. —Ed.]
在附录中，罗宾斯讨论了“经济原因”这个术语的含义，并总结道：“如果战争的目的是纯粹为了给某些人或某些人更大的资源控制权，那么战争的原因就是经济的。如果战争的目的不是为了任何进一步的目的——如果它明确是一个目的本身，而不是许多目的的手段——那么战争的原因就不是经济的。”
The extent of the control over all life that economic control confers is nowhere better illustrated than in the field of foreign exchanges. Nothing would at first seem to affect private life less than a state control of the dealings in foreign exchange, and most people will regard its introduction with complete indifference. Yet the experience of most Continental countries has taught thoughtful people to regard this step as the decisive advance on the path to totalitarianism and the suppression of individual liberty. It is, in fact, the complete delivery of the individual to the tyranny of the state, the final suppression of all means of escape—not merely for the rich but for everybody. Once the individual is no longer free to travel, no longer free to buy foreign books or journals, once all the means of foreign contact can be restricted to those of whom official opinion approves or for whom it is regarded as necessary, the effective control of opinion is much greater than that ever exercised by any of the absolutist governments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 经济控制对所有生活的控制程度，在外汇领域得到了最好的说明。没有什么比国家控制外汇交易对私人生活的影响更小的了，大多数人会对它的引入完全漠不关心。然而，大多数欧洲大陆国家的经历让深思熟虑的人们认为，这是向极权主义和压制个人自由的道路上迈出的决定性的一步。事实上，这是将个人完全交给了国家的暴政，最终压制了所有的逃跑手段——不仅针对富人，而且针对所有人。一旦个人不再能够自由旅行，不再能够自由购买外国书籍或杂志，一旦所有与外国接触的手段都可以被限制为官方认可的人或官方认为必要的人，那么对舆论的有效控制将远远超过 17 世纪和 18 世纪的任何专制政府。
It is no accident that in the totalitarian countries, be it Russia or Germany or Italy, the question of how to organize the people’s leisure has become a problem of planning. The Germans have even invented for this problem the horrible and self-contradictory name of Freizeitgestaltung (literally: the shaping of the use made of the people’s free time), as if it were still “free time” when it has to be spent in the way ordained by authority. 在极权国家，无论是俄罗斯、德国还是意大利，如何组织人民闲暇时间的问题已经成为一个规划问题，这并非偶然。德国人甚至为这个问题发明了一个可怕而自相矛盾的名字：Freizeitgestaltung（字面意思是：闲暇时间的塑造），仿佛在必须按照当局规定的方式度过闲暇时间时，它仍然是“自由时间”。

Eight: Who, Whom?

The finest opportunity ever given to the world was thrown away because the passion for equality made vain the hope for freedom. —Lord Acton 阿克顿勋爵说：“人类有史以来最好的机会被白白浪费了，因为对平等的热情使对自由的希望落空了。”
It is not irrelevant to recall that to the ancients blindness was an attribute of their deity of justice. Although competition and justice may have little else in common, it is as much a commendation of competition as of justice that it is no respecter of persons.
And this is nonetheless true, because in competition chance and good luck are often as important as skill and foresight in determining the fate of different people.
值得注意的是，在古人眼中，失明是正义之神的特征。尽管竞争和正义几乎没有其他共同之处，但竞争和正义一样，不因人而异，这也是对竞争的赞扬。
然而，事实确实如此，因为在竞争过程中，机会和运气往往与技能和远见一样，在决定不同人的命运方面起着重要作用。
The choice open to us is not between a system in which everybody will get what he deserves according to some absolute and universal standard of right, and one where the individual shares are determined partly by accident or good or ill chance, but between a system where it is the will of a few persons that decides who is to get what, and one where it depends at least partly on the ability and enterprise of the people concerned and partly on unforeseeable circumstances.
The fact that the opportunities open to the poor in a competitive society are much more restricted than those open to the rich does not make it less true that in such a society the poor are much more free than a person commanding much greater material comfort in a different type of society. Although under competition the probability that a man who starts poor will reach great wealth is much smaller than is true of the man who has inherited property, it is not only possible for the former, but the competitive system is the only one where it depends solely on him and not on the favors of the mighty, and where nobody can prevent a man from attempting to achieve this result. It is only because we have forgotten what unfreedom means that we often overlook the patent fact that in every real sense a badly paid unskilled worker in this country has more freedom to shape his life than many a small entrepreneur in Germany or a much better paid engineer or manager in Russia. Whether it is a question of changing his job or the place where he lives, of professing certain views or of spending his leisure in a particular manner, although sometimes the price he may have to pay for following his inclinations may be high, and to many appear too high, there are no absolute impediments, no dangers to bodily security and freedom, that confine him by brute force to the task and the environment to which a superior has assigned him.
在一个竞争性社会中，穷人获得的机会比富人少得多，这一事实并不能削弱这样一个事实：在这种社会中，穷人比另一种社会中拥有更多物质财富的人更自由。尽管在竞争中，一个出身贫寒的人获得巨额财富的可能性比继承财产的人要小得多，但前者不仅有可能，而且竞争制度是唯一一个完全取决于他而不是权贵恩惠的制度，而且没有人能阻止一个人试图实现这一结果。我们之所以经常忽视这个明显的事实，只是因为我们忘记了不自由意味着什么，在这个国家，一个薪水微薄的非熟练工人，在塑造自己的生活方面，比德国的许多小企业家或俄罗斯薪水高得多的工程师或经理拥有更多的自由。无论是改变他的工作还是居住地，是表达某些观点还是以某种方式度过闲暇时光，虽然有时他可能不得不为追随自己的意愿付出高昂的代价，而且对许多人来说，这个代价似乎太高了，但并没有绝对的障碍，没有危及人身安全和自由的危险，没有用野蛮力量将他限制在上级分配的任务和环境之中。
That the ideal of justice of most socialists would be satisfied if merely private income from property were abolished and the differences between the earned incomes of different people remained what they are now is true. What these people forget is that, in transferring all property in the means of production to the state, they put the state in a position whereby its action must in effect decide all other incomes. The power thus given to the state and the demand that the state should use it to “plan” means
如果仅仅废除来自财产的私人收入，而不同人群的劳动收入之间的差异保持不变，那么大多数社会主义者的正义理想就会得到满足，这是事实。这些人忘记的是，在将所有生产资料的所有权转移到国家手中时，他们使国家处于这样一种境地：国家的行动实际上必须决定所有其他收入。因此赋予国家的权力和要求国家利用它进行“计划”意味着，它应该充分意识到所有这些影响。
It is only because the control of the means of production is divided among many people acting independently that nobody has complete power over us, that we as individuals can decide what to do with ourselves.
正是因为生产资料的控制权分散在许多独立行动的人手中，所以没有人能完全控制我们，我们个人才能决定自己的命运。
and on whose discretion it depends whether and how I am to be allowed to live or to work? And who will deny that a world in which the wealthy are powerful is still a better world than one in which only the already powerful can acquire wealth?
我的生存或工作是否得到允许以及如何得到允许取决于他的自由裁量权？谁会否认一个富人强大的世界仍然是一个比只有强者才能获得财富的世界更好的世界？
“It seems obvious to me now—though I have been slow, I must say, in coming to the conclusion—that the institution of private property is one of the main things that have given man that limited amount of free-and-equalness that Marx hoped to render infinite by abolishing this institution. Strangely enough Marx was the first to see this. He is the one who informed us, looking backwards, that the evolution of private capitalism with its free market had been a precondition for the evolution of all our democratic freedoms. It never occurred to him, looking forward, that if this was so, these other freedoms might disappear with the abolition of the free market.” “我现在觉得很明显——虽然我必须承认，我得出这个结论的过程很缓慢——私有制是马克思希望通过废除私有制使自由和平等变得无限的主要因素之一。奇怪的是，马克思是第一个看到这一点的人。他告诉我们，回顾过去，私有资本及其自由市场的演变是所有民主自由发展的先决条件。他从未想到，展望未来，如果这是真的，那么其他自由可能会随着自由市场的废除而消失。”
Once it becomes increasingly true, and is generally recognized, that the position of the individual is determined not by impersonal forces, not as a result of the competitive effort of many, but by the deliberate decision of authority, the attitude of the people toward their position in the social order necessarily changes.
But when these things occur in a society which is consciously directed, the way in which people will react will be very different from what it is when they are nobody’s conscious choice.
一旦人们越来越相信，个人的地位不是由非个人的力量决定的，不是许多人竞争的结果，而是由当局的刻意决定决定的，那么人们对自己在社会秩序中的地位的态度必然会改变。
但是，当这些事情在一个有意识地指导的社会中发生时，人们的反应方式将与没有人有意识的选择时大不相同。
Inequality is undoubtedly more readily borne, and affects the dignity of the person much less, if it is determined by impersonal forces than when it is due to design.
如果不平等是由非个人力量决定的，而不是由设计决定的，那么不平等无疑更容易忍受，并且对人的尊严的影响要小得多。
While people will submit to suffering which may hit anyone, they will not so easily submit to suffering which is the result of the decision of authority.
Dissatisfaction of everybody with his lot will inevitably grow with the consciousness that it is the result of deliberate human decision.
虽然人们会屈服于可能降临到任何人身上的苦难，但他们不会轻易屈服于权威决定带来的苦难。
每个人对自己命运的不满都会不可避免地增加，因为他们意识到这是深思熟虑的人类决定的结果。
In a planned society we shall all know that we are better or worse off than others, not because of circumstances which nobody controls, and which it is impossible to foresee with certainty, but because some authority wills it.
And all our efforts directed toward improving our position will have to aim, not at foreseeing and preparing as well as we can for the circumstances over which we have no control, but at influencing in our favor the authority which has all the power.
在一个计划社会中，我们都会知道，我们比别人过得更好或更差，不是因为没有人控制的环境，也不是因为不可能确定地预见，而是因为某些权威的意愿。
我们为改善自己的地位而做出的所有努力，都将不是为了预测和尽可能地为我们无法控制的环境做好准备，而是为了影响对我们有利的拥有所有权力的权威。
I believe it was Lenin himself who introduced to Russia the famous phrase “who, whom?”—during the early years of Soviet rule the byword in which the people summed up the universal problem of a socialist society. Who plans whom, who directs and dominates whom, who assigns to other people their station in life, and who is to have his due allotted by others? These become necessarily the central issues to be decided solely by the supreme power. 我相信是列宁本人将“谁，谁？”这句名言引入了俄罗斯——在苏联统治的早期，这句箴言成为人们总结社会主义社会普遍问题的口头禅。谁计划谁，谁指导和支配谁，谁分配他人的社会地位，谁应由他人决定？这些必然成为由最高权力决定的核心问题。
Is there a scale of values, on which reasonable people can be expected to agree, which would justify a new hierarchical order of society and is likely to satisfy the demands for justice?
是否存在一个合理的价值尺度，可以使人们达成共识，从而证明一种新的社会等级秩序的合理性，并可能满足对正义的要求？
No socialist movement which aimed at complete equality has ever gained substantial support. What socialism promised was not an absolutely equal, but a more just and more equal, distribution. Not equality in the absolute sense but “greater equality” is the only goal which is seriously aimed at.
任何旨在实现完全平等的社会主义运动都没有获得实质性支持。社会主义所承诺的不是绝对平等的分配，而是更公正、更平等的分配。唯一认真追求的目标不是绝对意义上的平等，而是“更大的平等”。
While absolute equality would clearly determine the planner’s task, the desire for greater equality is merely negative, no more than an expression of dislike of the present state of affairs;
绝对的平等显然可以明确规划者的任务，而追求更大平等的愿望只是消极的，无非是不喜欢当前状况的一种表达；
What we mean by a just price, or a fair wage is either the customary price or wage, the return which past experience has made people expect, or the price or wage that would exist if there were no monopolistic exploitation. The only important exception to this used to be the claim of the workers to the “full produce of their labor,” to which so much of socialist doctrine traces back.
我们所认为的公正价格或公平工资，要么是习惯价格或工资，要么是过去的经验让人们所期待的回报，要么是如果没有垄断剥削就存在的价格或工资。这种情况唯一的重要例外是工人对“自己劳动的全部产品”的要求，许多社会主义学说都源于这种要求。
It is because successful planning requires the creation of a common view on the essential values that the restriction of our freedom with regard to material things touches so directly on our spiritual freedom.
这是因为成功的规划需要对基本价值观的共同看法，所以我们对物质自由的限制直接触及我们的精神自由。
But what does education mean in this respect? Surely we have learned that knowledge cannot create new ethical values, that no amount of learning will lead people to hold the same views on the moral issues which a conscious ordering of all social relations raises.
And, indeed, socialists everywhere were the first to recognize that the task they had set themselves required the general acceptance of a common Weltanschauung, of a definite set of values. It was in these efforts to produce a mass movement supported by such a single world view that the socialists first created most of the instruments of indoctrination of which Nazis and Fascists have made such effective use.
但是，教育意味着什么？我们当然已经知道，知识不能创造新的道德价值观，任何数量的学习都不会导致人们在道德问题上持有相同的观点，而道德问题是所有社会关系的有意识的秩序所提出的。
事实上，各地的社会主义者是第一个认识到他们所设定的任务需要普遍接受一种共同的世界观，一套明确的价值观。正是通过这些努力，社会主义者首先创造了纳粹和法西斯主义者有效利用的大多数教化工具，以支持这种单一的世界观。
The character of the problem changes, however, as in the course of the progressive advance toward socialism it becomes more and more evident to everyone that his income and general position are determined by the coercive apparatus of the state, that he can maintain or improve his position only as a member of an organized group capable of influencing or controlling the state machine in his interest.
然而，随着社会主义逐步向前推进，每个人越来越明显地意识到，他的收入和总体地位是由国家的强制机构决定的，他只有作为能够影响或控制国家机器以符合自己利益的有组织群体的一员，才能维持或提高自己的地位。
There is a great deal of truth in the often heard statement that fascism and National Socialism are a sort of middle-class socialism— only that in Italy and Germany the supporters of these new movements were economically hardly a middle class any longer. It was to a large extent a revolt of a new underprivileged class against the labor aristocracy which the industrial labor movement had created.
人们常说法西斯主义和纳粹主义是一种中产阶级社会主义，这种说法很有道理——只不过在意大利和德国，这些新运动的支持者已经不再在经济上属于中产阶级。这在很大程度上是一种新的弱势阶层对产业工人运动所创造出来的工人贵族阶级的反抗。
While the younger generation, out of that contempt for profit-making fostered by socialist teaching, spurned independent positions which involved risk and flocked in ever increasing numbers into salaried positions which promised security, they demanded a place yielding them the income and power to which in their opinion their training entitled them. While they believed in an organized society, they expected a place in that society very different from that which society ruled by labor seemed to offer.
虽然年轻一代对社会主义教育培养的对利润的蔑视，蔑视涉及风险的独立职位，并越来越多地涌向承诺安全的带薪职位，但他们要求一个能给他们带来收入和权力的职位，在他们看来，他们的培训使他们有资格获得这些。虽然他们相信一个有组织的社会，但他们期望在这个社会中占据一个与劳动统治的社会所提供的截然不同的位置。
Their tactics were developed in a world already dominated by socialist policy and the problems it creates. They had no illusions about the possibility of a democratic solution of problems which require more agreement among people than can reasonably be expected. They had no illusions about the capacity of reason to decide all the questions of the relative importance of the wants of different men or groups which planning inevitably raises, or about the formula of equality providing an answer. They knew that the strongest group which rallied enough supporters in favor of a new hierarchical order of society, and which frankly promised privileges to the classes to which it appealed, was likely to obtain the support of all those who were disappointed because they had been promised equality but found that they had merely furthered the interest of a particular class.
他们的战术是在一个已经被社会主义政策及其带来的问题所主宰的世界中发展起来的。他们对民主解决问题的可能性不抱幻想，这些问题需要人们达成超过合理预期的共识。他们对理性决定所有问题的能力不抱幻想，这些问题是规划不可避免地提出的不同的人或群体的需求的相对重要性，或者对提供答案的平等公式不抱幻想。他们知道，最强大的群体是那些召集足够多支持者支持新的社会等级秩序的群体，这些群体坦率地承诺向其呼吁的阶级提供特权，这些群体可能会获得所有那些失望者的支持，因为他们承诺平等，但发现他们只是促进了特定阶级的利益。
It is probable that we habitually overestimate the extent to which inequality of incomes is mainly caused by income derived from property, and therefore the extent to which the major inequalities would be abolished by abolishing income from property.
我们很可能习惯性地高估了收入不平等在很大程度上是由来自财产的收入造成的，因此高估了通过废除来自财产的收入来消除主要不平等的程度。
Max Eastman, “Socialism Doesn’t Jibe with Human Nature,” Reader’s Digest, vol. 38, June 1941, p. 47.

Nine: Security and Freedom

In a country where the sole employer is the State, opposition means death by slow starvation. The old principle: who does not work shall not eat, has been replaced by a new one: who does not obey shall not eat. 在这个国家，唯一的雇主是国家，反对意味着慢慢饿死。旧的原则是：不工作的人不能吃饭，已经被新的原则所取代：不服从的人不能吃饭。 —Leon Trotsky (1937) ——列夫·托洛茨基（1937年）
Independence of mind or strength of character is rarely found among those who cannot be confident that they will make their way by their own effort.
Yet the idea of economic security is no less vague and ambiguous than most other terms in this field; and because of this the general approval given to the demand for security may become a danger to liberty. Indeed, when security is understood in too absolute a sense, the general striving for it, far from increasing the chances of freedom, becomes the gravest threat to it.
那些对自己能否通过自己的努力取得成功没有信心的人，很少有独立的思想或坚强的性格。
It will be well to contrast at the outset the two kinds of security: the limited one, which can be achieved for all, and which is therefore no privilege but a legitimate object of desire; and absolute security, which in a free society cannot be achieved for all and which ought not to be given as a privilege—except in a few special instances such as that of the judges, where complete independence is of paramount importance. These two kinds of security are, first, security against severe physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum of sustenance for all; and, second, the security of a given standard of life, or of the relative position which one person or group enjoys compared with others;
the security of a minimum income and the security of the particular income a person is thought to deserve.
最好从一开始就对比一下两种安全：有限的安全，所有人都可以实现，因此不是特权，而是合法的愿望对象；绝对安全，在自由社会中不可能为所有人实现，也不应该作为特权给予——除非在少数特殊情况下，例如法官，完全独立至关重要。这两种安全首先是防止严重物质匮乏的安全，即所有人获得一定最低生活保障的确定性；其次，是某种生活标准的安全，或者一个人或一个群体相对于其他人的相对地位；
是最低收入的安全，以及一个人被认为应得的特定收入的安全。
there is particularly the important question whether those who thus rely on the community should indefinitely enjoy all the same liberties as the rest. An incautious handling of these questions might well cause serious and perhaps even dangerous political problems; but there can be no doubt that some minimum of food, shelter, and clothing, sufficient to preserve health and the capacity to work, can be assured to everybody.
那些依靠社会的人是否应该无限期地享有与其他人相同的所有自由，这是一个重要的问题。对这些问题的草率处理很可能会造成严重的、甚至危险的政治问题；但毫无疑问，每个人都能得到最低限度的食物、住所和衣服，足以保持健康和工作能力。
In any system which for the distribution of men between the different trades and occupations relies on their own choice it is necessary that the remuneration in these trades should correspond to their usefulness to the other members of society, even if this should stand in no relation to subjective merit. Although the results achieved will often be commensurate with efforts and intentions, this cannot always be true in any form of society. It will particularly not be true in the many instances where the usefulness of some trade or special skill is changed by circumstances which could not be foreseen. We all know the tragic plight of the highly trained man whose hard-learned skill has suddenly lost its value because of some invention which greatly benefits the rest of society.
我们都知道，受过高等训练的人的悲惨处境是，由于一些对社会其他成员有极大好处的发明，他们学得来的技能突然失去了价值。
That anyone should suffer a great diminution of his income and bitter disappointment of all his hopes through no fault of his own, and despite hard work and exceptional skill, undoubtedly offends our sense of justice.
任何人由于自身原因而遭受收入大幅减少和所有希望破灭的痛苦，尽管他努力工作并拥有特殊技能，这无疑违背了我们的正义感。
That security of an invariable income can be provided for all only by the abolition of all freedom in the choice of one’s employment is easily shown.
很容易证明，只有通过废除人们在就业选择上的所有自由，才能为所有人提供恒定的收入保障。
“In order to do an engineering job,” he explains, “there ought to be surrounding the work a comparatively large area of unplanned economic action. There should be a place from which workers can be drawn, and when a worker is fired he should vanish from the job and from the pay-roll. In the absence of such a free reservoir discipline cannot be maintained without corporal punishment, as with slave labor.” 他解释说：“为了完成一项工程工作，周围应该存在一个相对较大的非计划经济活动区域。应该有一个工人可以被吸引的地方，当一个工人被解雇时，他应该从工作中消失，从工资单上消失。如果没有这样一个自由的储备，就不能保持纪律，就像使用奴隶劳动一样。”
But no more than in the case of the worker can the manager’s position and income in a planned system be made to depend merely on the success or failure of the work under his direction. As neither the risk nor the gain is his, it cannot be his personal judgment, but whether he does what he ought to have done according to some established rule, which must decide. A mistake he “ought” to have avoided is not his own affair; it is a crime against the community and must be treated as such.
但是，在一个计划经济体中，管理者的地位和收入不能仅仅取决于他所指导的工作的成功或失败，就像工人的情况一样。因为风险和收益都不是他的，所以不能由他的个人判断来决定，而必须由他是否根据某些既定规则做了他应该做的事情来决定。他“应该”避免的错误不是他自己的事；这是对社会的犯罪，必须作为犯罪来对待。
The conflict with which we have to deal is, indeed, a quite fundamental one between two irreconcilable types of social organization, which, from the most characteristic forms in which they appear, have often been described as the commercial and the military type of society. The terms were, perhaps, unfortunate, because they direct attention to unessentials and make it difficult to see that we face a real alternative and that there is no third possibility. Either both the choice and the risk rest with the individual or he is relieved of both. The army does, indeed, in many ways represent the closest approach familiar to us to the second type of organization, where work and worker alike are allotted by authority and where, if the available means are scanty, everybody is alike put on short-commons.
我们必须应对的冲突，实际上是在两种不可调和的社会组织之间的一个非常根本的冲突，这两种社会组织从其最典型的表现形式来看，通常被描述为商业型社会和军事型社会。这些术语也许是不幸的，因为它们把注意力引向了无关紧要的事情上，并使人们难以看到，我们正面临着一个真正的选择，而且没有第三种可能性。要么选择和风险都由个人承担，要么他可以免除选择和风险。军队的确在许多方面代表了我们最熟悉的第二种组织，在这种组织中，工作和工人都是由权威分配的，而且，如果可用手段不足，那么每个人都会被置于同样的困境。
That proposals of this sort have in the past proved so little acceptable is due to the fact that those who are willing to surrender their freedom for security have always demanded that if they give up their full freedom it should also be taken from those not prepared to do so. For this claim it is difficult to find a justification.
过去，这类建议很少被接受，这是因为那些愿意为了安全而放弃自由的人总是要求，如果他们放弃全部自由，那些不愿意这样做的人也应该放弃自由。很难为这种要求找到正当理由。
In a society used to freedom it is unlikely that many people would be ready deliberately to purchase security at this price. But the policies which are now followed everywhere, which hand out the privilege of security, now to this group and now to that, are nevertheless rapidly creating conditions in which the striving for security tends to become stronger than the love of freedom. The reason for this is that with every grant of complete security to one group the insecurity of the rest necessarily increases.
And the essential element of security which the competitive system offers, the great variety of opportunities, is more and more reduced.
在一个习惯于自由的社会里，不太可能有很多人会准备好故意以这种价格购买安全。但是，现在各地都在遵循的政策，即发放安全特权，现在给这个群体，现在给那个群体，却正在迅速创造条件，使对安全的追求往往变得比对自由的热爱更为强烈。其原因在于，对一个群体完全提供安全，必然会增加其他群体的不安全感。
而竞争体系提供的安全要素，即机会的多样性，正日益减少。
The utter hopelessness of the position of those who, in a society which has thus grown rigid, are left outside the range of sheltered occupation, and the magnitude of the gulf which separates them from the fortunate possessors of jobs for whom protection against competition has made it unnecessary to budge ever so little to make room for those without, can be appreciated only by those who have experienced it.
It is not a question of the fortunate ones’ giving up their places, but merely that they should share in the common misfortune by some reduction of their incomes, or frequently even merely by some sacrifice of their prospects of improvement.
There has never been a worse and more cruel exploitation of one class by another than that of the weaker or less fortunate members of a group of producers by the well-established which has been made possible by the “regulation” of competition.
在一个变得僵化的社会中，那些被排除在受保护的职业范围之外的人的处境是绝对没有希望的，他们与那些幸运的拥有工作的人之间的鸿沟是巨大的，后者的工作是受到保护的，不需要为那些没有的人挪出哪怕一点点地方，只有那些经历过的人才能体会到这一点。
这不是幸运者放弃自己的位置的问题，而只是他们应该通过减少收入来分担共同的不幸，或者更常见的是，只是通过牺牲改善的前景来分担共同的不幸。
从来没有一个阶级对另一个阶级的剥削比生产者集团中较弱或较不幸的成员对老牌生产者的剥削更糟糕、更残酷。正是竞争的“调节”使这种剥削成为可能。
and, what is worse, the greater becomes the contrast between the security of those to whom it is granted as a privilege and the ever increasing insecurity of the underprivileged. And the more security becomes a privilege, and the greater the danger to those excluded from it, the higher will security be prized. As the number of the privileged increases and the difference between their security and the insecurity of the others increases, a completely new set of social values gradually arises. It is no longer independence but security which gives rank and status, the certain right to a pension more than confidence in his making good which makes a young man eligible for marriage, while insecurity becomes the dreaded state of the pariah in which those who in their youth have been refused admission to the haven of a salaried position remain for life.
更糟糕的是，那些被赋予特权的人的安全与那些没有特权的人的日益增多的不安全之间的反差就越大。而且，安全越成为一种特权，那些被排斥在安全之外的人的危险就越大，安全就越是受到珍视。
随着特权阶层的人数增加，以及他们的安全与其他人的不安全之间的差异增加，一套全新的社会价值观将逐渐形成。不再是独立，而是安全，赋予人们等级和地位，获得养老金的确定权利，而不是对自己前途的信心，使一个年轻人有资格结婚，而不安全则成为可憎的贱民状态，那些年轻时被剥夺了带薪职位的人终身都是贱民。
We cannot blame our young men when they prefer the safe, salaried position to the risk of enterprise after they have heard from their earliest youth the former described as the superior, more unselfish and disinterested occupation. The younger generation of today has grown up in a world in which in school and press the spirit of commercial enterprise has been represented as disreputable and the making of profit as immoral, where to employ a hundred people is represented as exploitation but to command the same number as honorable.
我们不能责怪我们的年轻人，因为他们宁愿选择安全、有薪水的职位，也不愿承担企业风险，因为他们从很小的时候起就被告知前者是优越的、更无私和无私的职业。今天的年轻一代成长于这样一个世界：在学校和媒体中，商业精神被描绘成不名誉的，谋利被描绘成不道德的，雇用一百人被描绘成剥削，而指挥同样数量的人却被描绘成可敬的。
While it is doubtful whether the spirit of freedom can anywhere be extirpated by force, it is not certain that any people would successfully withstand the process by which it was slowly smothered in Germany. Where distinction and rank are achieved almost exclusively by becoming a salaried servant of the state, where to do one’s assigned duty is regarded as more laudable than to choose one’s own field of usefulness, where all pursuits that do not give a recognized place in the official hierarchy or a claim to a fixed income are regarded as inferior and even somewhat disreputable, it is too much to expect that many will long prefer freedom to security.
In this state it is little surprising that more and more people should come to feel that without economic security liberty is “not worth having” and that they are willing to sacrifice their liberty for security.
自由的精神是否可能在任何地方被武力根除，这是值得怀疑的，但并非确定无疑的是，任何民族都能成功地经受住自由精神在德国被慢慢扼杀的过程。在德国，一个人要想出人头地，几乎唯一的途径就是成为国家的领薪俸的仆人；在德国，人们认为，做好分内之事比选择自己有用武之地更值得称道；在德国，所有不能在官方等级制度中占据一席之地或获得固定收入的职业都被视为低人一等，甚至有些声名狼藉，因此，指望许多人长久地宁愿选择自由而不选择安全，未免有些一厢情愿。
在这种状态下，越来越多的人感到，如果没有经济保障，自由是“不值得拥有的”，他们愿意牺牲自己的自由来换取安全，这并不奇怪。
It is essential that we should relearn frankly to face the fact that freedom can be had only at a price and that as individuals we must be prepared to make severe material sacrifices to preserve our liberty.
If we want to retain this, we must regain the conviction on which the rule of liberty in the Anglo-Saxon countries has been based and which Benjamin Franklin expressed in a phrase applicable to us in our lives as individuals no less than as nations: “Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.”
我们必须坦率地重新认识到这样一个事实，即自由是有代价的，作为个人，我们必须准备好做出巨大的物质牺牲，以维护我们的自由。
我们必须重新获得盎格鲁-撒克逊国家自由规则所基于的信念，本杰明·富兰克林用一个短语表达了这一点，这个短语不仅适用于我们的个人生活，也适用于我们的国家生活：“那些放弃基本自由以换取一点暂时安全的人，既不配享有自由，也不配享有安全。”
There are also serious problems of international relations which arise if mere citizenship of a country confers the right to a standard of living higher than elsewhere and which ought not to be dismissed too lightly. 如果一个国家的公民身份赋予了比其他地方更高的生活水平，那么就会出现一些严重的国际关系问题，这些问题不应被轻视。
H. J. Laski, Liberty in the Modern State (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1937), Pelican Books ed., p. 51: “Those who know the normal life of the poor, its haunting sense of impending disaster, its fitful search for beauty which perpetually eludes, will realise well enough that, without economic security, liberty is not worth having.”
H·J·拉斯基，《现代国家中的自由》（哈蒙德斯沃斯：企鹅图书有限公司，1937年），鹈鹕图书版，第51页：“那些了解穷人的正常生活、其挥之不去的灾难感、其对不断逃避的美的断断续续的追求的人，会充分意识到，没有经济保障，自由就不值得拥有。”

Ten: Why the Worst Get on Top

It is the belief that the most repellent features of the totalitarian regimes are due to the historical accident that they were established by groups of blackguards and thugs.
Why should it not be possible that the same sort of system, if it be necessary to achieve important ends, be run by decent people for the good of the community as a whole?
这种信念认为，极权政权的最可憎特征是由于历史偶然性造成的，这些政权的建立是由一群恶棍和暴徒造成的。
如果有必要实现重要目标，为什么不可能由正派的人为了整个社会的利益而管理同样的制度呢？
Just as the democratic statesman who sets out to plan economic life will soon be confronted with the alternative of either assuming dictatorial powers or abandoning his plans, so the totalitarian dictator would soon have to choose between disregard of ordinary morals and failure. It is for this reason that the unscrupulous and uninhibited are likely to be more successful in a society tending toward totalitarianism. Who does not see this has not yet grasped the full width of the gulf which separates totalitarianism from a liberal regime, the utter difference between the whole moral atmosphere under collectivism and the essentially individualist Western civilization.
正如民主政治家着手规划经济生活时，很快就会面临要么掌握独裁权力，要么放弃计划的选择一样，极权主义独裁者很快就会在无视普通道德和失败之间做出选择。正因为如此，在一个趋向极权主义的社会中，肆无忌惮的人可能更成功。谁没有看到这一点，谁还没有充分认识到极权主义与自由主义制度之间的鸿沟，集体主义下的整个道德氛围与本质上属于个人主义的西方文明之间的截然不同。
The “moral basis of collectivism” has, of course, been much debated in the past; but what concerns us here is not its moral basis but its moral results.
The ruling moral views will depend partly on the qualities that will lead individuals to success in a collectivist or totalitarian system and partly on the requirements of the totalitarian machinery.
当然，“集体主义的道德基础”在过去已经过很多讨论；但这里我们所关心的不是它的道德基础，而是它的道德结果。
统治的道德观点将在一定程度上取决于将导致个人在集体主义或极权主义制度中取得成功的品质，并在一定程度上取决于极权主义机器的要求。
In this stage it is the general demand for quick and determined government action that is the dominating element in the situation, dissatisfaction with the slow and cumbersome course of democratic procedure which makes action for action’s sake the goal. It is then the man or the party who seems strong and resolute enough “to get things done” who exercises the greatest appeal. “Strong” in this sense means not merely a numerical majority—it is the ineffectiveness of parliamentary majorities with which people are dissatisfied. What they will seek is somebody with such solid support as to inspire confidence that he can carry out whatever he wants. It is here that the new type of party, organized on military lines, comes in.
在这个阶段，对政府迅速采取果断行动的普遍要求是局势中的主导因素，对缓慢而繁琐的民主程序的不满使得为了行动而采取行动成为目标。然后，似乎足够强大和果断的“做事的人”或“党派”具有最大的吸引力。“强大”在这个意义上不仅意味着数字上的多数——它是指人们对议会多数的无能为力感到不满。他们所寻求的，是拥有如此坚实的支持，以鼓舞人们相信他能够实现自己的任何愿望。正是在这里，以军事方式组织的新型政党出现了。
The chance of imposing a totalitarian regime on a whole people depends on the leader’s first collecting round him a group which is prepared voluntarily to submit to that totalitarian discipline which they are to impose by force upon the rest.
将极权主义政权强加于全体人民的机会取决于领袖首先召集一个群体，这个群体自愿服从他们准备通过武力强加给其他人的极权主义纪律。
2025/01/23 发表想法 基本上是全书主题：想要实现的目的（社会主义/共产主义）和实现目的的唯一方法（军事化/集权）是相矛盾的

原文：That socialism can be put into practice only by methods which most socialists disapprove is, of course, a lesson learned by many social reformers in the past. The old socialist parties were inhibited by their democratic ideals; they did not possess the ruthlessness required for the performance of their chosen task.
That socialism can be put into practice only by methods which most socialists disapprove is, of course, a lesson learned by many social reformers in the past. The old socialist parties were inhibited by their democratic ideals; they did not possess the ruthlessness required for the performance of their chosen task.
当然，社会主义只能通过大多数社会主义者所不赞成的方法付诸实践，这是过去许多社会改革者吸取的教训。旧的社会主义政党被他们的民主理想所束缚；他们不具备完成自己选择的任务所必需的冷酷无情。
There are three main reasons why such a numerous and strong group with fairly homogeneous views is not likely to be formed by the best but rather by the worst elements of any society. By our standards the principles on which such a group would be selected will be almost entirely negative. 为什么这样一个人数众多、观点一致的强大群体不太可能由社会中最优秀的人组成，而是由社会中最糟糕的人组成呢？根据我们的标准，这样一个群体所依据的原则几乎完全是负面的。
In the first instance, it is probably true that, in general, the higher the education and intelligence of individuals become, the more their views and tastes are differentiated and the less likely they are to agree on a particular hierarchy of values. It is a corollary of this that if we wish to find a high degree of uniformity and similarity of outlook, we have to descend to the regions of lower moral and intellectual standards where the more primitive and “common” instincts and tastes prevail. This does not mean that the majority of people have low moral standards; it merely means that the largest group of people whose values are very similar are the people with low standards.
If a numerous group is needed, strong enough to impose their views on the values of life on all the rest, it will never be those with highly differentiated and developed tastes—it will be those who form the “mass” in the derogatory sense of the term, the least original and independent, who will be able to put the weight of their numbers behind their particular ideals.
首先，总体而言，个人的受教育程度和智力水平越高，他们的观点和品味就越不同，就越不可能在特定的价值等级制度上达成一致。由此可以推断，如果我们希望找到高度统一和相似的观点，就必须深入到道德和智力水平较低的地区，在那里，更原始和“普通”的本能和品味占主导地位。这并不意味着大多数人的道德标准较低；这仅仅意味着，价值观非常相似的最大群体是道德标准较低的人。
如果需要一个人数众多、强大到足以将自己的价值观强加于所有其他人的群体，那么这个群体将永远不会是那些拥有高度分化和发达的品味的人，而将是那些在贬义上形成“大众”的人，他们是最缺乏独创性和独立性的，他们将能够用自己的人数来支持自己特定的理想。
One of the inherent contradictions of the collectivist philosophy is that, while basing itself on the humanistic morals which individualism has developed, it is practicable only within a relatively small group. That socialism so long as it remains theoretical is internationalist, while as soon as it is put into practice, whether in Russia or in Germany, it becomes violently nationalist, is one of the reasons why “liberal socialism” as most people in the Western world imagine it is purely theoretical, while the practice of socialism is everywhere totalitarian. Collectivism has no room for the wide humanitarianism of liberalism but only for the narrow particularism of the totalitarian.
集体主义哲学的内在矛盾之一是，虽然它以个人主义发展起来的人道主义为基础，但它只在一个相对较小的群体中是可行的。社会主义只要仍然是理论上的，那就是国际主义的，而一旦付诸实践，无论是俄罗斯还是德国，它就会变成强烈的民族主义，这就是为什么“自由社会主义”在西方世界的大多数人看来纯粹是理论上的，而社会主义的实践在任何地方都是极权主义的。集体主义没有自由主义那种广泛的人道主义的空间，而只有极权主义的狭隘的特殊主义。
If the “community” or the state are prior to the individual, if they have ends of their own independent of and superior to those of the individuals, only those individuals who work for the same ends can be regarded as members of the community. It is a necessary consequence of this view that a person is respected only as a member of the group, that is, only if and in so far as he works for the recognized common ends, and that he derives his whole dignity only from this membership and not merely from being a man. Indeed, the very concepts of humanity and therefore of any form of internationalism are entirely products of the individualist view of man, and there can be no place for them in a collectivist system of thought. 如果“社区”或国家优先于个人，如果它们有自己的独立于个人并高于个人的目的，那么只有为共同目的而工作的个人才能被视为社区成员。这种观点的必然结果是，一个人只有作为群体的一员才受到尊重，也就是说，他只有在为公认的共同目的而工作时才受到尊重，他的全部尊严都来自于这种成员身份，而不仅仅是一个人的身份。事实上，人性以及任何形式的国际主义的概念都是个人主义观点的产物，它们在集体主义思想体系中没有立足之地。
在这些因素中，最重要的因素之一是，个人将自己与一个群体联系起来的愿望往往是自卑感的结果，因此，只有当该群体的成员资格赋予其相对于局外人的某种优越性时，他的愿望才会得到满足。
莱因霍尔德·尼布尔的《道德人与不道德社会》的标题中表达了一个深刻的真理——尽管我们很难遵循他从他的论文中得出的结论。正如他在别处所说，“现代人越来越倾向于认为自己是道德的，因为他们把自己的恶习委托给了越来越大的群体。”
They were ostentatiously imperialistic. The independence of small nations might mean something to the liberal individualist. It meant nothing to collectivists like themselves. I can still hear Sidney Webb explaining to me that the future belonged to the great administrative nations, where the officials govern and the police keep order.” And elsewhere Halévy quotes George Bernard Shaw, arguing, about the same time, that “the world is to the big and powerful states by necessity; and the little ones must come within their border or be crushed out of existence.”
他们公然表现出帝国主义倾向。对于自由个人主义者来说，小国的独立可能有些意义，但对于像他们这样的集体主义者来说，这毫无意义。我仍然可以听到西德尼·韦伯向我解释，未来属于伟大的行政国家，在那里，官员统治，警察维持秩序。”在另一个地方，埃莱维引用了乔治·伯纳德·肖的话，他同时认为，“世界必须由大国和强国统治；小国必须进入它们的边界，否则就会被消灭。”
It is even more the outcome of the fact that, in order to achieve their end, collectivists must create power—power over men wielded by other men—of a magnitude never before known, and that their success will depend on the extent to which they achieve such power.
为了实现他们的目的，集体主义者必须创造权力——由他人掌握的权力——其规模是前所未有的，而他们的成功将取决于他们实现这种权力的程度。
分割或分散权力必然会减少权力的绝对数量，竞争制度是唯一通过权力下放来最大限度减少人类对人类行使权力的制度。
From the two central features of every collectivist system, the need for a commonly accepted system of ends of the group and the all-overriding desire to give to the group the maximum of power to achieve these ends, grows a definite system of morals, which on some points coincides and on others violently contrasts with ours—but differs from it in one point which makes it doubtful whether we can call it morals: that it does not leave the individual conscience free to apply its own rules and does not even know any general rules which the individual is required or allowed to observe in all circumstances. This makes collectivist morals so different from what we have known as morals that we find it difficult to discover any principle in them, which they nevertheless possess.
从每个集体主义制度的两个中心特征来看，即需要一个被普遍接受的集体目标体系，以及给予集体最大权力以实现这些目标的压倒一切的愿望，由此产生了一个明确的道德体系，它在某些方面与我们的道德相一致，在另一些方面则与之形成强烈对比——但在一点上与我们的道德不同，这一点使我们怀疑我们是否应该称它为道德：它不允许个人良知自由地运用自己的规则，甚至不知道个人在所有情况下被要求或允许遵守的一般规则。这使得集体主义道德与我们所知道的道德如此不同，我们很难发现它们所拥有的任何原则。
Though we may sometimes be forced to choose between different evils, they remain evils.
虽然我们有时可能被迫在不同的邪恶之间做出选择，但它们仍然是邪恶的。
The principle that the end justifies the means is in individualist ethics regarded as the denial of all morals. In collectivist ethics it becomes necessarily the supreme rule; there is literally nothing which the consistent collectivist must not be prepared to do if it serves “the good of the whole,” because the “good of the whole” is to him the only criterion of what ought to be done.
在个人主义伦理学中，目的证明手段正确的原则被视为对所有道德的否定。在集体主义伦理学中，它必然成为至高无上的原则；如果“整体利益”需要，一个坚定的集体主义者必须愿意做任何事情，因为“整体利益”是他应该做什么的唯一标准。
The reason why we designate these qualities as “useful habits” and can hardly describe them as moral virtues is that the individual could never be allowed to put these rules above any definite orders or to let them become an obstacle to the achievement of any of the particular aims of his community. They only serve, as it were, to fill any gaps which direct orders or the designation of particular aims may leave, but they can never justify a conflict with the will of the authority.
我们之所以把这些品质称为“有用的习惯”，而很难把它们描述为道德美德，是因为个人永远不能把这些规则置于任何明确的命令之上，也不能让它们成为实现其社区任何特定目标的障碍。这些品质似乎只是用来填补直接命令或指定特定目标可能留下的任何空白，但它们永远不能证明与当局意愿的冲突是合理的。
the intensity of the moral emotions behind a movement like that of National Socialism or communism can probably be compared only to those of the great religious movements of history. Once you admit that the individual is merely a means to serve the ends of the higher entity called society or the nation, most of those features of totalitarian regimes which horrify us follow of necessity.
民族社会主义或共产主义等运动背后的道德情感的强烈程度可能只能与历史上伟大的宗教运动相提并论。
一旦你承认个人只是服务于被称为社会或国家的更高实体目的的手段，大多数极权主义政权的恐怖特征必然随之而来。
Where there is one common all-overriding end, there is no room for any general morals or rules.
There is always in the eyes of the collectivist a greater goal which these acts serve and which to him justifies them because the pursuit of the common end of society can know no limits in any rights or values of any individual.
只要有一个至高无上的共同目标，任何一般性的道德或规则都没有立足之地。
在集体主义者眼中，总有一个更大的目标，这些行为是为这个目标服务的，对他来说，这些行为是正当的，因为追求社会的共同目标不能以任何个人的任何权利或价值为限。
To be a useful assistant in the running of a totalitarian state, it is not enough that a man should be prepared to accept specious justification of vile deeds; he must himself be prepared actively to break every moral rule he has ever known if this seems necessary to achieve the end set for him.
Since it is the supreme leader who alone determines the ends, his instruments must have no moral convictions of their own. They must, above all, be unreservedly committed to the person of the leader; but next to this the most important thing is that they should be completely unprincipled and literally capable of everything.
The only tastes which are satisfied are the taste for power as such and the pleasure of being obeyed and of being part of a well-functioning and immensely powerful machine to which everything else must give way.
要在极权主义国家的运行中成为一个有用的助手，一个人不仅要准备好接受卑鄙行为的似是而非的辩解，而且他本人还必须准备好积极地打破他所知道的一切道德准则，如果这样做似乎是实现为他设定的目标所必需的。
既然只有最高领导人才能决定目标，那么他的工具就必须没有自己的道德信念。最重要的是，他们必须全心全意地忠于领袖；其次，最重要的是，他们应该完全没有原则，什么都做得出来。他们必须没有自己想要实现的理想；没有关于对错的想法，这些想法可能会干扰领导者的意图。
唯一得到满足的品味是对权力的品味，以及被服从的乐趣，以及成为一台运转良好和功能强大的机器的一部分的乐趣，这台机器必须让一切让路。
And as there will be need for actions which are bad in themselves, and which all those still influenced by traditional morals will be reluctant to perform, the readiness to do bad things becomes a path to promotion and power.
It is only too true when a distinguished American economist concludes from a similar brief enumeration of the duties of the authorities of a collectivist state that “they would have to do these things whether they wanted to or not: and the probability of the people in power being individuals who would dislike the possession and exercise of power is on a level with the probability that an extremely tender-hearted person would get the job of whipping-master in a slave plantation.”
由于需要有人去做那些本身是坏事的行为，而且所有那些仍受传统道德影响的人都不愿去执行，因此，做好事成为晋升和获得权力的途径。
一位杰出的美国经济学家从对集体主义国家当局职责的类似简短列举中得出结论：“无论他们是否愿意，他们都必须做这些事情：掌权的人是那些不喜欢拥有和行使权力的人的可能性，与一个非常心软的人在奴隶种植园担任鞭打主人的可能性一样。”
And this leads us to one of the most characteristic moral features of totalitarianism: its relation to, and its effect on, all the virtues falling under the general heading of truthfulness.
这使我们想到了极权主义最具特色的道德特征之一：它与所有美德的关系及其影响，这些美德都包含在“诚实”这个总标题之下。
“But tell me, I pray, my brethren: if the goal be lacking to humanity, is not humanity itself lacking?” “但是告诉我，我祈祷，我的兄弟们：如果人类缺乏目标，难道人类本身就不缺乏吗？” [Hayek quotes from Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra; the passage appears at the end of chapter 15. —Ed.]
In his Moral Man and Immoral Society, op cit., Niebuhr examined the implications of the idea that social groups often engage in practices that would be considered repugnant on the individual level. —Ed.]
在他的《道德的人与不道德的社会》（同上）一书中，尼布尔考察了这样一种观点的含义，即社会群体常常从事在个人层面上被认为可憎的实践。）
We must not allow ourselves to be deceived by the fact that the word “power,” apart from the sense in which it is used with respect to human beings, is also used in an impersonal (or rather anthropomorphic) sense for any determining cause. Of course, there will always be something that determines everything that happens, and in this sense the amount of power existing must always be the same. But this is not true of the power consciously wielded by human beings. 我们决不能让自己被这样一个事实所欺骗：“权力”这个词除了在涉及人类的意义上使用外，还用于任何决定性原因的非个人（或者更确切地说，拟人化）意义上。当然，总会有一些东西决定着所发生的一切，从这个意义上说，存在的权力数量必须始终相同。但是，人类有意识地挥舞的权力并非如此。

Eleven: The End of Truth

It is significant that the nationalization of thought has proceeded everywhere pari passu with the nationalization of industry. —E. H. Carr 思想国有化与工业国有化齐头并进，这一点意义重大。——E·H·卡尔
The most effective way of making everybody serve the single system of ends toward which the social plan is directed is to make everybody believe in those ends. To make a totalitarian system function efficiently, it is not enough that everybody should be forced to work for the same ends. It is essential that the people should come to regard them as their own ends. Although the beliefs must be chosen for the people and imposed upon them, they must become their beliefs, a generally accepted creed which makes the individuals as far as possible act spontaneously in the way the planner wants. If the feeling of oppression in totalitarian countries is in general much less acute than most people in liberal countries imagine, this is because the totalitarian governments succeed to a high degree in making people think as they want them to.
要使每个人服务于社会计划所指向的单一目标体系，最有效的方法是让每个人相信这些目标。要使极权主义体系高效运转，仅仅强迫每个人为同一个目标工作是不够的。人民必须将这些目标视为他们自己的目标，这一点至关重要。虽然这些信仰必须由人民选择并强加于他们，但它们必须成为他们的信仰，一种被普遍接受的信条，使个人尽可能地按照计划者希望的方式自发地行事。虽然极权主义国家的压迫感通常比自由国家的大多数人想象的要轻得多，但这是因为极权主义政府在很大程度上成功地让人们按照他们希望的方式思考。
We have seen that agreement on that complete ethical code, that all-comprehensive system of values which is implicit in an economic plan, does not exist in a free society but would have to be created.
我们已经看到，在经济计划中隐含的完整的道德准则和全面的价值体系，在自由社会中是不存在的，但必须加以创造。
创造一个“神话”来证明其行为的正当性，这一过程不一定是自觉的。这位极权主义领袖可能仅仅出于一种本能的厌恶，来指导他的行为，这种厌恶来自于他所发现的事情的状态，以及创造一种新的等级秩序的愿望，这种新秩序更符合他对功绩的构想；
为另一个神话提供了基础：“血与土”（Blut und Boden），它不仅表达了终极价值观，而且表达了关于因果关系的整套信仰，一旦这些信仰成为指导整个社会活动的理想，就不得质疑。
The most effective way of making people accept the validity of the values they are to serve is to persuade them that they are really the same as those which they, or at least the best among them, have always held, but which were not properly understood or recognized before. The people are made to transfer their allegiance from the old gods to the new under the pretense that the new gods really are what their sound instinct had always told them but what before they had only dimly seen.
要让人们接受他们所服务的价值观的有效性，最有效的方法是说服他们，这些价值观实际上与他们，或他们中至少是最优秀的人所一直持有的价值观相同，只是以前没有被正确理解或认可。人们被说服将他们的忠诚从旧神转移到新神，借口是新神确实是他们一直明智的本能所告诉他们的，而以前他们只是模糊地看到了这一点。
It is not difficult to deprive the great majority of independent thought. But the minority who will retain an inclination to criticize must also be silenced.
As the Webbs report of the position in every Russian enterprise: “Whilst the work is in progress, any public expression of doubt, or even fear that the plan will not be successful, is an act of disloyalty and even of treachery because of its possible effects on the will and on the efforts of the rest of the staff.”
剥夺绝大多数人的独立思想并不难。但是，必须让那些保留批评倾向的少数人保持沉默。
正如韦伯夫妇在报告中对俄罗斯企业现状的描述：“尽管工作正在进行中，但任何公开表达的质疑，甚至担心该计划不会成功，都是一种不忠甚至背叛的行为，因为它可能会影响其他员工的意愿和努力。”
There is consequently no field where the systematic control of information will not be practiced and uniformity of views not enforced.
因此，没有哪个领域不会实行对信息的系统控制，也不会强制执行意见的一致性。
That in the disciplines dealing directly with human affairs and therefore most immediately affecting political views, such as history, law, or economics, the disinterested search for truth cannot be allowed in a totalitarian system, and the vindication of the official views becomes the sole object, is easily seen and has been amply confirmed by experience.
在直接处理人类事务、因此最直接地影响政治观点的学科中，如历史、法律或经济学，在极权主义体制中不允许对真理的无私追求，为官方观点辩护成为唯一的目标，这一点很容易看到，并且已经得到了经验的充分证实。
In particular, they all seem to have in common an intense dislike of the more abstract forms of thought—a dislike characteristically also shown by many of the collectivists among our scientists. Whether the theory of relativity is represented as a “Semitic attack on the foundation of Christian and Nordic physics” or opposed because it is “in conflict with dialectical materialism and Marxist dogma” comes very much to the same thing. Nor does it make much difference whether certain theorems of mathematical statistics are attacked because they “form part of the class struggle on the ideological frontier and are a product of the historical role of mathematics as the servant of the bourgeoisie,” or whether the whole subject is condemned because “it provides no guaranty that it will serve the interest of the people.”
According to the Webbs, the Journal for Marxist-Leninist Natural Sciences has the following slogans: “We stand for Party in Mathematics. We stand for the purity of Marxist-Leninist theory in surgery.” The situation seems to be very similar in Germany.
它们似乎都有一个共同点，那就是对更抽象形式的思想的强烈反感——许多科学家中的集体主义者也表现出这种反感。无论是把相对论描述为“对基督教和北欧物理学基础的闪米特攻击”，还是因为它“与辩证唯物主义和马克思主义教条相冲突”而反对它，结果都是一样的。攻击数学统计学中的某些定理，是因为它们“构成了思想战线上的阶级斗争，是数学作为资产阶级奴仆的历史作用的产物”，还是因为整个学科遭到谴责，是因为“它不能保证为人民服务”，这似乎并不重要。
《马克思主义-列宁主义自然科学杂志》有如下口号：“我们支持数学中的党性。我们支持外科手术中马克思列宁主义理论的纯洁性。”德国的情况似乎非常相似。
It is entirely in keeping with the whole spirit of totalitarianism that it condemns any human activity done for its own sake and without ulterior purpose. Science for science’s sake, art for art’s sake, are equally abhorrent to the Nazis, our socialist intellectuals, and the communists. Every activity must derive its justification from a conscious social purpose. There must be no spontaneous, unguided activity, because it might produce results which cannot be foreseen and for which the plan does not provide.
I leave it to the reader to guess whether it was in Germany or in Russia that chess-players were officially exhorted that “we must finish once and for all with the neutrality of chess. We must condemn once and for all the formula ‘chess for the sake of chess’ like the formula ‘art for art’s sake.’”
这完全符合极权主义的精神，它谴责任何以自身为目的、没有其他目的的人类活动。为科学而科学，为艺术而艺术，对纳粹分子、我们的社会主义知识分子和共产主义者来说同样可憎。每项活动都必须从一种有意识的社会目的中获得正当性。决不能有自发的、无指导的活动，因为它可能会产生无法预见的结果，而计划中没有提供这些结果。
我让读者猜测，是德国还是俄罗斯正式劝告国际象棋棋手“我们必须彻底结束国际象棋的中立性。我们必须像‘为艺术而艺术’的公式一样，彻底谴责‘为下棋而下棋’的公式。”
The general intellectual climate which this produces, the spirit of complete cynicism as regards truth which it engenders, the loss of the sense of even the meaning of truth, the disappearance of the spirit of independent inquiry and of the belief in the power of rational conviction, the way in which differences of opinion in every branch of knowledge become political issues to be decided by authority, are all things which one must personally experience—no short description can convey their extent. Perhaps the most alarming fact is that contempt for intellectual liberty is not a thing which arises only once the totalitarian system is established but one which can be found everywhere among intellectuals who have embraced a collectivist faith and who are acclaimed as intellectual leaders even in countries still under a liberal regime.
由此产生的一般知识氛围，它产生的对真理的完全玩世不恭的精神，对真理甚至意义的丧失，独立探究精神的消失和对理性确信力量的信念，所有这些都必须亲身经历——简短的描述无法传达其程度。也许最令人震惊的事实是，对知识自由的蔑视并不是只有在极权主义制度确立后才出现的事情，而是在知识分子中随处可见的事情，他们信奉集体主义信仰，甚至在仍然处于自由制度下的国家也被誉为知识领袖。
The desire to force upon the people a creed which is regarded as salutary for them is, of course, not a thing that is new or peculiar to our time. New, however, is the argument by which many of our intellectuals try to justify such attempts. There is no real freedom of thought in our society, so it is said, because the opinions and tastes of the masses are shaped by propaganda, by advertising, by the example of the upper classes, and by other environmental factors which inevitably force the thinking of the people into well-worn grooves. From this it is concluded that if the ideals and tastes of the great majority are always fashioned by circumstances which we can control, we ought to use this power deliberately to turn the thoughts of the people in what we think is a desirable direction.
当然，强迫人民接受一种被认为对他们有益的信条的愿望，并不是我们这个时代所特有的。然而，许多知识分子试图为这种尝试辩护的论点是新的。我们社会中没有真正的思想自由，因为大众的观点和品味是由宣传、广告、上层阶级的榜样以及其他环境因素塑造的，这些因素不可避免地迫使人民的思想进入陈旧的轨道。由此得出结论，如果大多数人的理想和品味总是由我们能够控制的环境塑造的，那么我们就应该有意识地利用这种力量，将人民的思想转向我们认为可取的方向。
Probably it is true enough that the great majority are rarely capable of thinking independently, that on most questions they accept views which they find ready-made, and that they will be equally content if born or coaxed into one set of beliefs or another. In any society freedom of thought will probably be of direct significance only for a small minority. But this does not mean that anyone is competent, or ought to have power, to select those to whom this freedom is to be reserved.
大多数人很少能够独立思考，在大多数问题上，他们接受现成的观点，如果生来或被诱使接受一套信仰，他们也会同样满意。在任何社会中，思想自由可能只会对少数人产生直接影响。但这并不意味着任何人都有能力，或者应该有权，来选择哪些人应该享受这种自由。这当然不能证明任何群体都有权利决定人们应该思考或相信什么。
This interaction of individuals, possessing different knowledge and different views, is what constitutes the life of thought. The growth of reason is a social process based on the existence of such differences.
The idea that the human mind ought “consciously” to control its own development confuses individual reason, which alone can “consciously control” anything, with the interpersonal process to which its growth is due. By attempting to control it, we are merely setting bounds to its development and must sooner or later produce a stagnation of thought and a decline of reason.
具有不同知识和不同观点的个人之间的这种相互作用，构成了思想的生活。理性的增长是一个基于这种差异存在的社会过程。
人类思想应该“有意识地”控制自身发展的观点，混淆了唯一能够“有意识地控制”任何事物的个人理性，与导致其发展的人际过程。通过试图控制它，我们只是在为它的发展设定界限，迟早会导致思想停滞和理性衰退。
The tragedy of collectivist thought is that, while it starts out to make reason supreme, it ends by destroying reason because it misconceives the process on which the growth of reason depends. It may indeed be said that it is the paradox of all collectivist doctrine and its demand for “conscious” control or “conscious” planning that they necessarily lead to the demand that the mind of some individual should rule supreme—while only the individualist approach to social phenomena makes us recognize the superindividual forces which guide the growth of reason. Individualism is thus an attitude of humility before this social process and of tolerance to other opinions and is the exact opposite of that intellectual hubris which is at the root of the demand for comprehensive direction of the social process.
集体主义思想的悲剧在于，它开始时让理性占据至高无上的地位，最终却毁灭了理性，因为它错误理解了理性发展的过程。确实可以说，所有集体主义信条及其对“有意识”控制或“有意识”规划的要求，都必然导致要求某些个人的思想占据至高无上的地位，而只有对社会现象采取个人主义态度，我们才能认识到引导理性发展的超个人力量。因此，个人主义是面对这一社会过程保持谦卑的态度，对其他意见持宽容态度，与知识傲慢恰恰相反，知识傲慢是全面指导社会过程的要求的根源。
Blut und Boden, a term first introduced by the historian Oswald Spengler, was the doctrine that the state rightly consists of people of a uniform race on their own land.
“血与土”（Blut und Boden）一词最初由历史学家奥斯瓦尔德·斯宾格勒（Oswald Spengler）提出，它是一种学说，认为国家应该由同一种族的人在自己的土地上组成。
[Plato’s “noble lies” refers to the lies that the leaders of a republic must tell to get each person to fulfill the function that the leaders thought best suited his nature, thereby ensuring a stable society. The French philosopher Georges Sorel (1847–1922) argued that to be successful political opposition must use violence, and that “social myths” are necessary to inspire the necessary collective action. —Ed.] 【柏拉图的“高贵的谎言”指的是，共和国领导人为了确保社会稳定，让每个人各司其职，必须向每个人撒谎。法国哲学家乔治·索雷尔（1847-1922）认为，成功的政治反对派必须使用暴力，而“社会神话”是激发必要的集体行动的必要条件。】

Twelve: The Socialist Roots of Naziism

It is a common mistake to regard National Socialism as a mere revolt against reason, an irrational movement without intellectual background. If that were so, the movement would be much less dangerous than it is. But nothing could be further from the truth or more misleading. The doctrines of National Socialism are the culmination of a long evolution of thought, a process in which thinkers who have had great influence far beyond the confines of Germany have taken part.
Their system was developed with ruthless consistency. Once one accepts the premises from which it starts, there is no escape from its logic.
将国家社会主义仅仅视为对理性的反抗、一场没有知识背景的非理性运动，是一种常见的错误。若果真如此，这场运动的危险性就会大大降低。但事实与此恰恰相反，它不仅危险得多，而且误导性也大得多。国家社会主义的教义是长期思想演变的顶点，在这一过程中，思想家们发挥了巨大影响，其波及范围远远超出了德国的界限。
他们的体系发展得前后一致，毫不留情。一旦接受其出发点，就无法逃避其逻辑。
The “German idea of the state,” as formulated by Fichte, Lassalle, and Rodbertus, is that the state is neither founded nor formed by individuals, nor an aggregate of individuals, nor is its purpose to serve any interest of individuals. It is a Volksgemeinschaft in which the individual has no rights but only duties. Claims of the individual are always an outcome of the commercial spirit. “The ideas of 1789”—liberty, equality, fraternity—are characteristically commercial ideals which have no other purpose but to secure certain advantages to individuals.
费希特、拉萨尔和罗德贝图斯所阐述的“德国国家观念”是，国家既不是由个人建立的，也不是由个人组成的，也不是为个人利益服务的。它是一个Volksgemeinschaft，其中个人没有权利，只有义务。个体的主张总是商业精神的产物。“1789年的观念”——自由、平等、博爱——是典型的商业理想，除了为个人获得某些优势之外，没有其他目的。
Sombart knew that the Germans were held in contempt by other people because they regard war as sacred—but he glories in it. To regard war as inhuman and senseless is a product of commercial views. There is a life higher than the individual life, the life of the people and the life of the state, and it is the purpose of the individual to sacrifice himself for that higher life. War is to Sombart the consummation of the heroic view of life, and the war against England is the war against the opposite ideal, the commercial ideal of individual freedom and of English comfort, which in his eyes finds its most contemptible expression in—the safety razors found in the English trenches.
桑巴特知道，德国人受到其他民族的蔑视，因为他们认为战争是神圣的——但他为此感到自豪。把战争视为不人道的和毫无意义的，是商业观点的产物。有一种生活高于个人生活、人民生活和国家生活，而个人生活的目的是为这种更高生活而牺牲自己。对桑巴特来说，战争是英雄主义人生观的顶点，而反对英国的战争则是反对相反理想的战争，即反对个人自由和英国安逸的商业理想的战争，在他看来，这种理想在英国战壕里的安全剃须刀中得到了最可鄙的体现。
State and economic life form a new unity. . . . The feeling of economic responsibility which characterizes the work of the civil servant pervades all private activity.” The new German corporative constitution of economic life, which Professor Plenge admits is not yet ripe or complete, “is the highest form of life of the state which has ever been known on earth.”
国家和经济生活形成了一个新的统一体。. . . 公务员工作中特有的经济责任感弥漫在所有私人活动中。”普伦格教授承认，德国新的经济生活社团宪法尚未成熟或完整，“是地球上所知的国家生活的最高形式。”
At first Professor Plenge still hoped to reconcile the ideal of liberty and the ideal of organization, although largely through the complete but voluntary submission of the individual to the whole. But these traces of liberal ideas soon disappear from his writings. By 1918 the union between socialism and ruthless power politics had become complete in his mind. Shortly before the end of the war he exhorted his compatriots in the socialist journal Die Glocke in the following manner: 最初，普伦格教授仍然希望调和自由理想和组织理想，尽管这主要是通过个人完全且自愿地服从整体来实现。但是，这些自由主义思想的痕迹很快就从他的著作中消失了。到 1918 年，社会主义和无情的强权政治之间的联盟在他的思想中已经根深蒂固。在战争结束前不久，他在社会主义杂志《钟声》中以如下方式劝告他的同胞：
“It is high time to recognize the fact that socialism must be power policy, because it is to be organization. Socialism has to win power: it must never blindly destroy power. And the most important and critical question for socialism in the time of war of peoples is necessarily this: what people is pre-eminently summoned to power, because it is the exemplary leader in the organization of peoples?” “是时候承认这个事实了：社会主义必须是权力政策，因为它必须是组织。社会主义必须赢得权力：它决不能盲目地破坏权力。在人民战争的时代，社会主义面临的最重要和最关键的问题必然是：哪些人民被特别召唤到权力中，因为它是人民的组织中的模范领袖？”
He is reported to have stated publicly that “Germany wants to organize Europe which up to now still lacks organization. I will explain to you now Germany’s great secret: we, or perhaps the German race, have discovered the significance of organization. While the other nations still live under the regime of individualism, we have already achieved that of organization.”
据报道，他曾公开表示：“德国希望组织欧洲，迄今为止，欧洲仍然缺乏组织。我现在就向你们解释德国的伟大秘密：我们，也许是德国种族，发现了组织的重要性。当其他国家仍然生活在个人主义制度下时，我们已经实现了组织制度。”
according to which a state with a weak government is a liberal state, and every restriction upon the freedom of the individual is conceived as the product of autocracy and militarism.”
根据这种观念，一个政府软弱无力的国家是一个自由主义国家，对个人自由的任何限制都被视为独裁和军国主义的产物。
The German, more correctly, Prussian, instinct is: the power belongs to the whole. . . . Everyone is given his place. One commands or obeys.
德国人，更确切地说，普鲁士人的本能是：权力属于全体……每个人都有自己的位置。一个人指挥或服从。
“In Prussia there existed a real state in the most ambitious meaning of the word. There could be, strictly speaking, no private persons. Everybody who lived within the system that worked with the precision of a clockwork, was in some way a link in it. The conduct of public business could therefore not be in the hands of private people, as is supposed by Parliamentarianism. It was an Amt and the responsible politician was a civil servant, a servant of the whole.” “在普鲁士，存在一个真正意义上的国家，从最雄心勃勃的意义上讲。严格来说，没有私人。每个生活在像钟表一样精确运转的制度中的人，在某种程度上都是其中的一环。因此，公共事务的管理不能像议会制所认为的那样，掌握在私人手中。它是一个行政机构，负责任的政治家是公务员，是整个国家的仆人。”
Moeller van den Bruck glories in the fact that “there are no liberals in Germany today; there are young revolutionaries, there are young conservatives. But who would be a liberal? . . . Liberalism is a philosophy of life from which German youth now turns with nausea, with wrath, with quite peculiar scorn, for there is none more foreign, more repugnant, more opposed to its philosophy.
莫勒·凡·登上·布罗克引以为豪地说：“当今德国没有自由主义者，只有年轻的革命者和保守主义者。但是谁会是自由主义者呢……自由主义是一种人生哲学，德国的年轻人现在对它感到厌恶、愤怒，带着一种特殊的蔑视，因为再也没有比它更异国、更可憎、更反对它的哲学的了。
These writers were by no means isolated phenomena. As early as 1922 a detached observer could speak of a “peculiar and, on a first glance, surprising phenomenon” then to be observed in Germany: “The fight against the capitalistic order, according to this view, is a continuation of the war against the Entente with the weapons of the spirit and of economic organization, the way which leads to practical socialism, a return of the German people to their best and noblest traditions.” 这些作家绝不是孤立的现象。早在1922年，一位超然的观察者就可以谈论德国当时观察到的“奇怪而乍一看令人惊讶的现象”：“根据这种观点，反对资本主义秩序的斗争是使用精神和经济组织的武器继续对协约国的战争，是通向实际社会主义的道路，是德国人民回归他们最好的和最高贵的传统。”
[Volksgemeinschaft might be translated as “people’s community,” though under the Nazis it was carried further to imply something like a “racially pure community.” —Ed.] （“Volksgemeinschaft”可以被翻译为“人民社区”，但在纳粹统治下，它被进一步引申为类似于“种族纯洁社区”的东西。）
[Ibid., pp. 25–26. In this passage Lensch actually said, “from the point of view of historical development, that country is to be regarded as revolutionary or not.” —Ed.] ［同上，第25-26页。在这段话中，伦施实际上说，“从历史发展的角度来看，这个国家被视为革命或不革命。”——编者。］
法学家卡尔·施米特（Carl Schmitt）
This Spenglerian formula finds its echo in an often-quoted statement of Schmitt, the leading Nazi expert on constitutional law, according to which the evolution of government proceeds “in three dialectic stages: from the absolute state of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries through the neutral state of the liberal nineteenth century to the totalitarian state in which state and society are identical.” See Carl Schmitt, Der Hüter der Verfassung (Tübingen: Mohr, 1931), p. 79.
这种斯宾格勒式的公式在卡尔·施米特（Carl Schmitt）的一句常被引用的名言中得到了呼应。施米特是研究宪法的著名纳粹专家。他认为，政府的演变经历了“三个辩证阶段：从十七、十八世纪的绝对国家，到十九世纪自由主义的中立国家，再到国家和社会合二为一的极权国家。”见卡尔·施米特，《宪法的守护者》（图宾根：莫尔出版社，1931年），第79页。

Thirteen: The Totalitarians in Our Midst

When authority presents itself in the guise of organization, it develops charms fascinating enough to convert communities of free people into totalitarian States. —The Times (London) 当权威以组织的形式出现时，它会发展出足够的魅力，将自由人的社区转变为极权国家。——《泰晤士报》（伦敦）
Probably it is true that the very magnitude of the outrages committed by the totalitarian governments, instead of increasing the fear that such a system might one day arise in more enlightened countries, has rather strengthened the assurance that it cannot happen here. When we look to Nazi Germany, the gulf which separates us seems so immense that nothing that happens there can possess relevance for any possible development here.
很可能，极权主义政府所犯暴行的严重性，非但没有增加人们对这种制度有朝一日会在更开明的国家出现的恐惧感，反而增强了人们对这种事情不可能发生在这里的信心。当我们想到纳粹德国时，将我们隔开的鸿沟似乎如此巨大，以至于那里发生的事情不可能与这里可能发生的事情有任何关联。
I shall merely quote one brief passage by Lord Keynes, describing in 1915 the “nightmare” which he found expounded in a typical German work of that period: he describes how, according to a German author, “even in peace industrial life must remain mobilised. This is what he means by speaking of the ‘militarisation of our industrial life’ [the title of the work reviewed]. Individualism must come to an end absolutely. A system of regulations must be set up, the object of which is not the greater happiness of the individual (Professor Jaffé is not ashamed to say this in so many words), but the strengthening of the organised unity of the state for the object of attaining the maximum degree of efficiency (Leistungsfähigkeit), the influence of which on individual advantage is only indirect.—This hideous doctrine is enshrined in a sort of idealism. The nation will grow into a ‘closed unity’ and will become, in fact, what Plato declared it should be—‘Der Mensch im Grossen.’
我只想引用凯恩斯勋爵的一小段话，他在1915年描述了他发现在一本典型的德国著作中阐述的“噩梦”：他描述了根据一位德国作者的说法，“即使在和平时期，工业生活也必须保持动员状态。这就是他所说的“我们的工业生活的军事化”（所评著作的标题）。个人主义必须彻底结束。必须建立一种制度，其目的不在于增进个人的最大幸福（雅费教授并不羞于如此直白地说出这一点），而在于加强国家有组织的团结，以实现最大限度的效率（Leistungsfähigkeit），这种效率对个人利益的影响只是间接的。——这种可怕的学说被奉为某种理想主义。国家将发展为一种“封闭的统一体”，并实际上成为柏拉图所宣称的“伟大的个人”。
As was also true in Germany, most of the works which are preparing the way for a totalitarian course in the democracies are the product of sincere idealists and often of men of considerable intellectual distinction.
An extensive investigation into all the subtle changes in thought and language would be necessary to make explicit what one readily enough recognizes as symptoms of a familiar development. Through meeting the kind of people who talk about the necessity of opposing “big” ideas to “small” ones and of replacing the old “static” or “partial” thinking by the new “dynamic” or “global” way, one learns to recognize that what at first appears sheer nonsense is a sign of the same intellectual attitude with whose manifestations we can alone concern ourselves here.
正如在德国一样，在民主国家为极权主义铺平道路的大部分作品都是真诚的理想主义者的产物，而且往往是具有相当学术造诣的学者。
要对思想和语言中的所有微妙变化进行广泛调查，才能明确地认识到人们很容易认为这是一种熟悉的发展的症状。通过与那些谈论有必要反对“大”思想，用新的“动态”或“全球”方式取代旧的“静态”或“局部”思维的人见面，人们就会认识到，最初看起来纯粹是无稽之谈的东西，是同一种知识态度的表现，我们在这里唯一关心的是这种知识态度的表现。
There are, perhaps, few other instances in contemporary English literature where the influence of the specific German ideas with which we are concerned is so marked as in Professor E. H. Carr’s books on the Twenty Years’ Crisis and the Conditions of Peace.
在当代英语文学中，很少有其他作品像E.H.卡尔教授的《二十年危机》和《和平条件》那样明显地受到我们所关注的特定德国思想的影响。
In the first of these two books Professor Carr frankly confessed himself an adherent of “the ‘historical school’ of realists [which] had its home in Germany and [whose] development can be traced through the great names of Hegel and Marx.” A realist, he explains, is one “who makes morality a function of politics” and who “cannot logically accept any standard of value save that of fact.” This “realism” is contrasted, in truly German fashion, with the “utopian” thought dating from the eighteenth century “which was essentially individualist in that it made the human conscience the final court of appeal.” But the old morals with their “abstract general principles” must disappear because “the empiricist treats the concrete case on its individual merits.” In other words, nothing but expediency matters, and we are even assured that “the rule pacta sunt servanda is not a moral principle.” That without abstract general principles merit becomes solely a matter of arbitrary opinion and that international treaties, if they are not morally binding, have no meaning whatever does not seem to worry Professor Carr. 在这两本书的第一本中，卡尔教授坦承自己是“现实主义‘历史学派’的拥护者，该学派起源于德国，其发展可追溯到黑格尔和马克思等伟大人物”。他解释说，现实主义者是“将道德视为政治的一个功能”的人，“除了事实之外，无法从逻辑上接受任何价值标准”。这种“现实主义”与十八世纪以来的“乌托邦”思想形成了鲜明对比，“乌托邦思想本质上是个人主义的，它将人类良知视为最终的上诉法庭”。但是，旧有的道德及其“抽象的普遍原则”必须消失，因为“经验主义者根据具体案例的个别优点来处理问题”。换句话说，只有权宜之计是重要的，我们甚至可以确信，“pacta sunt servanda规则并不是一个道德原则”。卡尔教授似乎并不担心，如果没有抽象的普遍原则，那么功绩就仅仅是一个武断意见的问题，而且如果国际条约没有道德约束力，那么它们就没有任何意义。
Professor Carr, who would presumably argue that the different views then professed in this country were merely a product of British hypocrisy. How little difference he is able to see between the ideals held in this country and those practiced by present-day Germany is best illustrated by his assertion that “it is true that when a prominent National Socialist asserts that ‘anything that benefits the German people is right, anything that harms them is wrong’ he is merely propounding the same identification of national interest with universal right which has already been established for English-speaking countries by [President] Wilson, Professor Toynbee, Lord Cecil, and many others.”
卡尔教授大概会辩称，当时英国宣称的不同观点，只是英国虚伪的产物。卡尔教授认为，英国现在所持的理想和德国现在所实践的理想几乎没有区别。他断言，“当一位著名的国家社会主义者宣称‘任何有利于德国人民的事情都是对的，任何伤害德国人民的事情都是错的’时，他只是在重申国家利益与普世权利的一致性，而这种一致性已经由【总统】威尔逊、汤因比教授、塞西尔勋爵和其他许多人为英语国家确立了。”
Does Professor Carr, for example, realize, when he asserts that “we can no longer find much meaning in the distinction familiar to nineteenth-century thought between ‘society’ and ‘state,’” that this is precisely the doctrine of Professor Carl Schmitt, the leading Nazi theoretician of totalitarianism and, in fact, the essence of the definition of totalitarianism which that author has given to that term which he himself had introduced?
Or that the view that, “the mass production of opinion is the corollary of the mass production of goods” and that, therefore, “the prejudice which the word propaganda still exerts in many minds today is closely parallel to the prejudice against control of industry and trade” is really an apology for a regimentation of opinion of the kind practiced by the Nazis?
例如，卡尔教授是否意识到，当他断言“我们再也无法在19世纪思想中熟悉的‘社会’和‘国家’之间的区别中找到很多意义”时，这正是卡尔·施米特教授的学说，即极权主义的主要纳粹理论家，事实上，这是卡尔教授自己提出的极权主义定义的本质？
或者，“舆论的大规模生产是商品大规模生产的必然结果”，因此，“今天，‘宣传’一词在许多人心目中仍然存在的偏见与对工业和贸易控制的偏见非常相似”，这种观点实际上是为纳粹的舆论控制辩解？
As he himself rightly says, “it was almost inevitable that this challenge to nineteenth-century beliefs which she had never really shared should find in Germany one of its strongest protagonists.” With all the fatalistic belief of every pseudo-historian since Hegel and Marx, this development is represented as inevitable: “We know the direction in which the world is moving, and we must bow to it or perish.”
“对十九世纪信仰的挑战几乎不可避免，而她从未真正分享过这些信仰，德国几乎不可避免地成为其中最强大的倡导者。”自黑格尔和马克思以来，所有伪史学家都抱有这种宿命论信念，这种发展被描述为不可避免的：“我们知道世界正在向哪个方向发展，我们必须顺从它，否则就会灭亡。”
Now, however, “the artificial production of some degree of autarchy is a necessary condition of orderly social existence.” To bring about a “return to a more dispersed and generalized world trade . . . by a ‘removal of trade barriers’ or by a resuscitation of the laissez faire principles of the nineteenth century” is “unthinkable.”
然而，现在，“人为地制造某种程度的自给自足是有序的社会存在的必要条件。”通过“消除贸易壁垒”或恢复19世纪的自由放任原则，实现“更加分散和普遍化的世界贸易的回归”是“不可想象的”。

原文：After all this one is hardly surprised to find a characteristic section headed “The Moral Functions of War,” in which Professor Carr condescendingly pities “the well-meaning people (especially in English-speaking countries) who, steeped in the nineteenth-century tradition, persist in regarding war as senseless and devoid of purpose,” and rejoices in the “sense of meaning and purpose” which war, “the most powerful instrument of social solidarity,” creates. This is all very familiar—but it was not in the works of English scholars that one expected to find these views. 在读完这本书后，人们不会对卡尔教授在《战争的道德功能》一节中流露出的居高临下的怜悯之情感到惊讶，他怜悯那些“沉浸在19世纪传统中，坚持认为战争毫无意义、毫无目的的善意的人们（尤其是英语国家的人们）”，并欣喜于战争这种“社会凝聚力最强大的工具”所创造的“意义和目的感”。
After all this one is hardly surprised to find a characteristic section headed “The Moral Functions of War,” in which Professor Carr condescendingly pities “the well-meaning people (especially in English-speaking countries) who, steeped in the nineteenth-century tradition, persist in regarding war as senseless and devoid of purpose,” and rejoices in the “sense of meaning and purpose” which war, “the most powerful instrument of social solidarity,” creates. This is all very familiar—but it was not in the works of English scholars that one expected to find these views. 在读完这本书后，人们不会对卡尔教授在《战争的道德功能》一节中流露出的居高临下的怜悯之情感到惊讶，他怜悯那些“沉浸在19世纪传统中，坚持认为战争毫无意义、毫无目的的善意的人们（尤其是英语国家的人们）”，并欣喜于战争这种“社会凝聚力最强大的工具”所创造的“意义和目的感”。
The influence of these scientist-politicians was of late years not often on the side of liberty: the “intolerance of reason” so frequently conspicuous in the scientific specialist, the impatience with the ways of the ordinary man so characteristic of the expert, and the contempt for anything which was not consciously organized by superior minds according to a scientific blueprint were phenomena familiar in German public life for generations before they became of significance in England. And perhaps no other country provides a better illustration of the effects on a nation of a general and thorough shift of the greater part of its educational system from the “humanities” to the “realities” than Germany between 1840 and 1940.
这些科学家-政治家的影响近年来并不经常站在自由的一边：科学专家中经常出现的“不容忍理性”，专家所特有的对普通人的方式的不耐烦，以及对任何没有按照科学蓝图由优秀头脑有意识地组织起来的事物的蔑视，这些现象在德国公众生活中几代人都司空见惯，后来才在英国变得重要起来。也许没有哪个国家能比 1840 年至 1940 年间的德国更好地说明，一个国家大部分教育体系从“人文学科”向“现实学科”的普遍而彻底的转变对一个国家的影响。
It is well known that particularly the scientists and engineers, who had so loudly claimed to be the leaders on the march to a new and better world, submitted more readily than almost any other class to the new tyranny.
众所周知，尤其是在科学家和工程师中，他们曾大声宣称自己是走向一个更美好新世界的领导者，他们比其他任何阶级都更愿意屈服于新的暴政。
It is the passage in which M. Benda speaks of the “superstition of science held to be competent in all domains, including that of morality; a superstition which, I repeat, is an acquisition of the nineteenth century. It remains to discover whether those who brandish this doctrine believe in it or whether they simply want to give the prestige of a scientific appearance to passions of their hearts, which they perfectly know are nothing but passions. It is to be noted that the dogma that history is obedient to scientific laws is preached especially by partisans of arbitrary authority. This is quite natural, since it eliminates the two realities they most hate, i.e., human liberty and the historical action of the individual.”
班达先生在这段话中谈到“科学迷信，认为科学在所有领域，包括道德领域，都是有效的；我重申，这种迷信是19世纪的产物。有待发现的是，那些挥舞这一信条的人是否相信它，或者他们是否只是想给他们心中的激情披上科学的外衣，他们完全知道这些激情只不过是激情。值得注意的是，宣扬历史服从科学规律的教条，特别是由专制权威的拥护者宣扬的。这是很自然的，因为它消除了他们最痛恨的两个现实，即人的自由和个人的历史行动。
We have already had occasion to mention one English product of this kind, a work in which, on a Marxist background, all the characteristic idiosyncrasies of the totalitarian intellectual, a hatred of almost everything which distinguishes Western civilization since the Renaissance, is combined with an approval of the methods of Inquisition.
我们已经提到过这样一种英国产品，在马克思主义的背景上，结合了极权主义知识分子所有的典型怪癖，一种对自文艺复兴以来西方文明的一切特征的仇恨，以及一种对宗教裁判所手段的赞同。
As in almost all works of this type, Dr. Waddington’s convictions are largely determined by his belief in “inevitable historical tendencies” which science is presumed to have discovered and which he derives from “the profound scientific philosophy” of Marxism, whose basic notions are “almost, if not quite, identical with those underlying the scientific approach to nature” and which his “competence to judge” tells Dr. Waddington are an advance on anything which has gone before.
And for his facile optimism that in this totalitarian system freedom of thought will be preserved, his “scientific attitude” has no better counsel than the conviction that “there must be very valuable evidence about questions which one does not need to be an expert to understand,” such as, for example, whether it is possible “to combine totalitarianism with freedom of thought.”
正如在几乎所有这类作品中一样，沃丁顿博士的信念在很大程度上取决于他对“不可避免的历史趋势”的信念，他认为科学已经发现了这些趋势，并从马克思主义的“深刻科学哲学”中推导出这些趋势，马克思主义的基本概念“即使不是完全相同，也几乎与科学对待自然的方法所基于的概念相同”，而他的“判断能力”告诉沃丁顿博士，这些概念比以往任何东西都更先进。
对于他的轻率的乐观主义，即在这个极权主义制度中，思想自由将得到保留，他的“科学态度”没有比这种信念更好的建议，即“对于人们不需要成为专家就能理解的问题，一定有非常有价值的证据”，例如，“极权主义与思想自由是否有可能结合在一起”。
They do this through their common, and often concerted, support of the monopolistic organization of industry; and it is this tendency which is the great immediate danger. While there is no reason to believe that this movement is inevitable, there can be little doubt that if we continue on the path we have been treading, it will lead us to totalitarianism. 他们通过共同、通常一致支持垄断工业组织来实现这一点；正是这种趋势构成了巨大的迫在眉睫的危险。虽然我们没有理由认为这种运动是不可避免的，但毫无疑问，如果我们继续走我们已经走过的道路，它将导致我们走向极权主义。
A state which allows such enormous aggregations of power to grow up cannot afford to let this power rest entirely in private control. Nor is the belief any less illusory that in such conditions the entrepreneurs will be long allowed to enjoy the favored position which in a competitive society is justified by the fact that, of the many who take the risks, only a few achieve the success the chances of which make the risk worth taking. It is not surprising that entrepreneurs should like to enjoy both the high income which in a competitive society the successful ones among them gain and the security of the civil servant. So long as a large sector of private industry exists side by side with the government-run industry, great industrial talent is likely to command high salaries even in fairly secure positions.
一个允许如此巨大的权力集合体发展起来的国家，不能让这种权力完全掌握在私人手中。人们同样不切实际地认为，在这种条件下，企业家将长期被允许享受优惠地位。在竞争性社会中，这种地位是合理的，因为只有少数人承担了风险，而只有少数人取得了成功，而取得成功的机会使承担风险是值得的。企业家既想享受竞争性社会中成功者获得的高收入，又想享有公务员的保障，这并不奇怪。只要私营工业的很大一部分与政府经营的工业并存，即使是在相当有保障的职位上，优秀的工业人才也可能获得高薪。
In some measure the monopolists have gained this support either by letting other groups participate in their gains or, and perhaps even more frequently, by persuading them that the formation of monopolies was in the public interest.
Every raid on the gains of monopoly, be it in the interest of particular groups or of the state as a whole, tends to create new vested interests which will help to bolster up monopoly.
But though it should be clear that, for example, the higher wages which the monopolist is in a position to pay are just as much the result of exploitation as his own profit, and are just as certain to make poorer not only all the consumers but still more all other wage-earners, not merely those who benefit from it but the public generally nowadays accept the ability to pay higher wages as a legitimate argument in favor of monopoly.
在某种程度上，垄断者获得了这种支持，要么是通过让其他集团参与他们的收益，要么，甚至更常见的是，是通过说服他们，垄断的形成符合公众利益。
对垄断收益的每一次突袭，无论是为了个别集团还是为了整个国家的利益，都倾向于产生新的既得利益，这将有助于巩固垄断。
垄断者有能力支付更高的工资，这既是他自己的利润的结果，也是剥削的结果，并且不仅会使所有消费者更贫穷，而且会使所有其他工资收入者更贫穷，而不仅仅是那些从中受益的人，如今，公众普遍接受有能力支付更高的工资作为支持垄断的合法论据。
The machinery of monopoly becomes identical with the machinery of the state, and the state itself becomes more and more identified with the interests of those who run things than with the interests of the people in general.
即使铁路、公路和航空运输，或天然气和电力供应都是不可避免的垄断，只要它们仍然是独立的垄断企业，消费者的地位无疑要比由中央控制下的“协调”垄断企业强大得多。私人垄断很少是完整的，更不可能长期存在，也不可能无视潜在的竞争。但国家垄断始终是受到国家保护的垄断，既受到潜在竞争的保护，也受到有效批评的保护。这意味着在大多数情况下，临时垄断被赋予了确保其地位的权力——这种权力几乎肯定会被使用。当本应制约和控制垄断的权力变得对保护其任命者感兴趣，当政府纠正滥用权力的行为等于承认责任，当对垄断行为的批评意味着对政府的批评，垄断成为社区仆人的希望就微乎其微了。
垄断的机制与国家的机制变得相同，而国家本身越来越与那些管理事情的人的利益相一致，而不是与一般人的利益相一致。
The problem of monopoly would not be difficult as it is if it were only the capitalist monopolist whom we have to fight. But, as has already been said, monopoly has become the danger that it is, not through the efforts of a few interested capitalists, but through the support they have obtained from those whom they have let share in their gains, and from the many more whom they have persuaded that in supporting monopoly they assist in the creation of a more just and orderly society. The fatal turning-point in the modern development was when the great movement which can serve its original ends only by fighting all privilege, the labor movement, came under the influence of anti-competition doctrines and became itself entangled in the strife for privilege. The recent growth of monopoly is largely the result of a deliberate collaboration of organized capital and organized labor where the privileged groups of labor share in the monopoly profits at the expense of the community and particularly at the expense of the poorest, those employed in the less-well-organized industries and the unemployed.
如果我们只与资本主义垄断者作斗争，垄断问题就不会像现在这样难以解决。但是，正如已经说过的那样，垄断之所以成为一种危险，不是通过少数有利益的资本家的努力，而是通过他们从那些让他们分享利润的人那里获得的支持，以及从他们说服的许多人那里获得的支持，这些人相信，支持垄断有助于建立一个更公正和有序的社会。现代发展的致命转折点是，只有通过打击一切特权才能实现其最初目的的伟大运动——劳工运动，受到了反竞争学说的影响，并自己陷入了争取特权的斗争中。垄断的近期增长在很大程度上是有组织资本和有组织劳工的蓄意合作的结果，在这种合作中，特权劳工群体以牺牲社区为代价，特别是以牺牲那些在组织较差的行业中就业和失业的最贫穷者的利益为代价，分享垄断利润。
It is one of the saddest spectacles of our time to see a great democratic movement support a policy which must lead to the destruction of democracy and which meanwhile can benefit only a minority of the masses who support it.
There is no other possibility than either the order governed by the impersonal discipline of the market or that directed by the will of a few individuals; and those who are out to destroy the first are wittingly or unwittingly helping to create the second.
这是我们这个时代最可悲的景象之一：一场伟大的民主运动支持一项必将导致民主毁灭的政策，而这项政策同时只会让支持它的少数人受益。
除了由市场的无情纪律所支配的秩序，或者由少数人的意志所指导的秩序之外，没有其他可能；而那些想要摧毁第一种秩序的人，无论是有意还是无意，都在帮助创造第二种秩序。
[The sentence, “The realist cannot logically accept any standard of value save that of fact” is found ibid., p. 28. I could not find the phrase “who makes morality a function of politics,” but the phrase “who regard ethics as a function of politics” is found on p. 54. —Ed.] （“现实主义者无法从逻辑上接受除事实以外的任何价值标准”这句话出自同上，第 28 页。我找不到“谁把道德视为政治的功能”这句话，但第 54 页找到了“谁把伦理视为政治的功能”这句话。——译注）

Fourteen: Material Conditions and Ideal Ends

They who seek nothing but their own just liberty, have always the right to win it, whenever they have the power, be the voices never so numerous that oppose it.
那些只寻求自己公正自由的人，无论反对的声音多么强烈，他们都有权在任何时候获得自由。
—John Milton –约翰·弥尔顿
Our generation likes to flatter itself that it attaches less weight to economic considerations than did its parents or grandparents. The “End of Economic Man” bids fair to become one of the governing myths of our age.
When we consider the claims for social reconstruction which are most strongly pressed, it appears that they are almost all economic in character: we have seen already that the “reinterpretation in economic terms” of the political ideals of the past, of liberty, equality, and security, is one of the main demands of people who at the same time proclaim the end of economic man. Nor can there be much doubt that in their beliefs and aspirations men are today more than ever before governed by economic doctrines, by the carefully fostered belief in the irrationality of our economic system, by the false assertions about “potential plenty,” pseudo-theories about the inevitable trend toward monopoly, and the impression created by certain much-advertised occurrences such as the destruction of stocks of raw materials or the suppression of inventions, for which competition is blamed, though they are precisely the sort of thing which could not happen under competition and which are made possible only by monopoly and usually by government-aided monopoly.
我们这一代人喜欢自欺欺人地认为，与父辈或祖辈相比，我们更少地考虑经济因素。“经济人的终结”很有希望成为我们这个时代的主导性神话之一。
当我们考虑那些最强烈要求进行社会重建的主张时，它们似乎几乎都是经济性质的：我们已经看到，对过去政治理想（自由、平等和安全）进行“经济上的重新解释”，是那些同时宣称经济人终结的人的主要要求之一。毫无疑问，当今的人们比以往任何时候都更受经济教条的支配，更受精心培育的对经济制度的非理性信念的支配，更受关于“潜在丰富”的虚假断言的支配，更受有关必然走向垄断的伪理论的支配，更受某些大肆宣传的事件（如破坏原材料库存或压制发明）所造成的印象的支配，虽然这些事件正是竞争不可能发生的那种事情，只有垄断和通常由政府资助的垄断才能使之成为可能。
It is not any contempt for material welfare, or even any diminished desire for it, but, on the contrary, a refusal to recognize any obstacles, any conflict with other aims which might impede the fulfillment of their own desires, which distinguishes our generation. Economophobia would be a more correct description of this attitude than the doubly misleading “End of Economic Man,” which suggests a change from a state of affairs which has never existed in a direction in which we are not moving. Man has come to hate, and to revolt against, the impersonal forces to which in the past he submitted, even though they have often frustrated his individual efforts.
我们这一代人的特点不是蔑视物质福利，甚至不是对物质福利的欲望降低，而是拒绝承认任何障碍，任何可能阻碍他们实现自己欲望的其他目标，与这些障碍的冲突。用“经济恐惧症”来描述这种态度比“经济人的终结”更准确，后者具有双重误导性，它暗示着一种变化，从一种从未存在过的状态转向一个我们没有移动的方向。人类已经变得憎恨和反抗过去服从的无情力量，即使这些力量经常挫败他的个人努力。
This revolt is an instance of a much more general phenomenon, a new unwillingness to submit to any rule or necessity the rationale of which man does not understand;
But there are fields where this craving for intelligibility cannot be fully satisfied and where at the same time a refusal to submit to anything we cannot understand must lead to the destruction of our civilization. Though it is natural that, as the world around us becomes more complex, our resistance grows against the forces which, without our understanding them, constantly interfere with individual hopes and plans, it is just in these circumstances that it becomes less and less possible for anyone fully to understand these forces.
A complex civilization like ours is necessarily based on the individual’s adjusting himself to changes whose cause and nature he cannot understand: why he should have more or less, why he should have to move to another occupation, why some things he wants should become more difficult to get than others, will always be connected with such a multitude of circumstances that no single mind will be able to grasp them;
这种反抗是一种更普遍现象的例证，即一种不愿屈从于人类无法理解之规则或必然性的新态度；
但在有些领域，对可理解性的渴望无法得到充分满足，同时拒绝屈从于我们无法理解的一切必然会导致我们文明的毁灭。虽然随着我们周围的世界变得越来越复杂，我们对那些不断干扰个人希望和计划、而我们又无法理解的力量的抵抗变得愈加强烈，但正是在这种环境下，任何人完全理解这些力量的可能性变得愈来愈小。
像我们这样的复杂文明，必然是以个人适应变化为基础的，而这种变化的原因和性质他无法理解：为什么他应该或多或少地得到一些，为什么他应该改变职业，为什么他想要的一些东西比其他东西更难获得，这些问题总是与无数的情况联系在一起，没有一个头脑能够理解它们；
It may, indeed, be the case that infinitely more intelligence on the part of everybody would be needed than anybody now possesses, if we were even merely to maintain our present complex civilization without anyone’s having to do things of which he does not comprehend the necessity. The refusal to yield to forces which we neither understand nor can recognize as the conscious decisions of an intelligent being is the product of an incomplete and therefore erroneous rationalism. It is incomplete because it fails to comprehend that the coordination of the multifarious individual efforts in a complex society must take account of facts no individual can completely survey. And it fails to see that, unless this complex society is to be destroyed, the only alternative to submission to the impersonal and seemingly irrational forces of the market is submission to an equally uncontrollable and therefore arbitrary power of other men.
如果我们只是想维持现有的复杂文明，而不需要任何人做他不理解必要性的事情，那么每个人确实需要比现在多得多的智力。拒绝屈服于我们既不了解也无法认识到是有意识的人做出的决定的力量，是片面和错误理性主义的产物。它之所以片面，是因为它没有认识到，在一个复杂的社会中，协调各种个人努力必须考虑到任何个人都无法完全了解的事实。它没有看到，除非这个复杂的社会被摧毁，否则屈服于市场这种非个人和看似不理性的力量之外的唯一选择，就是屈服于其他人的同样无法控制和因此专横的权力。
and where the categorical and irresponsible “it must be done at all cost” of the single-minded idealist is likely to do the greatest harm.
偏执的理想主义者所说的“不惜一切代价”这种斩钉截铁且不负责任的言论，可能会造成最大的危害。
There is little doubt that after the war wisdom in the management of our economic affairs will be even more important than before and that the fate of our civilization will ultimately depend on how we solve the economic problems we shall then face.
毫无疑问，战后管理经济事务的智慧将比以前更加重要，我们文明的命运最终将取决于我们如何解决我们将面临的经济问题。
Our hopes of avoiding the fate which threatens must indeed to a large extent rest on the prospect that we can resume rapid economic progress which, however low we may have to start, will continue to carry us upward; and the main condition for such progress is that we should all be ready to adapt ourselves quickly to a very much changed world, that no considerations for the accustomed standard of particular groups must be allowed to obstruct this adaptation, and that we learn once more to turn all our resources to wherever they contribute most to make us all richer.
我们避免威胁到我们命运的希望，确实在很大程度上取决于我们能否恢复快速的经济进步，无论我们起步多么低，这种进步将继续推动我们前进；而取得这种进步的主要条件是，我们都应准备好迅速适应一个变化很大的世界，任何考虑特定群体习惯标准的想法都不应阻碍这种适应，我们应再次学会把所有资源都投入到最能让我们致富的地方。
It may sound noble to say, “Damn economics, let us build up a decent world”—but it is, in fact, merely irresponsible. With our world as it is, with everyone convinced that the material conditions here or there must be improved, our only chance of building a decent world is that we can continue to improve the general level of wealth. The one thing modern democracy will not bear without cracking is the necessity of a substantial lowering of the standards of living in peacetime or even prolonged stationariness of its economic conditions. 说“见鬼的经济，让我们建立一个体面的世界”可能听起来很崇高，但事实上，这只是不负责任而已。鉴于我们的世界如此，每个人都确信这里或那里的生活条件必须得到改善，我们建立体面世界的唯一机会是，我们能够继续提高总体财富水平。现代民主不能忍受的一件事是，在和平时期，甚至在经济状况长期不变的情况下，必须实质性降低生活水平。
Issues in this field have become so confused that it is necessary to go back to fundamentals. What our generation is in danger of forgetting is not only that morals are of necessity a phenomenon of individual conduct but also that they can exist only in the sphere in which the individual is free to decide for himself and is called upon voluntarily to sacrifice personal advantage to the observance of a moral rule. Outside the sphere of individual responsibility there is neither goodness nor badness, neither opportunity for moral merit nor the chance of proving one’s conviction by sacrificing one’s desires to what one thinks right. Only where we ourselves are responsible for our own interests and are free to sacrifice them has our decision moral value.
As Milton said: “If every action which is good or evil in a man of ripe years were under pittance and prescription and compulsion, what were virtue but a name, what praise should then be due to well-doing, what gramercy to be sober, just, or continent?”
我们这一代人面临的危险不仅是，道德必然是一种个人行为的现象，而且它们只存在于个人可以自由决定自己的领域，并呼吁人们自愿牺牲个人利益，以遵守道德规则。在个人责任领域之外，既没有善也没有恶，既没有道德功绩的机会，也没有通过牺牲自己的欲望来证明自己的信念的机会。只有在我们自己为自己的利益负责，并自由地牺牲自己的利益时，我们的决定才有道德价值。
正如弥尔顿所说：“如果一个成熟的人的每一个善行或恶行都受到微薄报酬、时效和强制力的约束，那么美德不过是一个空洞的名字，那么对善行的赞扬，对清醒、公正或克制的感谢又有什么意义呢？”
Freedom to order our own conduct in the sphere where material circumstances force a choice upon us, and responsibility for the arrangement of our own life according to our own conscience, is the air in which alone moral sense grows and in which moral values are daily re-created in the free decision of the individual. Responsibility, not to a superior, but to one’s conscience, the awareness of a duty not exacted by compulsion, the necessity to decide which of the things one values are to be sacrificed to others, and to bear the consequences of one’s own decision, are the very essence of any morals which deserve the name. 在物质环境迫使我们做出选择的地方，我们有自由支配自己的行为，也有责任根据自己的良心安排自己的生活，只有这样，道德意识才能成长，道德价值观才能在个人的自由决定中得到每日的重塑。责任，不是对上级的责任，而是对良心的责任，意识到一种不是通过胁迫而产生的义务，有必要决定自己珍视的东西中哪些要牺牲给别人，并承担自己决定的后果，这才是任何名副其实的道德的精髓。
That in this sphere of individual conduct the effect of collectivism has been almost entirely destructive is both inevitable and undeniable. A movement whose main promise is the relief from responsibility cannot but be antimoral in its effect, however lofty the ideals to which it owes its birth.
It may even be, as has been suggested, that the passion for collective action is a way in which we now without compunction collectively indulge in that selfishness which as individuals we had learned a little to restrain.
在个人行为这个领域，集体主义的效果几乎完全是破坏性的，这是不可避免的，也是不可否认的。一个主要承诺是免除责任的运动，其效果必然是反道德的，无论它赖以产生的理想多么崇高。
正如人们所建议的那样，对集体行动的热情是我们现在毫不内疚地集体沉迷于自私自利的一种方式，而作为个人，我们学着稍微克制一下。
It is true that the virtues which are less esteemed and practiced now—independence, self-reliance, and the willingness to bear risks, the readiness to back one’s own conviction against a majority, and the willingness to voluntary cooperation with one’s neighbors—are essentially those on which the working of an individualist society rests. Collectivism has nothing to put in their place, and in so far as it already has destroyed them it has left a void filled by nothing but the demand for obedience and the compulsion of the individual to do what is collectively decided to be good. The periodical election of representatives, to which the moral choice of the individual tends to be more and more reduced, is not an occasion on which his moral values are tested or where he has constantly to reassert and prove the order of his values and to testify to the sincerity of his profession by the sacrifice of those of his values he rates lower to those he puts higher. 诚然，现在不太受重视和实践的美德——独立、自力更生、愿意承担风险、准备支持自己的信念与多数人相悖，以及愿意自愿与邻居合作——本质上正是个人主义社会赖以运转的美德。集体主义无法取代这些美德，而且它已经摧毁了这些美德，留下的空白只有对顺从的需求，以及强迫个人做集体决定的好事。定期选举代表，个人的道德选择越来越少，这不是考验他的道德价值观的机会，也不是他不断重申和证明自己的价值观秩序的机会，更不是他通过牺牲自己认为较低的价值观来证明自己职业的真诚的机会。
There is one aspect of the change in moral values brought about by the advance of collectivism which at the present time provides special food for thought. It is that the virtues which are held less and less in esteem and which consequently become rarer are precisely those on which Anglo-Saxons justly prided themselves and in which they were generally recognized to excel. The virtues these people possessed—in a higher degree than most other people, excepting only a few of the smaller nations, like the Swiss and the Dutch—were independence and self-reliance, individual initiative and local responsibility, the successful reliance on voluntary activity, noninterference with one’s neighbor and tolerance of the different and queer, respect for custom and tradition, and a healthy suspicion of power and authority.
盎格鲁-撒克斯逊人所具备的美德——除了瑞士和荷兰等少数小国，他们所具备的美德比大多数人都多——包括独立自主、自力更生、个人主动性和地方责任感、对自愿活动的成功依赖、不干涉邻居、容忍不同和奇怪的事物、尊重习俗和传统、对权力和权威的合理怀疑。
And even today the English conservative or socialist, no less than the liberal, if he travels abroad, though he may find the ideas and writings of Carlyle or Disraeli, of the Webbs or H. G. Wells, exceedingly popular in circles with which he has little in common, among Nazis and other totalitarians, if he finds an intellectual island where the tradition of Macaulay and Gladstone, of J. S. Mill or John Morley, lives, will find kindred spirits who “talk the same language” as himself— however much he himself may differ from the ideals for which these men specifically stood.
即使在今天，英国保守派或社会主义者，不亚于自由派，如果他去国外旅行，尽管他可能会发现卡莱尔或迪斯雷利、韦伯或赫伯特·乔治·威尔斯的思想和著作，在与他没有什么共同之处的圈子里非常受欢迎，在纳粹和其他极权主义者中，如果他发现麦考利和格莱斯顿、J·S·密尔或约翰·莫利的传统思想仍然存在，就会发现志趣相投的人，他们“讲着同样的语言”——无论他自己可能多么不同于这些人为之奋斗的理想。
The main feature of the new order he promises is that in it the community will “say to the individual ‘Don’t you bother about the business of getting your own living.’” In consequence, of course, “it must be the community as a whole which must decide whether or not a man shall be employed upon our resources, and how and when and in what manner he shall work,” and that the community will have “to run camps for shirkers in very tolerable conditions.”
他承诺的新秩序的主要特征是，在这个秩序中，社会将“对个人说‘不要操心谋生的事。’”因此，当然，“必须由整个社会来决定一个人是否应被雇用来利用我们的资源，以及他如何、何时、以何种方式工作，”而且，社会“必须为逃避劳动的人开办条件相当不错的劳动营”。
The American poet and critic Ezra Pound (1885–1972) was credited by T. S. Eliot as being the motivating force behind “modern” poetry. Pound lived in Italy from 1924 to 1945, where he became enamored with fascist ideas. In the early part of the war he issued broadcasts critical of democracy. He was indicted for treason after the war, but instead of being tried he was judged insane and spent over a decade in an asylum. He was released in 1958.
美国诗人和评论家埃兹拉·庞德（1885-1972）被T·S·艾略特认为是“现代”诗歌背后的推动力量。庞德从1924年到1945年居住在意大利，在那里他迷上了法西斯主义思想。战争初期，他发表了批评民主的广播讲话。战后，他被控叛国罪，但没有被审判，而是被判为精神错乱，在精神病院呆了十多年。1958年，他获释。

Fifteen: The Prospects of International Order

If most people are not willing to see the difficulty, this is mainly because, consciously or unconsciously, they assume that it will be they who will settle these questions for the others, and because they are convinced of their own capacity to do this justly and equitably.
如果大多数人不愿意看到困难，这主要是因为，他们有意识或无意识地认为，他们将为他人解决这些问题，而且他们确信自己能够公正公平地做到这一点。
To undertake the direction of the economic life of people with widely divergent ideals and values is to assume responsibilities which commit one to the use of force; it is to assume a position where the best intentions cannot prevent one from being forced to act in a way which to some of those affected must appear highly immoral.
指导有着截然不同理想和价值观的人们的经济生活，就是承担起使用武力的责任；就是承担起这样一个立场，即最好的意图也不能阻止一个人被迫以某种方式行事，而这种行为对某些受影响的人来说肯定是不道德的。
The alarming thing about these suggestions is not that they are made but that they are made in all innocence and regarded as a matter of course by decent people who are completely unaware of the moral enormity which the use of force for such purposes involves.
这些建议令人震惊之处不在于它们被提出，而在于它们被完全无辜地提出，并被体面的人理所当然地接受，而这些体面的人完全不知道为达到这些目的而使用武力所涉及的道德上的严重性。
To the worker in a poor country the demand of his more fortunate colleague to be protected against his low-wage competition by minimum-wage legislation, supposedly in his interest, is frequently no more than a means to deprive him of his only chance to better his conditions by overcoming natural disadvantages by working at wages lower than his fellows in other countries.
对于一个贫穷国家的工人来说，他的收入较高的同事要求通过最低工资立法来保护自己免受他的低工资竞争，这通常只是剥夺了他通过在工资低于其他国家工人的条件下工作来克服自然劣势、改善自己生活条件的唯一机会。
It is, in fact, one of the main advantages of federation that it can be so devised as to make most of the harmful planning difficult while leaving the way free for all desirable planning. It prevents, or can be made to prevent, most forms of restrictionism. And it confines international planning to the fields where true agreement can be reached—not only between the “interests” immediately concerned but among all those affected.
事实上，联邦制的主要优势之一就是，它可以被设计为使大多数有害的规划变得困难，同时为所有可取的规划开辟道路。它防止，或者可以防止，大多数形式的限制主义。它把国际规划限制在能够达成真正协议的领域——不仅是在直接相关的“利益”之间，而且在所有受影响的人之间。
We shall not rebuild civilization on the large scale. It is no accident that on the whole there was more beauty and decency to be found in the life of the small peoples, and that among the large ones there was more happiness and content in proportion as they had avoided the deadly blight of centralization. Least of all shall we preserve democracy or foster its growth if all the power and most of the important decisions rest with an organization far too big for the common man to survey or comprehend.
It is only where responsibility can be learned and practiced in affairs with which most people are familiar, where it is the awareness of one’s neighbor rather than some theoretical knowledge of the needs of other people which guides action, that the ordinary man can take a real part in public affairs because they concern the world he knows. Where the scope of the political measures becomes so large that the necessary knowledge is almost exclusively possessed by the bureaucracy, the creative impulses of the private person must flag.
我们不会大规模重建文明。总的来说，小民族的生活中更容易发现美丽和体面，而大民族的生活中更容易发现幸福和满足，这并不是偶然的，因为他们避免了中央集权的致命危害。如果所有权力和大多数重要决定都掌握在一个对普通人来说过于庞大而无法监督或理解的组织手中，我们最不应该维护民主或促进民主的发展。
只有在人们熟悉的事务中，责任可以被学习和实践，只有当一个人的邻居意识，而不是对其他人需求的某些理论知识指导行动时，普通人才能真正参与公共事务，因为这些事务涉及他所知道的世界。当政治措施的范围变得如此之大，以至于必要的知识几乎完全由官僚机构所拥有时，个人的创造冲动必须减弱。

Sixteen: Conclusion

The first need is to free ourselves of that worst form of contemporary obscurantism which tries to persuade us that what we have done in the recent past was all either wise or inevitable.
首先需要摆脱当代最糟糕的蒙昧主义，这种蒙昧主义试图说服我们，我们在不久以前所做的一切，要么是明智的，要么是不可避免的。
Though we neither can wish nor possess the power to go back to the reality of the nineteenth century, we have the opportunity to realize its ideals—and they were not mean. We have little right to feel in this respect superior to our grandfathers; and we should never forget that it is we, the twentieth century, and not they, who have made a mess of things. If they had not yet fully learned what was necessary to create the world they wanted, the experience we have since gained ought to have equipped us better for the task. If in the first attempt to create a world of free men we have failed, we must try again.
事实上，那些大声疾呼建立新秩序的人，最彻底地受制于那些造成了这场战争以及我们大部分苦难的思想。年轻人对统治他们大部分长辈的思想没有多少信心，这是对的。
虽然我们既不能希望也不能拥有回到 19 世纪现实的力量，但我们有机会实现它的理想——而且这些理想并不卑鄙。在这方面，我们几乎没有权利认为自己比我们的祖辈更优越；我们也永远不要忘记，把事情搞得一团糟的是我们，而不是他们。如果他们还没有完全学会创造他们想要的世界所必需的东西，那么我们后来获得的经验应该能更好地帮助我们完成这项任务。如果我们第一次试图创造一个自由人的世界失败了，我们必须再试一次。

by F. W.